It has been stated in Parliament that in August 1900 Sir Charles Warren, on his return home, wrote his own answer to the accusations, of which he was then aware from the published despatches. Since then the Government has been worried by Sir Redvers Buller into publishing further accusations against Sir Charles Warren, who tells us, in his recent letter to the newspapers, that he has asked the Government in common justice to give his refutation the same publicity. At present the Government has decided not to publish it, in order that the personal controversy involved between two distinguished Generals may not be prolonged. But is this quite fair to Sir Charles Warren? Having made public all that is to be said against him, might he not be allowed to show that he can justify himself?
APPENDIX
EXTRACTS FROM DESPATCHES[8]
A
From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the
Secretary of State for War
Army Headquarters, South Africa, Camp,
Dekiel Drift, Riet River: 13th February, 1900.
My Lord,—I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s information, despatches from General Sir Redvers Buller, describing the advance across the Tugela River on the 17th and 18th January, 1900, and the capture and evacuation of the Spion Kop position on the 23rd and 24th January, as well as certain minor operations between the 19th and 24th January on the right or eastern line of advance.
2. The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents themselves that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence by following the road past ‘Fair View’ and ‘Acton Homes,’ to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east, and branching off from a point east of ‘Three Tree Hill.’ The selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice to his subordinate commander, and on the day after the withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command.