General Clery accordingly moved at 3 A.M. on 20th January with a force of four batteries Royal Field Artillery and the 5th and 11th Brigades of Infantry to occupy the heights to the west and north-west of Spion Kop. The eastern spur[6] was occupied with two battalions of the 11th Brigade, and the spur immediately to the west of the latter with the two remaining battalions of the 11th Brigade. On occupying these heights Lieut.-General Clery found himself in front of a semicircular range of heights completely overlooking the heights he had arrived on. The left of this high ridge almost rested on Spion Kop, while the right extended to the spur overlooking Fair View Farm. The road which would have to be used for wagons in the advance passed on the left of this position, but the enemy’s position was very strong, with a glacis reaching down to the heights occupied by Lieut.-General Clery. The ground on the other flank (left) afforded a good deal more cover for advance, and Lieut.-General Clery hoped, if he succeeded in occupying that flank of the ridge, to swing round to the right and take the remainder of the enemy’s position in flank. He therefore moved up the artillery to the eastern spur and moved the 5th Brigade to reinforce the two battalions of the 11th Brigade already on the western spur, placing the whole of this latter force under Major-General Hart, and directing him to move forward against the left flank of the enemy’s position. This was done, and a series of kopjes was occupied in succession, which brought the force that evening within reach of storming the enemy’s position.
In a despatch dated 20th January 1900 Sir Charles Warren says:
‘After successfully carrying some of the hills General Clery reported that he had now reached a point which it would be necessary to take by frontal attack, which he did not think would be desirable. To this I replied: “I quite concur that a frontal attack is undesirable, and that a flank attack is more suitable. I intended to convey that we should hold what we get by means of intrenchments when necessary, and not retire, continuing the advance to-morrow if it cannot be done to-night; frontal attack, with heavy losses, is simply playing the Boer game.”’
On the same day Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War:
‘General Clery with part of Warren’s force has been in action from 6 A.M. till 7 P.M. to-day. By judicious use of his artillery he has fought his way up, capturing ridge after ridge, for about three miles. Troops are now bivouacking on the ground he has gained, but main position is still in front of them.’
Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ writes: ‘Saturday, January 20th.—The fighting is continuous, but the real battle is on the other side of the hill, where Sir Charles Warren is swinging his line round. His right wing, which is only some five miles from us over the ridge of Spion Kop, is the pivot, and while that remains more or less stationary, a long line is gradually swinging round to his left, so bringing the Boers into a V.’
On 20th January ‘the cavalry on the extreme left, under Lord Dundonald, demonstrated effectively,’ says Mr. Winston S. Churchill, ‘and the South African Light Horse, under Colonel Byng, actually took and held, without artillery support of any kind, a high hill (Sugarloaf Hill), called henceforward Bastion Hill, between the Dutch right and centre.’
Mr. Bennet Burleigh says: ‘Warren prosecuted his turning movement, sending his right and centre well in, whilst Hildyard on the left with Hart’s Brigade moved forward. Clearly the object in view was to seize Bastion Hill, as we have dubbed it from its shape, and roll up the Boer right towards Spion Kop over the direct Ladysmith road viâ Potgieter’s.... Still, it was with his left that he pushed hardest with Hildyard’s and Hart’s Brigades—the latter thrown further forward.’
On 21st January it was found that the enemy had evacuated the position during the night, and it was occupied by Major-General Hart’s Brigade in the morning. Two battalions had been detached from the 2nd Brigade on the previous evening to assist the troops on the heights, and were directed to co-operate with Major-General Hart by attacking the enemy’s right flank. When the enemy’s position of the previous day had been thus occupied it was discovered that the enemy had fallen back to a second strong position in near, the advance to which was over open ground and entailed a frontal attack.
Sir Redvers Buller, who went over to see Sir Charles Warren on the 21st, warned him that the enemy had received large reinforcements, some 2,500 men, to strengthen their right flank, and ordered two batteries to move from the hill on the right to ground on the left, where they came into action against the enemy’s right flank. A fire was kept up all day, but it was not considered advisable to make a frontal attack on his position.