These fifty or sixty persons, one may say, were the men on whom it mainly depended, in the first months of Richard's Protectorate, whether that Protectorate should succeed or should founder. It has been customary, in general retrospects of the time, to represent some of them as already tired of the Commonwealth in any possible form, and scheming afar off for the restoration of the Stuarts. This, however, is quite a misconstruction.—Monk, who is chiefly suspected, and who did now, from his separate station in the north, watch events in an independent manner, had certainly as yet no thought of the kind imagined. He had sent Richard a paper of advices showing a real desire to assist him at the outset. He advised him, substantially, to persevere in the later or very conservative policy of his father, but with certain differences or additions, which would be now easy. He ought, said Monk, at once to secure the affections of the great Presbyterian body, by attaching to himself privately some of the most eminent Presbyterian divines, and by publicly calling an Assembly of Divines, in which Moderate Presbyterians and Moderate Independents together might agree on a standard of orthodoxy, and so stop the blasphemy and profaneness "too frequent in many places by the great extent of Toleration." Then, when a Parliament should meet, he ought to bring a number of the most prudent and trustworthy of the old nobility and the wealthy country gentry into the House of Lords. For retrenchment of expense the chief means would be a reduction of the Armies in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by throwing two regiments everywhere into one, and so getting rid of unnecessary officers; nor let his Highness think this advice too bold, for Monk could assure him "There is not an officer in the Army, upon any discontent, that has interest enough to draw two men after him, if he be out of place." On the other hand, the Navy ought to be strengthened, and many of the ships re-officered1—Such were Monk's advices; and, whatever may be thought of their value, they were certainly given in good faith. And so with those others to whom, from their subsequent conduct, similar suspicions have been attached. At our present date there was no ground for these suspicions. To some in the list, either ranking among the actual Regicides or otherwise deeply involved in the transactions of the late reign and their immediate consequences, the idea of a Restoration of the Stuarts may have been more horrible, on personal grounds, than it need have been to others, conscious only of later participation and lighter responsibility; but not a man in the list yet dreamt of going over to the Royalist cause. The dissensions were as to the manner and extent of their adhesion to Richard, and the policy to be recommended to him or forced upon him.
1: Thurloe, VII. 387-388.
Cromwell's death having removed the one vast personal ascendency that had so long kept all in obedience, jealousies and selfish interests had sprung up, and were wrangling round his successor. From certain mysterious letters in cipher from Falconbridge to Henry Cromwell it appears that the wrangle had begun even round Cromwell's death-bed, "Z. [Cromwell] is now beyond all possibility of recovery" Falconbridge had written on Tuesday, Aug. 31: "I long to hear from A. [Henry Cromwell] what his intentions are. If I may know, I'll make the game here as fair as may be; and, if I may have commission from A., I can make sure of Lord Lockhart and those with him." One might imagine from this that Falconbridge would have liked to secure the succession for Henry; but it rather appears that what he wanted was to counteract a cabal against the interests of the family generally, which he had reported as then going on among the officers. Certain it is that, after Richard had been proclaimed and Henry had most loyally and affectionately put all his services at the disposal of his elder brother, Falconbridge continued in cipher letters to inform Henry of the proceedings of the same cabal. Gradually, in these letters and in other documents, we come to a clear view of the main fact. It was that the wrangle of jealousies and personal interests round the new Protector had taken shape in a distinct division of his adherents and supporters into two parties. First there was what may be called the Court Party or Dynastic Party, represented by Falconbridge himself, and by Admiral Montague, Fiennes, Philip Jones, Thurloe, and others in the Council, with Howard, Whitlocke, and Ingoldsby, out of the Council, and with the assured backing of Henry Cromwell, Broghill, and Lockhart, if not also of Monk. What they desired was to make Richard's Protectorate an avowed continuation of his father's, with the same forms, the same powers, and the permanence of the Petition and Advice as the instrument of the Protectoral Constitution in every particular. In opposition to this party was the Army Party, or Wallingford-House Party, led by Fleetwood and Desborough, with a following of others in the Council and of the Army-officers almost in mass. While maintaining the Protectorate in name, they were for such modifications of the Protectoral Constitution as might consist with the fact that the chief magistrate was now no longer Oliver, but the feeble and unmilitary Richard. In especial, they were for limiting the Protectorship by taking from Richard the control of the Army, and re-assuming it for the Army itself in the name of the Commonwealth. It was their proposal, more precisely, that Fleetwood should be Commander-in-chief independently, and so a kind of military co-ordinate with the Protector.1
1: Falconbridge's Letters (deciphered) in Thurloe, VII. 365-366 et seq., with other Letters in Thurloe and Letters of the French Ambassador, M. de Bordeaux, chiefly to Mazarin, appended to Guizot's Richard Cromwell and the Restoration, I. 231 et seq.
