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[ NOTE M, p. 247. The author is sensible that some blame may be thrown upon him, on account of this last clause in Mr. Hambden’s character; as if he were willing to entertain a suspicion of bad intentions where the actions were praiseworthy. But the author’s meaning is directly contrary. He esteems the last actions of Mr. Hambden’s life to hare been very blamable; though, as they were derived from good motives, only pushed to an extreme, there is room left to believe that the intentions of that patriot, as well as of many of his party, were laudable. Had the preceding administration of the king, which we are apt to call arbitrary, proceeded from ambition, and an unjust desire of encroaching on the ancient liberties of the people, there would have been less reason for giving him any trust, or leaving in his hands a considerable share of that power which he had so much abused. But if his conduct was derived in a great measure from necessity, and from a natural desire of defending that prerogative which was transmitted to him from his ancestors, and which his parliaments were visibly encroaching on, there is no reason why he may not be esteemed a very virtuous prince, and entirely worthy of trust from his people. The attempt, therefore, of totally annihilating monarchical power, was a very blamable extreme; especially as it was attended with the danger, to say the least, of a civil war, which, besides the numberless ills inseparable from it, exposed liberty to much greater perils than it could have incurred under the now limited authority of the king. But as these points could not be supposed be clear during the time as they are, or may be, at present, there are great reasons of alleviation for men who were heated by the controversy, or engaged in the action. And it is remarkable, that even at present, (such is the force of party prejudices,) there are few people who have coolness enough to see these matters in a proper light, or are convinced that the parliament could prudently have stopped in their pretensions. They still plead the violations of liberty attempted by the king, after granting the petition of right; without considering the extreme harsh treatment which he met with after making that great concession, and the impossibility of supporting government by the revenue then settled on the crown. The worst of it is, that there was a great tang of enthusiasm in the conduct of the parliamentary leaders, which, though it might render their conduct sincere, will not much enhance their character with posterity. And though Hambden was, perhaps, less infected with this spirit than many of his associates, he appears not to have been altogether free from it. Eds intended migration to America, where he could only propose the advantage of enjoying Puritanical prayers and sermons, will be allowed a proof of the prevalence of this spirit in him.]
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[ NOTE N, p. 260. In a letter of the king to the queen, preserved in the British Museum, and published by Mrs. Macaulay, (vol. iv. p. 420,) he says, that unless religion was preserved, the militia (being not, as in France, a formed powerful strength) would be of little use to the crown; and that if the pulpits had not obedience, which would never be if Presbyterian government was absolutely established, the king would have but small comfort of the militia. This reasoning shows the king’s good sense, and proves that his attachment to Episcopacy, though partly founded on religious principles, was also, in his situation, derived from the soundest views of civil policy. In reality, it was easy for the king to perceive, by the necessary connection between trifles and important matters, and by the connection maintained at that time between religion and politics, that, when he was contending for the surplice, he was in effect fighting for his crown, and even for his head. Few of the popular party could perceive this connection. Most of them were carried headlong by fanaticism; as might be expected in the ignorant multitude. Few even of the leaders seem to have had more enlarged views.]
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[ NOTE O, p. 298. That Laud’s severity was not extreme, appears from this feet, that he caused the acts or records of the high commission court to be searched, and found that there had been fewer suspensions, deprivations, and other punishments, by three, during the seven years of his time, than hi any seven years of his predecessor, Abbott, who was, notwithstanding, in great esteem with the house of commons. Troubles and Trials of Laud, p. 164. But Abbot was little attached to the court, and was also a Puritan in doctrine, and bore a mortal hatred to the Papists. Not to mention, that the mutinous spirit was rising higher in the time of Laud, and would less bear control. The maxims, however, of his administration were the same that had ever prevailed in England, and that had place in every other European nation, except Holland, which studied chiefly the interests of commerce, and France, which was fettered by edicts and treaties. To have changed them for the modern maxims of toleration, how reasonable soever, would have been deemed a very bold and dangerous enterprise. It is a principle advanced by President Montesquieu, that where the magistrate, is satisfied with the established religion, he ought to repress the first attempts towards innovation, and only grant a toleration to sects that are diffused and established. See L’Esprit des Loix, liv. 25, chap. 10. According to this principle, Laud’s indulgence to the Catholics, and severity to the Puritans, would admit of apology. I own, however, that it is very questionable, whether persecution can in any case be justified; but, at the same time, it would be hard to give that appellation to Laud’s conduct, who only enforced the act of uniformity, and expelled the clergymen that accepted of benefices, and yet refused to observe the ceremonies which they previously knew to be enjoined by law. He never refused them separate places of worship, because they themselves would have esteemed it impious to demand them, and no less impious to allow them.]
