The success of Sir Charles Warren, therefore, depended upon his being able to accomplish his flanking movement in four days from the time of leaving his temporary base, upon his having no necessity for long-range guns, and upon the right flank of the Boers, which he was to turn, being within easy reach.
It is, however, well to read the views of others on the spot of the intentions of Sir Redvers Buller.
Thus Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ gives some information on the subject, which was obtained at first hand from Major-General Lyttelton. On pages 180 and 181 he says:
‘Tuesday, Jan. 16th.—I went up the hill after breakfast: when I came back to lunch I found the camp in a stir. At last the orders had come to move, and the plan of campaign was declared, and General Lyttelton explained it to me. Our brigade is to move off about 2.30 to the river, and two battalions are to cross Potgieter’s Drift to-night and the rest to-morrow. To-morrow our big guns will open on the Boers and we shall make a big demonstration. Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren, with his other brigade (General Woodgate’s), and with General Clery’s Division (consisting of General Hildyard’s and General Hart’s brigades), is to move away to a point five or six miles higher up the river, cross there, and approach the flank of the Boer position up the slopes of Spion Kop. The hope is that the Boers will not be able to spare men enough from here (besides Colenso and Ladysmith) to offer effective opposition to Sir Charles Warren, or, if they do, then we may get through their defences here. General Lyttelton called the colonels of his battalions together and explained the plan to them.’
Mr. J. B. Atkins, in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith,’ writes:
‘On Friday, January 19, I crossed Waggon Drift and rode some five miles further to the advanced position of Sir Charles Warren, who was now marching west. Obviously the plan was this: Warren was to make a long march round and attack the Boer hills in the rear, and the force remaining at Potgieter’s Drift would simultaneously attack them in front. Warren’s troops were, in a word, to become a detached force; they would disappear round the stretching hills, and when we heard them banging away behind Spion Kop, we, who stayed behind, would have our signal to advance.’
Mr. Bennet Burleigh, in ‘The Natal Campaign,’ says:
‘Whilst this demonstration was proceeding near Potgieter’s, Sir Charles Warren, with his guns and part of Clery’s division, advanced towards a drift near Trieghardt’s Farm, commonly so called, six miles west of Mount Alice.[5] It was upon the direct Acton Homes road and led to the rough ground, foothills, and detached ranges behind, on the west of Spion Kop. The possession of these, it was trusted, would drive the Boers from the vicinity of Potgieter’s, and Spion Kop must fall into our hands.’
It is now understood that Sir Redvers Buller intended Sir Charles Warren to advance by the Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie road, because he says in the memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication,’ just published: ‘From the first there could be no question but that the only practicable road for his column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get rid of the enemy who were holding it.’ And it seems more likely he would call the Fair View road that from Fair View to Groote Hoek than that to Acton Homes, which he would probably call the Acton Homes road. And, indeed, there is this corroboration—that the troops were furnished with a list of the wells of water on the road from Trichard’s Drift to Groote Hoek, or Rosalie, by Fair View Farm. The length of the road from Fair View to a point near Groote Hoek is nine miles, and the length of the road to the same point by way of Acton Homes is twenty miles, more than double the length. Yet Lord Roberts had both Buller’s memorandum and also his secret instructions to Warren before him when he wrote in his covering despatch: