Moreover, Acton Homes was on the line of communication of the Orange Free State Boers with some of their mountain passes, and they kept a large force in the hills above to secure their retreat.’
As to the strength of the Boer force opposed to the British on the Tugela there is the greatest difference of opinion. Sir Redvers Buller has put it at some 7,000 men, a Boer writer says it was little over half that number, while Sir Charles Warren thinks it was much greater than 7,000. It is generally agreed that the British Intelligence Office rightly estimated the combined forces of the enemy at about 60,000, increased probably by foreigners and rebels to 80,000, and that about half of that number were in Natal. If, then, a very liberal allowance be made for the numbers required to guard the lines of communication to the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, to carry on the investment of Ladysmith, to patrol and reconnoitre the country, a very large force would still be available for watching the British Brigade at Chieveley and opposing the British forces at Potgieter’s and Trichard’s Drifts; and whatever the number may have been on the Tugela the Boers were all mounted and acting on interior lines, and could easily and rapidly concentrate a large force in any direction on the Tugela front.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that during the month which had elapsed since the battle of Colenso the Boers had largely increased their forces on the Tugela, and we know that they had been busy preparing long lines of intrenchment in favourable positions right away beyond Acton Homes to the positions defending the roads leading to the passes to the Orange Free State. All round the Acton Homes basin the hills had been fortified, pom-poms and guns were in position along the western slopes of the Rangeworthy hills, and guns and rifles on the road to the Harrismith Pass. The Boers were quite prepared all along the line, and, although they were uncertain where the British were going to cross the river and strike, and were so badly commanded that they allowed the crossings to be made without serious resistance, they were quite ready with camps in sheltered positions, with retired ‘schanzes’ on the hills, with outposts on the slopes to the river, to concentrate a large front in any direction from which they might be attacked.
Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, in his ‘London to Ladysmith via Pretoria,’ thus describes the position in front of Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Charles Warren:—
‘When Buller had arrived at Potgieter’s he found himself confronted by a horseshoe position of great strength, enclosing and closing the debouches from the ford where he had secured a practical bridgehead. He therefore masked Potgieter’s with seven battalions and twenty-four guns, and sent Warren with twelve battalions and thirty-six guns to turn the right, which rested on the lofty hill—almost mountain—of Spion Kop. The Boers, to meet this turning movement, extended their line westwards along the heights of the Tugela valley almost as far as Acton Homes. Their whole position was therefore shaped like a note of interrogation laid on its side, —◠, the curve in front of General Lyttelton, the straight line before Sir Charles Warren. At the angle formed by the junction of the curve and the line stands Spion Kop—“Look-out Hill.” The straight position in front of Sir Charles Warren ran in two lines along the edge and crest of a plateau which rises steeply two miles from the river, but is approachable by numerous long arêtes and dongas.’
Let us now consider what were the operations Sir Redvers Buller proposed to execute. The instructions[4] he issued to Sir Charles Warren are necessarily the official record of what was in his mind at the time. But they are vague where they should be definite, and definite where they should be elastic. They tell Sir Charles Warren that, finding the Boers in front of Potgieter’s too strongly posted to allow of a direct attack upon their positions, his chief has decided to send him with the larger part of the army to turn their flank by crossing the Tugela near Trichard’s Drift and ‘moving up to the west of Spion Kop.’
But what the west of Spion Kop meant, whether the road by Acton Homes, or that by Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie, the former twice as long as the latter, is not explained and it is impossible to gather from these instructions. Lord Roberts, in his despatch, though evidently in some perplexity, seems to think it meant the Acton Homes road.
Next Sir Charles Warren was instructed to act as circumstances require, but he was to continue to refuse his right and throw his left forward till he gained the open plain north of Spion Kop, where he was told he would command the rear of the position facing Potgieter’s Drift, which he would be able to render untenable. While Sir Charles Warren was so employed, Sir Redvers Buller undertook to threaten both of the positions in front of Potgieter’s and also to attempt a crossing at Skiet’s Drift, so as to hold the enemy off Sir Charles Warren as much as possible.
But the turning force of 12,000 men had fifteen miles of wagons accompanying it, and was to take with it only four days’ provisions, which, of course, could be filled up by Sir Redvers Buller so long as it was in road communication with him; but, as soon as this was broken, Sir Charles Warren’s operations were limited to what he could do in four days. And that Sir Redvers Buller intended the road communication to be broken is shown by his request in the instructions that as soon as Sir Charles Warren had made the passage of the river he should, if possible, send the pontoons to him. Finally, Sir Charles Warren was directed by these instructions to send the eight naval 12-pr. guns to Sir Redvers Buller, a step which had a very important bearing upon the final issue of the undertaking.