Reality he defines most clearly as follows:
“‘Reality’ is in general what truths have to take account of….
“The first part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are forced upon us…. Over their nature, order and quantity we have as good as no control….
“The second part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also take account of, is the relations that obtain between their copies in our minds. This part falls into two sub-parts: (1) the relations that are mutable and accidental, as those of date and place; and (2) those that are fixed and essential because they are grounded on the inner nature of their terms. Both sorts of relation are matters of immediate perception. Both are ‘facts’….
“The third part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho largely based upon them), is the previous truths of which every new inquiry takes account”. (Pragmatism, p. 244).
An idea’s agreement with reality, or better with all those parts of reality, means a satisfactory relation of the idea to them. Relation to the sensational part of reality is found satisfactory when the idea leads to it without jar or discord. “… What do the words verification and validation themselves pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than the ordinary agreement-formula—just such consequences being what we have in mind when we say that our ideas ‘agree’ with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into and up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the while … that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea’s verification”. (Pragmatism, pp. 201-2).
An idea’s relation to the other parts of reality is conceived more broadly. Thus pragmatism’s “only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of life’s demands, nothing being omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God’s existence? She could see no meaning in treating as ‘not true’ a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with concrete reality”? (Pragmatism, p. 80, italics mine). Agreement with reality here means ability to satisfy the sum of life’s demands.
James considers that this leaves little room for license in the choice of our beliefs. “Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly”. “Our (any) theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To ‘work’ means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis. Our theories are thus wedged and controlled as nothing else is”. “Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations”. (Pragmatism, pp. 211, 217, 233).
Now on the contrary it immediately occurs to a reader that if reality be simply “what truths have to take account of”, and if taking-account-of merely means agreeing in such a way as to satisfy “the collectivity of life’s demands”, then the proportion in which these parts of reality will count will vary enormously. One person may find the ‘previous-truths’ part of reality to make such a strong ‘demand’ that he will disregard ‘principles’ or reasoning almost entirely.
Another may disregard the ‘sensational’ part of reality, and give no consideration whatever to ‘scientific’ results. These things, in fact, are exactly the things that do take place. The opinionated person, the crank, the fanatic, as well as the merely prejudiced, all refuse to open their minds and give any particular consideration to such kinds of evidence. There is therefore a great deal of room for license, and a great deal of license practiced, when the agreement of our ideas with reality means nothing more than their satisfactoriness to our lives’ demands.