316. No philosophical relation admissible with Hume that is not derived from a natural one.
317. Examination of his account of cause and effect as ‘natural relation’.
318. Double meaning of natural relation. How Hume turns it to account.
319. If an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence, how can an event be an effect the first time it is observed? Hume evades this question;
320. Still, he is a long way off the Inductive Logic, which supposes an objective sequence.
321. Can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived from sequence of feelings?
322. With Hume the only uniformity is in expectation, as determined by habit; but strength of such expectation must vary indefinitely.
323. It could not serve the same purpose as the conception of uniformity of nature.
324. Hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account of the ‘remembrance’ which determines it. Bearing of his doctrine of necessary connexion upon his argument against miracles. This remembrance, as he describes it, supposes conception of a system of nature.
326. This explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objective character to causation.