For nearly five months there had been this tug of parties at Whitehall round poor Richard. Naturally, all his own sympathies were with the Dynastic Party; and he had made this apparent. He had proposed to bring Falconbridge and Broghill, perhaps also Whitlocke, into the Council; and, when he found that the Army party would not consent, he had declined to bring in Whalley, Goffe, Berry, and Cooper, proposed by that party in preference. In the matter of the limitation of his Protectorship by the surrender of his headship of the Army he had been even more firm. The matter having come before him formally by petition from the Council of Officers, after having been pressed upon him again and again by Fleetwood and Desborough in private, he had, in a conference with all the officers then in town (Oct, 14). Fleetwood at their head, explained his sentiments fully. The speech was written for him by Thurloe. After some gentle preliminaries, with dutiful references to his father, it came to the main subject. "I am sure it may be said of me," said Richard, "that not for my wisdom, my parts, my experience, my holiness, hath God chosen me before others: there are many here amongst you who excel me in all these things: but God hath done herein as it pleased Him, and the nation, by His providence, hath put things this way. Being then thus trusted, I shall make a conscience, I hope, in the execution of this trust; which I see not how I should do if I should part with any part of the trust which is committed to me unto any others, though they may be better men than myself." He then instanced the two things which he understood to be demanded of him by the Army. "For instance," he said, "if I should trust it to any one person or more to fill up the vacancies of the Army otherwise than it is in the Petition and Advice—which directs that the commanders-in-chief of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the other field-officers, should be from time to time supplied by me, with the consent of the Council, leaving all other commissioned officers only to my disposal—I should therein break my trust and do otherwise than the Parliament intended. It may as well be asked of me that I would commit it to some other persons to supply the vacancies in the Council, in the Lords' House, and all other magistracies. I leave it to any reasonable man to imagine whether this be a thing in my power to do.... There hath also been some discourse about a Commander-in-chief. You know how that stands in the Petition and Advice, which I must make my rule in my government, and shall through the blessing of God stick close to that. I am not obliged to make any Commander-in-chief: that is left to my own liberty, as it was in my father's; only, if I will make any, it must be done by the consent of the Council. And by the Commander-in-chief can be meant no other than the person who under me commands the whole Army, call him what you will—'Field-Marshal,' 'Commander-in-chief,' 'Major-General,' or 'Lieutenant-General.' ... Commander-in-chief is the genus; the others are the species. And, though I am not obliged to have any such person besides myself to command all the forces, yet I have made one: that is, I have made my brother Fleetwood Lieutenant-General of all the Army, and so by consequence commander-in-chief [under me]; and I am sure I can do nothing that will give him more influence in the Army than that title will give him, unless I should make him General [instead of me]; and I have told you the reasons why I cannot do that." Altogether, the speech, and the modesty with which it was delivered, produced very considerable effect for the moment upon the officers. Whalley, Goffe, Berry, and others are understood to have shown more sympathy with Richard in consequence; there was respect for his firmness among people generally when it came to be known; and, though the meetings at Wallingford House and Desborough's house were continued, action was deferred. One effect, however, had been to rouse the dormant Anti-Cromwellianism of the Army-men, and to bring out, more than Fleetwood and Desborough intended, that leaven of pure Republicanism, or affection for the "good old cause" of 1648-1653, which had not ceased, through all the submission to the Protectorate, to lurk in the regiments in combination with Anabaptistry, Fifth-Monarchism, and other extreme forms of religious Independency. In the meetings round Fleetwood and Desborough there had been reflections on the late Protector's memory far from respectful. Henry Cromwell in Ireland had heard of this; and among many interesting letters of his to various correspondents on the difficulties of his brother's opening Protectorate, all showing a proud and fine sensitiveness, with some flash of his father's intellect, there is one (Oct. 20) of rebuke to his brother-in-law Fleetwood on account of his conjunction with the malcontents, "Pray give me leave to expostulate with you. How came those 200 or 300 officers together? ... If they were called, was it with his Highness's privity? If they met without leave in so great a number, were they told their error? I shall not meddle with the matter of their petition, though some things in it do unhandsomely reflect not only on this present, but his late, Highness, I wish with all my heart you were Commander-in-chief of all the forces in the three nations; but I had rather have it done by his Highness's especial grace and mere motion than put upon you in a tumultuary soldierly way. But, dear brother, I must tell you (and I cannot do it without tears) I hear that dirt was thrown upon his late Highness at that great meeting. They were exhorted to stand up for that 'good old cause