Before relating the capture of Spion Kop and the events of 24th January, it will not be amiss to see how the other side regarded the British operations up to this time, and what importance they attached to the position of Spion Kop; and, further, how far it was tactically sound to occupy the hill in the circumstances.
In the diary of Mr. Raymond Maxwell, published in the ‘Contemporary Review’ of March 1901, we have the daily notes of a busy doctor in the Boer ambulance, who jots down shortly any scraps of information he hears about the operations going on. The doctor was not a Boer, nor even a naturalised burgher of the Transvaal, but a British subject who for three years had practised as a medical man in the Transvaal and, when war became imminent, was asked to take the place of his colleague, Dr. Everard, who was down with malaria, in charge of a Boer ambulance, until Dr. Everard should be well enough to relieve him. As refusal meant expulsion and the loss of all his property, he consented to act, considering that at any rate under the Red Cross flag he was in a neutral position. His diary, which extends from 28th September 1899 to 20th February 1900, when Dr. Everard was well enough to relieve him, is instructive and illuminating, and from it we quote the following extracts, made during some of the days we have been considering:
‘January 20th.—The English are now trekking for Acton Homes, and have occupied Mount Alice, on which they have posted artillery to cover the advance. A patrol from the Pretorian commando was surprised and cut off—forty-eight killed, wounded, and missing.
‘The two forces are now getting into touch, and the English are evidently going to try and obtain the Thaba Njama (Black Mountain) ridge.
‘January 21st.—Severe fighting going on. The English have got on to the ridge, and have put up schanzes all along it, and at some points are only eight hundred to nine hundred yards from our trenches. Our men are beginning to get very jumpy and nervous, as their trenches are lying mostly in open rolling country, and, according to many of the Burghers, could be rushed. There has been continuous rifle fire from the various schanzes and trenches all day. Two Ermelo men have been killed and five wounded. Total Boer casualties up there, so far, are sixty. The English artillery is magnificent, so much so that our guns can only be worked at intervals.
‘January 22nd.—All eyes are now directed to the Upper Tugela, and there is no doubt affairs there are becoming critical. The strain of the continuous fighting is beginning to tell on the Burghers, more especially as there are every day more or less casualties in the trenches. The Burghers get into the trenches before daylight, and then have to remain in them till they are relieved the next morning before daybreak. The country is too open and exposed for them to leave the trenches, unless it is dark. Moreover, they are expecting a rush some morning early, or a night attack.
‘January 23rd.—Excitement everywhere is intense, and if things continue like this for a few days longer, the Boers will break and run. Things are hanging in the balance, and the officers and burghers are looking more anxious now than when retreating through Weenen. The English have only to win through our trenches to the Ladysmith-Van Reenen road, i.e. about one mile of open rolling country, and then Ladysmith is practically relieved.
‘Owing to the Boer trenches not being “cast-iron” positions, and chiefly because they have no good back door to them, the Boers do not like them, and I verily believe the English are going to break through at last. The wear and tear and strain of the last two days’ fighting is telling very much on the burghers.’
Here we have evidence that Sir Charles Warren’s plan of advancing step by step after periods of continuous bombardment was demoralising the Boers, and that another day or two of such bombardment would have enabled the British to rush the Boer trenches with success.