(3) Had Spion Kop been within the enemy’s line of defence so that the enemy could fire along its front or into its front, i.e. get a fire on it of an arc of 180° or more, a passive occupation could not have been carried out, and a general advance would have been required. But Spion Kop was actually within the British line. The arc of the enemy’s fire directed on Spion Kop did not exceed 100°, i.e. not more than on any other position we held in our advance. The statement that it drew the fire of the whole Boer army is ludicrously impossible. The whole rifle fire of the enemy at short range was confined to an arc of about 100°, and could not have been from more than about 500 Boers. At long ranges it was confined to a hill in one direction at 2,000 yards distance. The guns that could fire on to it were from (i) a position in front of Three Tree Hill, (ii) east of Spion Kop, (iii) hill behind Spion Kop. Spion Kop was perfectly tenable, quite as tenable as any of the hills already named. The only difference was that in the case of Spion Kop the troops were all new, in the other cases they had learnt their severe lesson. It is impossible to compare the action of the troops on Spion Kop with their action subsequently.
(4) Spion Kop is not abnormally high. It is 1,500 feet above the Tugela, while the general line of Boer trenches on the Rangeworthy hills is about 1,200 to 1,300 feet above the Tugela. Spion Kop, when it was occupied by us, was about 150 feet above the point—400 yards distant, occupied by the Boers. The Spion Kop range shelves down gradually to the east. It is about 500 feet above Three Tree Hill, and 500 to 600 feet above the neck, where it becomes steep. It is not a very formidable hill. It is about the height above the Tugela that the Rock gun at Gibraltar is above the level of the sea; but then the point where the ascent was commenced was 400 feet above the Tugela, and carts could go some 400 feet higher, so that the climb at most was only 700 feet, or half the height of Gibraltar. A man in good condition could walk up and down several times during the day without fatigue. There was nothing formidable in the climb.
(5) The statement that the passive occupation of Spion Kop could not lead to anything is not borne out by the facts. The troops on Spion Kop had already outflanked the Boer position, and the Boer camp at the front of the hill had to be moved.
(6) Moreover, it is incorrect to say that only a passive occupation of Spion Kop was contemplated. The occupation of Spion Kop was necessary before an advance could take place, but when it was captured the advance could be made, and would have been made if the hill had not been abandoned.
(7) The position occupied by the troops on the top of Spion Kop is described elsewhere, and was, no doubt, wrong. The inner crest should have been occupied in the first instance.
To sum up:
(1) There are decided advantages in the occupation of a hill in line of the advance to attack, if it be not abnormally high.
(2) The advantage was practically shown by the occupation of hills in similar positions to Spion Kop all through the war.
(3) Spion Kop was advantageously placed for occupation.
(4) It was not abnormally high.