Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop: A Vindication

by Defender

(2) The attack from the right, on Spion Kop, which, if successful, would turn the enemy’s position and the Boers would have to go;

(3) Continuous long-range and high-angle artillery fire on the Boer positions and trenches, by which the Orange Free Staters would be worn out and demoralised, leaving only the Transvaal Boers to be dealt with.

Sir Redvers Buller, commanding in chief, advocated the first. Sir Charles Warren, second in command, was in favour of the third. But as Sir Redvers Buller insisted on either the first or second, and Sir Charles Warren objected to the first, the second—that is, the attack from the right on Spion Kop—was decided upon.

Sir Charles Warren had been reinforced at noon of the 22nd by the 10th Brigade under Major-General Talbot Coke. The Brigades of both Major-Generals Hildyard and Hart were on the hills, as we have seen, in touch with the enemy. The choice, therefore, of a column for the assault of Spion Kop was limited to the 11th Brigade forming the right attack, or the 10th Brigade just arrived. Sir Charles Warren selected the latter, and put Major-General Coke in orders to command the attack that same night. General Coke, however, asked for a delay of twenty-four hours to enable him to reconnoitre the position with the officers commanding the battalions to be employed in the assault, and to this Sir Charles assented.

On 23rd January Sir Redvers Buller again visited Sir Charles Warren, and, as he states in his despatch, again advocated an attack from the left. This, we have seen, Sir Charles Warren and his Generals had deemed too hazardous when considered on the previous day; and in the light of Sir Redvers Buller’s memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication,’ in which he mentions how he went over to tell Sir Charles Warren that the Boer right was being strongly reinforced on the 21st, and also of his Vaal Krantz despatch of 8th February, in which he again mentions that the Boer right had been considerably strengthened, so much so that on 25th January any attempt to advance his left would probably have been unsuccessful, it is strange that he should on 23rd January have been so desirous to try his fortune in that direction.

Finding that his proposal to attack from the left was not concurred in by his juniors, Sir Redvers Buller would not take upon himself the responsibility of ordering it, and gave no direction to Sir Charles Warren beyond that which he mentions in his despatch—that he must either attack or his force would be withdrawn. Retirement was the last thing to be thought of, especially bearing in mind the general order to the troops in which Sir Redvers Buller told them there would be no turning back. Sir Charles Warren states in his despatch that, being given the alternative to attack or retire, he replied that he should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, showed the Commander-in-Chief the orders of the previous evening, and explained the reason of the postponement of the attack for twenty-four hours.

On this same 23rd January Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed to the Secretary of State for War the following despatch, and it is a matter to note as we go along that in no one of these telegraphic despatches is there the slightest hint or expression that would lead the reader to suppose Sir Redvers Buller had any cause of dissatisfaction, or that Sir Charles Warren was not carrying out the operations in accordance with his wishes:

‘Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. In front of him, at about 1,400 yards, is the enemy’s position west of Spion Kop. It is on higher ground than Warren’s position, so it is impossible to see into it properly. It can only be approached over bare, open slopes. The ridges held by Warren are so steep that guns cannot be placed on them, but we are shelling the enemy’s position with howitzers and field artillery, placed on the lower ground behind the infantry. Enemy reply with Creusot and other artillery. In the duel the advantage rests with us, as we appear to be searching his trenches, and his artillery fire is not causing us much loss. An attempt will be made to-night to seize Spion Kop, the Salient which forms the left of the enemy’s position facing Trichard’s Drift, and divides it from the position facing Potgieter’s. It has considerable command over all the enemy’s intrenchments.’

It was on 23rd January that Sir Redvers Buller altered Sir Charles Warren’s disposition, and directed him to hand over to Major-General Coke the command of the 5th Division, retaining the command of the whole force across the Tugela. This step was no doubt taken to relieve Sir Charles Warren from over-work, and to free his hands for the more important duties of the general command; but at such a time any change of the kind was unfortunate, and such a change naturally caused an entire alteration of arrangements, because there was no Staff supplied for the commander of the whole force, and the Staff of the 5th Division had carried on both the divisional duties and those for the whole force.