We seem, then, it may be said in conclusion, to be confronted with something like the following alternatives:

If we believe that Dewey could not have made a correct deduction from the pragmatic method when he developed it into a theory of truth making truth dependent upon fulfilled expectations alone, then very obviously the next step in this investigation is to find the point at which his inference went wrong. This means a re-examination of each step in his reasoning.

If we believe that Dewey does make a correct deduction from the pragmatic method in this development toward truth, then we are confronted with the alternative of either accepting the Deweyan theory of truth or of rejecting the Peircian theory of clearness. That is, if we begin with Peirce on method, we must then go clear through to Dewey on truth. And if we reject Dewey, while believing that Peirce gave a correct description of the method of science, then it seems that we must conclude that the method of science and the method of philosophy are not the same.

Footnotes

  1. See for example an article by Alfred Lloyd on “Conformity, Consistency, and Truth” in the Journal of Philosophy for May 22, 1913; also Boodin’s Truth and Reality, Caldwell’s Pragmatism and Idealism, De Laguna’s Dogmatism and Evolution, Murray’s Pragmatism, Moore’s Pragmatism and Its Critics, and others. [Return]
  2. “The Pragmatic Method”, University of California Chronicle 1898. Reprinted in Journal of Philosophy, 1904, v. 1, p. 673. Page references are to the latter. [Return]
  3. “The Meaning of Truth”, Preface, p. viii. [Return]
  4. Same, p. 137. [Return]
  5. “The Psychology of Belief”, Mind 1889, v. 14, p. 31. [Return]
  6. Vol. II, chapter XXI. [Return]
  7. Mind, N. S. 13, p. 457. [Return]
  8. This paragraph appears as a footnote. [Return]
  9. Boodin: Truth and Reality, pp. 193-4. [Return]
  10. Lee: Vital Lies, vol. 1, pp. 11, 31, 33, 72. [Return]
  11. It is interesting to see that Peirce had the following comment to make in 1878 upon the utility of truth. “Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of natural selection; but outside of these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus upon impractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought”. (From the first article in the series “Illustrations of the Logic of Science”, Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12, p. 3). [Return]
  12. For example, in the Meaning of Truth, pages 195 and 233. [Return]
  13. Mind, N. S. 15, July 1906. Reprinted in “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays”, p. 77. Page references are to the latter. [Return]
  14. What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?”, Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1908, v. 5, p. 85. [Return]
  15. The last four sentences appear in a footnote. [Return]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Works of Charles Sanders Peirce

1865. On an improvement of Boole’s calculus of logic. Proc. Am. Acad. Arts and Sci., v. 7, p. 250.
1867. Logical Papers.
1868. Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:103.
Nominalism and realism. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:57.
On the meaning of ‘determined’. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:190.
Some consequences of four incapacities. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:140.
Grounds for the validity of the laws of logic. Jour. Spec. Phil. 2:193.
1871. Review and discussion of Fraser’s “Works of Berkeley.” No. Am. Rev. 113:449.
1878. Illustrations of the logic of science.
I—The fixation of belief. Pop. Sci. Mo. 12:1.
II—How to make our ideas clear. Pop. Sci. Mo. 12:286.
III—The doctrine of chances. Pop. Sci. Mo. 12:604.
IV—The probability of induction. Pop. Sci. Mo. 12:705.
1879. Illustrations of the logic of science.
V—The order of nature. Pop. Sci. Mo. 13:203.
VI—Deduction, induction, and hypothesis. Pop. Sci. Mo. 13:470.
La logique de la science. Rev. Philos. 6:553, 7:39.
1880. On the algebra of logic. Am. Jour. Math. 3:15.
Also, Rev. Philos. 12:646.
1883. (Editor) Studies in Logic.
1884. Numerical measure of success of predictions. Science 4:453.
Old stone mill at Newport. Science 4:512.
1888. Logical machines. Am. Jour. Psy. 1:165.
1890. The architecture of theories. Monist 1:161.
1891. The doctrine of necessity examined. Monist 2:321.
The law of mind. Monist 2:533.
1892. Man’s glassy essence. Monist 3:1.
Evolutionary love. Monist 3:176.
Reply to the necessitarians. Monist 3:526.
1896. The regenerated logic. Monist 7:19.
The logic of relatives. Monist 7:161.
1900. Infinitesimals. Science 11:430.
Decennial celebration of Clark University. Science 11:620.
Century’s great men of science. Smithsonian Institute Reports, 1900, p. 673.
Annotations on the first three chapters of Pearson’s Grammar of Science. Pop. Sci. Mo. 58:296.
1901. Campanus. Science 13:809.
1905. What pragmatism is. Monist 15:161.
The issues of pragmaticism. Monist 15:481.
1906. Mr. Peterson’s proposed discussion. Monist 16:147.
Prolegomena to an apology for pragmaticism. Monist 16:492.
1908. Some amazing mazes. Monist 18:227, 416, 19:36.
A neglected argument for the reality of God. Hib. Jour. 7:90.
1910. On non-Aristotelian logic. Monist 20:158.

The Works of William James