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[ NOTE P, p. 319. Dr. Birch has written a treatise on this subject It is not my business to oppose any facts contained in that gentleman’s performance. I shall only produce arguments, which prove that Glamorgan, when he received his private commission, had injunctions from the king to net altogether in concert with Ormond. 1. It seems to be implied in the very words of the commission. Glamorgan is empowered and authorized to treat and conclude with the confederate Roman Catholics in Ireland. “If upon necessity any (articles) be condescended unto, wherein the king’s lieutenant cannot so well be seen in, as not fit for us at present publicly to own.” Here no articles are mentioned which are not fit to be communicated to Ormond, but only not fit for him and the king publicly to be seen in, and to avow. 2. The king’s protestation to Ormond ought, both on account of that prince’s character, and the reasons he assigns, to have the greatest weight. The words are these: “Ormond, I cannot but add to my long letter, that, upon the word of a Christian, I never intended Glamorgan should treat any thing without your approbation, much less without your knowledge. For besides the injury to you, I was always diffident of his judgment (though I could not think him so extremely weak as now to my cost I have found;) which you may easily perceive in a postscript of a letter of mine to you.” Carte, vol. ii. App. xxiii. It is impossible that any man of honor, however he might dissemble with his enemies, would assert a falsehood in so solemn a manner to his best friend, especially where that person must have had opportunities of knowing the truth. The letter, whose postscript is mentioned by the king, is to be found in Carte, vol. ii. App. xiii. 3. As the king had really so low an opinion of Glamorgan’s understanding, it is very unlikely that he would trust him with the sole management of so important and delicate a treaty. And if he had intended that Glamorgan’s negotiation should have been independent of Ormond, he would never have told the latter nobleman of it, nor have put him on his guard against Glamorgan’s imprudence. That the king judged aright of this nobleman’s character, appears from his Century of Arts, or Scantling of Inventions, which is a ridiculous compound of Hes, chimeras, and impossibilities, and shows what might be expected from such a man. 4. Mr. Carte has published a whole series of the king’s correspondence with Ormond, from the time that Glamorgan came into Ireland; and it is evident that Charles all along considers the lord lieutenant as the person who was conducting the negotiations with the Irish. The 31st of July, 1645, after the battle of Naseby, being reduced to great straits, he writes earnestly to Ormond, to conclude a peace upon certain conditions mentioned, much inferior to those granted by Glamorgan; and to come over himself with all the Irish he could engage in his service. Carte, vol. iii. No. 400. This would have been a great absurdity, if he had already fixed a different canal, by which, on very different conditions, he purposed to establish a peace On the 22d of October, as his distresses multiply, he somewhat enlarges the conditions, though they still fall short of Glamorgan’s; a new absurdity! See Carte, vol. iii. p. 411. 5. But What is equivalent to a demonstration that Glamorgan was conscious that he had no powers to conclude a treaty on these terms, or without consulting the lord lieutenant, and did not even expect that the king would ratify the articles, is the defeasance which he gave to the Irish council at the time of signing the treaty. “The earl of Glamorgan does no way intend hereby to oblige his majesty other than he himself shall please, after he has received these ten thousand men as a pledge and testimony of the said Roman Catholics’ loyalty and fidelity to his majesty; yet he promises faithfully, upon his word and honor, not to acquaint his majesty with this defeasance, till he had endeavored, as far as in him lay, to induce his majesty to the granting of the particulars in the said articles; but that done, the said commissioners discharge the said earl of Glamorgan, both in honor and conscience, of any further engagement to them therein; though his majesty should not be pleased to grant the said particulars in the articles mentioned; the said earl having given them assurance, upon his word, honor, and voluntary oath, that he would never, to any person whatsoever, discover this defeasance in the interim without their consents.” Dr. Birch, p. 96. All Glamorgan’s view was to get troops for the king’s service without hurting his own honor or his master’s. The wonder only is, why the Irish accepted of a treaty which bound nobody, and which the very person who concludes it, seems to confess he does not expect to be ratified. They probably hoped that the king would, from their services, be more easily induced to ratify a treaty which was concluded, than to consent to its conclusion. 6. I might add, that the lord lieutenant’s concurrence in the treaty was the more requisite, because without it the treaty could not be carried into execution by Glamorgan, nor the Irish troops be transported into England; and even with Ormond’s concurrence, it clearly appears, that a treaty so ruinous to the Protestant religion in Ireland, could not be executed in opposition to the zealous Protestants in that kingdom. No one can doubt of this truth, who peruses Ormond’s correspondence in Mr. Carte. The king was sufficiently apprised of this difficulty. It appears indeed to be the only reason why Ormond objected to the granting of high terms to the Irish Catholics.
