It is only reasonable to suppose that Sir Charles Warren explained verbally to Sir Redvers Buller, on this first occasion of meeting him since his reconnaissance, what his plans were—i.e. the ‘special arrangements’ he had alluded to in his telegram of 19th January—the continual bombardment, the advance on both sides of an arête, and the alternate turning of the Boer position on the right hand and on the left, with the ultimate intention, when the position was gained, of sending the wagons back and advancing in light order with provisions carried in the haversack.
Sir Charles Warren, on 21st January, asked to be supplied with another infantry brigade to extend his line to the left, with howitzers and long-range guns. The infantry brigade and howitzers were sent to him, but not the long-range guns.
Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War on 21st January:
‘Warren has been engaged all day, chiefly on his left, which he has swung round about a couple of miles. The ground is very difficult, and, as the fighting is all the time up-hill, it is difficult exactly to say how much we gain, but I think we are making substantial progress.’
Early on the morning of the 22nd four howitzers arrived, and Sir Redvers Buller, who came over about the same time, gave directions where they were to be placed. Two were brought into action on the height close to the batteries already in action there; the others came into action on the left to keep down the Boer fire from Acton Homes. They were all effective in reaching the enemy’s position, and fire was kept up by both sides until near sundown. Both sides retained generally the same positions at the close of the day.
It was on the 22nd that Sir Redvers Buller held a consultation with Sir Charles Warren and his Generals on the situation. Sir Charles, it is understood, pointed out that it would be impossible to get the wagons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless Spion Kop were first taken; and Sir Redvers, who, it is believed, strongly objected to the wagons being sent back, agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken; but he preferred to make an attack from the British left flank from Bastion Hill, and proposed that it should be made that night. Both Sir Charles Warren and Lieut.-General Clery were, it is gathered, opposed to the proposal as a hazardous proceeding, because, if successful, it would mean to take the whole line of the enemy’s position, which they might not be able to hold.
We learn from Sir Redvers Buller’s own despatch that he was impatient of delay, and wanted an immediate attack, either to the right or to the left, preferably to the left, but an attack at once. It would seem that, in deference to the opinions expressed at the conference, Sir Redvers did not further press the attack from the left on that day, and Sir Charles Warren decided to attack Spion Kop that night, because, if the force must take the wagons, it was only possible to do so by making the road from Fair View to Groote Hoek safe for them, and the road could only be made safe for them by the capture of Spion Kop, which, as Sir Redvers Buller has observed, was evidently the key of the position.
We now see why Spion Kop was attacked. The Acton Homes route was out of the question, and there remained three courses or lines of action for consideration:
(1) The attack from the left, on Salient, from Bastion Hill (favoured by Sir Redvers Buller, but deemed to be very hazardous by Sir Charles Warren and other generals);