‘The holding of such a position is not alluded to in our drill-book or in tactical works, nor is it likely to be in favour with book tacticians for a long time to come; it is of too practical a character—the natural outcome of our troops returning to primitive ways and instinctively securing a position they could hold under stress of severe fire. The tactics of the future must eventually recognise the importance of the method of holding a hill, for it was by clinging to the reverse slope of hills that we were enabled to relieve Ladysmith with so comparatively small a loss when advancing against a superior force.
‘It was in this manner that we held our ground against superior numbers on the hills above Venter’s Spruit from 17th to 25th January 1900. Sir R. Buller describes our troops on this occasion as perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, admitting of no second line, and in his telegram of 27th January he says, “The actual position held was perfectly tenable.” Mr. Winston Churchill describes the position as follows: “The infantry had made themselves masters of all the edge of the plateau, and the regiments clustered in the steep re-entrants like flies on the side of a wall.” All through our advance on Ladysmith the reverse slopes of hills we captured sheltered our forces.
‘Let us consider Spion Kop as a hill on the line of our advance—was its capture likely to be advantageous or not?
‘The summit at its southern extremity (the highest point of all the range) outflanked and could see down into our position at Three Tree Hill, and though just out of rifle range this was an undoubted advantage to the enemy. Moreover, it was higher by about 150 feet than any portion of the enemy’s lines, and could enfilade their trenches at long rifle range, and could see into their works, and also dominate their camps to the north.
‘Evidently it was a desirable position for either side to hold; but while the enemy could not (according to their mode of fighting) put guns upon it, it could, if in our possession, be so utilised. Our guns, placed on the lower slopes, could search out some of the enemy’s guns behind the Rangeworthy hills, and guns placed on the summit (as they might have been ultimately) would have forced the enemy to retire from the Rangeworthy position, not necessarily altogether, but to take up a new position they had prepared further to the east. It was thus desirable as a possession if it were not an absolutely necessary objective in our advance.’
Captain Holmes Wilson in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith’ states that only the passive occupation of Spion Kop was contemplated, that ‘the passive occupation of Spion Kop could never have led to anything,’ that Spion Kop should not have been occupied unless it was intended to make at the same time a general advance along the whole line, and that ‘the mere fact of going to the top of a high hill cannot constitute a tactical success as long as the enemy’s moral courage lasts; when, however, the movement draws the fire of the whole of the opposing army it is more likely to end in a disaster than in defeat.’
These statements of Captain Wilson bristle with misapprehensions and misconceptions, and may be resolved into seven points on which explanations are necessary.
(1) As to the advantages or disadvantages of holding a hill in the line of advance of an attacking force, the advantages are: (a) that the hill may give command of fire and a view of part of the enemy’s line; (b) that it cannot so readily be seen into or commanded by fire; and (c) that it gives protection from the enemy’s fire to troops properly placed behind it. The disadvantages arise when the hill projects so far into the enemy’s line that it can be taken in flank or in reverse by the enemy’s fire.
(2) The advantages of the occupation of hills during the war are exemplified in the following: Rangeworthy, Mount Alice, Zwart Kop, Hussar Hill, The Gomba, Monte Christo, Llangwani, Colenso Hills, Hart’s Hill, and Pieters, with many others. In all these cases the hill was more or less exposed, but there were not such strenuous endeavours on the part of the Boers, and the British troops had learnt their lesson and knew how to dispose of themselves.