Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop: A Vindication

by Defender

A writer of a paper entitled ‘Pages from the Diary of a Boer Officer,’ by another of them, contributed to the ‘United Service Magazine’ of February 1902, says, in reference to the importance of Spion Kop:

‘The centre and key of the line of defence was Spion Kop, a flat-topped hill, which through its height dominated all the federal positions.... Besides being the central position this hill was the key of the federal line of defence and thus most important—the taking and the holding of Spion Kop by the English meaning the defeat of the Republicans and the relief of Ladysmith.’

With regard to the question—Was it tactically right to capture this hill?—said by both sides to be the key of the position, it seems an absurd question to ask; for if the advance could have been accomplished without taking it, it could not rightly be called the key of the position. Nevertheless, some critics have maintained that its capture was a blunder, and that, had it not been abandoned, our chances of success would have been no greater.

Sir Charles Warren has discussed this question in one of his contributions to the ‘National Review’ in 1901 on ‘Some Lessons from the South African War,’ and it will not be out of place to quote his views on the subject which are given in the following extract:

‘The Capture of a Hill.—Commanding sites in the vicinity of contending troops must always attract attention, because there is a natural impulse in man to strive for the higher ground. Recent criticisms, however, have rather deprecated this longing and have minimised the advantages the higher ground presents from a failure to comprehend the principles which govern the subject.

‘It is quite true that in the defence of flat-topped hills, such as are found in South Africa, it is difficult to obtain a good fire down the steep slopes from trenches running along the edge or outer crest, without partly exposing the defenders. It is also admitted that strong positions can be taken up in gently swelling low ground with good glacis, or flat surfaces, for frontal fire; but the command of view from the summits of hills, and the immunity from being seen, must for a long time to come be powerful factors in the choice of defensive lines.

‘The Boers, with a shrewdness and skill which smacks somewhat of European military aid, have, in cases where practicable, taken advantage of both conditions, by holding the outer edges, or crests, of flat-topped hills lightly, and by placing their main trenches about a mile behind on the hill’s comparatively flat surface. They thus derived all the advantage of the smooth glacis for frontal fire, while they had command of view without being seen into, could not in many instances be touched by long-range guns, and in a great measure debarred the attack from using field guns against them, because the only positions they could be placed in were under rifle fire.

‘For example, we may refer to the two Boer positions in front of Potgieter’s and Venter’s Spruit. The former was strongly situated in the low swelling ground north of the Tugela, but it could be seen into and bombarded by long-range guns at 7,000 yards, at a height of some 600 feet above it, and from as many field guns as could be brought together at 3,500 yards in the lowland north of the Tugela. The Venter’s Spruit position, on the other hand, extending from the Rangeworthy farm round by Acton Homes, and thence into the Drakensberg, was quite as strongly situated on the swelling ground of the comparatively flat hill-top; but it also possessed the enormous advantage that the hills on which it was situated were over 1,000 feet above the Tugela, and thus it could not be seen into or dominated by our long-range guns, and with difficulty could field guns be brought against it: moreover, from it could be seen the movements of our troops. The main camps of the enemy were behind Spion Kop and Acton Homes, and were thus nearer the western position than the eastern. It is not too much to say that, had there been a high hill or a balloon in the vicinity overlooking the Venter’s Spruit position as Zwart Kop does that of Potgieter’s, the great strength of that position would have been more fully appreciated.

‘Let us now consider the advantage of occupying hills in the line of the advance of an attack. They are obvious, both on account of the command of view they afford of the enemy’s position, and because they screen from view and from fire a portion of the attack; but it is to be noted that the reverse slopes only of those hills can be securely held, not the flat summits. The only case in which it may be generally disadvantageous to hold a hill is when it is in such proximity to the enemy’s lines that it can be taken in reverse or all round by the enemy’s fire.

‘A most conspicuous instance of the secure holding of a hill within the enemy’s lines occurred on 24th February, after the failure of the attack on the isolated position of Hart’s Hill. During the retirement the 1st Battalion Durham Light Infantry kept possession of a nook or kloof on the side of that hill which could not be reached by the enemy’s fire, and from which neither rifle fire nor shell could dislodge them. To the eye from afar they seemed to be in a perilous position, but they were secure.