which had long lain asleep,' &c. I thought my dear father had pursued it to the last. He died like a servant of God, and prayed for those that desired to trample upon his dust, for they also were God's people. O dear brother! ... whither do these things tend? Surely God hath a controversy with us. What a hurly-burly is there made! A hundred Independent ministers called together" [the Savoy Synod of the Congregationalists, with Owen, Thomas Goodwin, Nye, Caryl, and others, at their head, convoked Sept. 29, 1658, for framing a Confession of Faith, by permission from the late Protector: see ante p. 844]. "a Council, as you call it, of 200 or 300 officers of a judgment! Remember what has always befallen imposing spirits. Will not the loins of an imposing Independent or Anabaptist be as heavy as the loins of an imposing Prelate or Presbyter? And is it a dangerous error that dominion is founded on grace when it is held by the Church of Rome, and a sound principle when it is held by the Fifth Monarchy? ... O dear brother, my spirit is sorely oppressed with the consideration of the miserable estate of the innocent people of these three poor nations. What have these sheep done that their blood should be the price of our lust and ambition? Let me beg of you to remember how his late Highness loved you, how he honoured you with the highest trust in the world by leaving the sword in your hand which must defend or destroy us; and his declaring his Highness his successor shows that he left it there to preserve him and his reputation. O brother, use it to curb extravagant spirits and busybodies; but let not the nations be governed by it. Let us take heed of arbitrary power. Let us be governed by the known laws of the land, and let all things be kept in their proper channels; and let the Army be so governed that the world may never hear of them unless there be occasion to fight. And truly, brother, you must pardon me if I say God and man may require this duty at your hand, and lay all miscarriages in the Army, in point of discipline, at your door." Fleetwood could answer this (Nov. 9) but very lamely: "I do wonder what I have done to deserve such a severe letter from you," &c. Fleetwood was really a good-hearted gentleman, meaning no desperate harm to Richard or his Protectorate, though desiring the Commandership-in-chief for himself, and perhaps (who knows domestic secrets?) a co-equality of public status for his wife, Lady Bridget, with the Lady-Protectress Dorothy. In fact, however, Lieutenant-General Fleetwood and Major-General Desborough between them had let loose forces that were to defy their own management. Meanwhile, the phenomenon observable in the weeks preceding the meeting of the Parliament which Richard had called was that of a violent division already among the councillors and assessors of the Protectorate. There was the Court Party or Dynastic Party, taking their stand on the Petition and Advice, and advocating a strictly conservative and constitutional procedure, in the terms of that document, on the lines laid down by Oliver. There was also the Army Party or Wallingford-House Party, led by Fleetwood and Desborough, with an immediate retinue of Cromwellian ex-Major-Generals and Colonels purposely in London, and a more shadowy tail of majors, captains, and inferior officers, coiled away among the regiments.1
1: Thurloe, VII. 447-449, 454-455, and 498; Phillips, 639; Guizot, I. 13-19, with Letters of M. de Bordeaux appended to the volume.
More than questions of home-administration was involved in this division of parties. It involved also the future foreign policy of the Protectorate. The desire of Richard himself and of the Court Party was to prosecute the foreign policy which Oliver had so strenuously begun. Now, the great bequests from the late Protectorate in the matter of foreign policy had been two: (1)The War with Spain, in alliance with France. The Treaty Offensive and Defensive with France against Spain, originally formed by Cromwell March 23, 1656-7, and renewed March 28, 1658, was to expire on March 28, 1659. Was it to be then again renewed? If not, how was the war with Spain to be farther conducted, and what was to become of Dunkirk, Mardike, and other English conquests and interests in Flanders? Mazarin was really anxious on this topic. The alliance with England had been immensely advantageous for France; and could it not be continued? In frequent letters, since Cromwell's death, to M. de Bordeaux, the French Ambassador in London, Mazarin had pressed for information on this point. The substance of the Ambassador's replies had been that the new Protector and his Council, especially Mr. Secretary Thurloe, were too much engrossed with home-difficulties to be very explicit with him, but that he had reason to believe a loan from France of £50,000 would aid the natural inclinations of the Court-party to continue the alliance. This was more than Mazarin would risk on the chance, though he was willing to act on the suggestion of the ambassador that a present of Barbary horses should be sent to Lord Falconbridge, or a jewel to Lady Falconbridge, to keep them in good-humour. There can be no doubt that Falconbridge, Thurloe, Lockhart, and the Court Party generally, did hope to preserve the close friendship with France and the hold acquired by England on Flanders. Lockhart particularly had at heart the hard, half-starved condition of his poor Dunkirk garrison and the other forces in Flanders. On the other hand, there were signs that public feeling might desert the Court Party in their desire to carry on Oliver's joint-enterprise with France against the Spaniards. Dunkirk and Mardike were precious possessions; but might