Dr. Birch (in p. 360) has published a letter of the king’s to Glamorgan, where he says, “Howbeit I know you cannot be but confident of my making good all instructions and promises to you and the nuncio.” But it is to be remarked, that this letter is dated in April 6th, 1646; after there had been a new negotiation entered into between Glamorgan and the Irish, and after a provisional treaty had even been concluded between them. See Dr. Birch, p. 179. The king’s assurances, therefore, can plainly relate only to this recent transaction. The old treaty had long been disavowed by the king, and supposed by all parties to be annulled.]
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[ NOTE Q, p. 347. Salmonet, Ludlow, Hollis, etc., all these, especially the last, being the declared inveterate enemies of Cromwell, are the more to be credited, when they advance any fact which may serve to apologize for his violent and criminal conduct. There prevails a story, that Cromwell intercepted a letter written to the queen, where the king said, that he would first raise, and then destroy Cromwell. But, besides that this conduct seems to contradict the character of the king, it is, on other accounts, totally unworthy of credit. It is first told by Roger Coke, a very passionate and foolish historian, who wrote, too, so late as King William’s reign; and even he mentions it only as a mere rumor or hearsay, without any known foundation. In the memoirs of Lord Broghill, we meet with another story of an intercepted letter, which deserves some more attention, and agrees very well with the narration here given. It is thus related by Mr. Maurice, chaplain to Roger, earl of Orrery: “Lord Orrery, in the time of his greatness with Cromwell, just after he had so seasonably relieved him in his great distress at Clonmell, riding out of Youghall one day with him and Ireton, they fell into discourse about the king’s death. Cromwell thereupon said more than once, that if the king had followed his own judgment, and had been attended by none but trusty servants, he had fooled them all; and that once they had a mind to have closed with him; but, upon something that happened, fell off from that design. Orrery, finding them in good humor, and being alone with them, asked if he might presume to desire to know why they would once have closed with his majesty, and why they did not. Cromwell very freely told him, he would satisfy him in both his queries. The reason, says he, why we would have closed with the king was this: we found that the Scotch and Presbyterians began to be more powerful than we, and were likely to agree with him, and leave us in the lurch. For this reason, we thought it best to prevent them, by offering first to come in upon reasonable conditions; but whilst our thoughts were taken up with this subject, there came a letter to us from one of our spies, who was of the king’s bedchamber, acquainting us, that our final doom was decreed that very day; that he could not possibly learn what it was, but we might discover it, if we could but intercept a letter sent from the king to the queen, wherein he informed her of his resolution; that this letter was sown up in the skirt of a saddle, and the bearer of it would come with the saddle upon his head, about ten of the clock that night, to the Blue Boar in Holborn, where he was to take horse for Dover. The messenger knew nothing of the letter in the saddle, though some in Dover did. ‘We were at Windsor,’ said Cromwell, ‘when we received this letter; and immediately upon the receipt of it, Ireton and I resolved to take one trusty fellow with us, and to go in troopers’ habits to that inn. We did so; and leaving our man at the gate of the inn, (which had a wicket only open to let persons in and out,) to watch and give us notice when any man came in with a saddle, we went into a drinking-stall. We there continued, drinking cans of beer, till about ten of the clock, when our sentinel at the gate gave us notice that the man with the saddle was come. We rose up presently, and just as the man was leading out his horse saddled, we came up to him with drawn swords, and told him we were to search all that went in and out there: but as he looked like an honest man, we would only search his saddle, and so dismiss him. The saddle was ungirt; we carried it into the stall where we had been drinking and ripping open one of the skirts, we there found the letter we wanted. Having thus got it into our hands, we delivered the man (whom we had left with our sentinel) his saddle, told him he was an honest fellow, and bid him go about his business; which he did, pursuing his journey without more ado, and ignorant of the harm he had suffered. We found in the letter, that his majesty acquainted the queen that he was courted by both factions, the Scotch Presbyterians and the army: and that those which bade the fairest for him should have him. But yet he thought he should close with the Scots sooner than with the other. Upon this we returned to Windsor; and finding we were not like to have good terms from the king, we from that time vowed his destruction.’ This relation suiting well enough with other passages and circumstances at this time, I have inserted to gratify the reader’s curiosity.” Carte’s Ormond, vol. ii. p. 12.]