it not be better for trade to make peace with Spain, even if Jamaica should have to be given back and there should have to be other sacrifices? This idea had diffused itself, it appears, pretty widely among the pure Commonwealth's men, and was in favour with some of the Wallingford-House party. Why be always at war with Spain? True, she was Roman Catholic, and the more the pity; but what did that concern England? Was there not enough to do at home?1 (2) Assistance to the King of Sweden. A great surprise to all Europe just before Cromwell's death had been, as we know, the sudden rupture of the Peace of Roeskilde between Sweden and Denmark, with the reinvasion of Zealand by Charles Gustavus, and his march on Copenhagen (ante p. 396). Had Cromwell lived, there is no doubt that, with whatever regret at the new rupture, he would have stood by his heroic brother of Sweden. For was not the Swedish King still, as before, the one real man of mark in the whole world of the Baltic, the hope of that league of Protestant championship on the Continent which Cromwell had laboured for; and was he not now standing at bay against a most ugly and unnatural combination of enemies? Not only were John Casimir and his Roman Catholic Poles, and the Emperor Leopold and his Roman Catholic Austrians, and Protestant Brandenburg and some other German States, all in eager alliance with the Danes for the opportunity of another rush against him; the Dutch too were abetting the Danes for their own commercial interests? Actually this was the state of things which Richard's Government had to consider. Charles Gustavus was still besieging Copenhagen; a Dutch fleet, under Admiral Opdam, had gone to the Baltic to relieve the Danes (Oct. 1658): was Cromwell's grand alliance with the Swede, were the prospects of the Protestant League, were English interests in the Baltic, to be of no account? Applications for help had been made by the Swedish King; Mazarin, through the French ambassador, had been urging assistance to Sweden; the inclinations of Richard, Thurloe, and the rest, were all that way. Here again, however, the perplexity of home-affairs, the want of money, the refusal of Mazarin himself to lend even £50,000, were pleaded in excuse. All that could be done at first was to further the despatch to the Baltic of Sir George Ayscough, an able English Admiral who had for some years been too much in the background, but of whom the Swedish Count Bundt had conceived a high opinion during his embassy to England in 1655-6, and who had consequently been invited by the Swedish King to enter his service, bringing with him as many English officers and seamen as he could. This volunteer expedition of Ayscough Richard and his Council did at once countenance. Nay, when news came (Nov. 8) of a great defeat of Opdam's Dutch fleet by the Swedish Admiral Wrangel, the disposition to help the Swede became stronger. On the 13th of that month a special envoy from the Swedish King, who had been in London for some weeks, took his departure with some satisfaction; and within a few days Vice-Admiral Lawson and his fleet of some twenty or twenty-one ships in the Downs had orders to sail for the Sound, for mediation at least, but for the support of Charles Gustavus if necessary. The fleet did put to sea, but with hesitations to the last and the report that it was "wind-bound."2
1: Letters between Mazarin and M. de Bordeaux in Guizot, I. 231-286, and II. 441-450; Thurloe, VII. 466-467.
2: Letters between Mazarin and M. de Bordeaux last cited, with. Guizot, I. 23-26; Thurloe, VII. 412, 509, 529; Whitlocke for Sept., Oct., Nov., and Dec. 1658, also for Aug. 1656; Phillips, 638.
"Wind-bound" was the exact description of the state of Richard's Government itself. All depended on what should blow from the Parliament that had been called. In the writs for the elections to the Commons there had been a very remarkable retrogression from the practice of Oliver for his two Parliaments. For those two Parliaments there had been adopted the reformed electoral system agreed upon by the Long Parliament, reducing the total number of members for England and Wales to about 400, instead of the 500 or more of the ancient system, and allocating the 400 among constituencies rearranged so as to give a vast proportion of the representation to the counties, while reducing that of the burghs generally and disfranchising many small old burghs altogether. The Petition and Advice having left this matter of the number of seats and their distribution open for farther consideration, Richard and his Council had been advised by the lawyers that it would be more "according to law" and therefore more safe and more agreeable to the spirit and letter of the Petition and Advice, to abandon the late temporary method, though sanctioned by the Long Parliament, and revert to the ancient use and wont. Writs had been issued, therefore, for the return of over 500 members from England and Wales by the old time-honoured constituencies, besides additions from Scotland and Ireland. Thus, whereas, for the last two Protectoral Parliaments, some of the larger English counties had returned as many as six, eight, nine, or twelve members each, all were now reduced alike to two, the large number of seats so set free, together with the extra hundred, going back among the burghs, and reincluding those that had been disfranchised. London also was reduced from six seats to four. It seems amazing now that this vast retrogression should have been so quietly accepted. It seems even to have been popular; and, at all events, it roused no commotion. It had been recommended by the lawyers, and it was expected to turn out favourable to the Government.1