MADAM,
I am of your Authors opinion, concerning self-activity or self-motion,[1] That what is Active of it self, can no more cease to be active then to be: And I have been always of this opinion, even from the first beginning of my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as you may see in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put forth eleven years since; where I say, That self-moving Matter is in a Perpetual motion; But your Author endeavors from thence to conclude, That Matter is not self active, because it is reducible to rest. To which I answer, That there is no such thing as Rest in Nature: Not do I say, that all sorts of motions are subject to our senses, for those that are subject to our sensitive Perceptions, are but gross Motions, in comparison to those that are not subject to our exterior senses: as for example; We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others corrupt; yet we do not see how they dilate, nor how they consume, nor how they corrupt: Also we see some bodies contract, some attract, some condense, some consist, &c. yet we do not see their contracting, attracting, condensing, consisting or retenting motions; and yet we cannot say, they are not corporeal motions, because not subject to our exterior senses; for if there were not contracting, attracting, retenting or consistent corporeal self-motions, it had been impossible that any creature could have been composed into one united figure, much less stayed and continued in the same figure without a general alteration. But your Author says, If Matter, as Matter, had Motion, nothing would hold together, but Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea, this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner substance then the subtil Air, or rather it never had been condensated together to this consistency we find it. But I would ask him, what reason he can give, that corporeal self-motion should make all matter rare and fluid, unless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Nature, but this, human sense and reason will contradict; for we may observe there are Infinite changes of Motion, and there is more variety and curiosity in corporeal motions, then any one single Creature can imagine, much less know; but I suppose he conceives all corporeal matter to be gross, and that not any corporeal motion can be subtil, penetrating, contracting and dilating; and that whatsoever is penetrating, contracting and dilating, is Individable: But by his leave, Madam, this doth not follow; for though there be gross degrees of Matter, and strong degrees of Corporeal Motions, yet there are also pure and subtil degrees of Matter and Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I name sensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and Knowledg, as sensitive Life and rational Knowledg. Again, your Author askes, What glue or cement holds the parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals together? I answer, Consistent or retentive corporeal motions, by an agreeable union and conjunction in the several parts of Metal or Stone; and these retentive or consistent motions, are as strong and active, if not more, then some dilative or contractive motions; for I have mentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and rational corporeal motions are in all Creatures, so also in Stone, Metal, and any other dense body whatsoever; so that not any one Creature or part of Matter is without Motion, and therefore not any thing is at rest. But, Madam, I dare say, I could bring more reason and sense to prove, that sensitive and rational Matter is fuller of activity, and has more variety of motion, and can change its own parts of self-moving Matter more suddenly, and into more exterior figures, then Immaterial Spirits can do upon natural Matter. But your Author says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with Sense and Reason; I say, My sensitive and rational corporeal Matter is Sense and Reason it self, and is the Architect or Creator of all figures of Natural matter, for though all the parts of Matter are not self-moving, yet there is not any part that is not moving or moved, by and with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus I conclude, and rest constantly,
Madam,
Your Faithful Friend
and Servant.
[1] Of the Immortality of the Soul, l. 1. c. 7.
[XIII.]
MADAM,
That Matter is uncapable of Sense, your Author proves by the example of dead Carcasses;[1] For, says he, Motion and Sense being really one and the same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is motion, there is also sense and perception; but on the contrary, there is Reaction in dead Carcasses, and yet no Sense. I answer shortly, That it is no consequence, because there is no animal sense nor exterior perceptible local motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there is no sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet it may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of that figure, into which it did change from being an animal. Also he says, If any Matter have sense, it will follow, that upon reaction all shall have the like; and that a Bell while it is ringing, and a Bow while it is bent, and every Jack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be living animals. I answer, It is true, if reaction made sense; but reaction doth not make sense, but sense makes reaction; and though the Bell hath not an animal knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable knowledg; for the shape and form of the Bell, Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial; nevertheless each in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an animal in his kind; onely they are different according to the different proprieties of their Figures: And who can prove the contrary that they have not? For certainly Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans nature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures, he presently judges there is no more knowledg in Nature, then what Man, at least Animals, have; and confines all sense onely to Animal sense, and all knowledg to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, That Matter is utterly uncapable of such operations as we find in our selves, and that therefore there is something in us Immaterial or Incorporeal; for we find in our selves that one and the same thing, both hears, and sees, and tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that Nature manifests unto us. I answer, That is the reason there is but one matter, and that all natural perception is made by the animate part of matter; but although there is but one matter in Nature, yet there are several parts or degrees, and consequently several actions of that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions, both sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception is made by the sensitive corporeal motions, copying out the figures of forreign objects in the sensitive organs of the sentient; and if those sensitive motions do pattern out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike at one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch and smell, at one and the same time: But Thoughts and Passions, as Imagination, Conception, Fancy, Memory, Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are made by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of matter, to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is made by one and the same matter, through the variety of its actions or motions, making various and several figures, both sensitive and rational. But all this variety in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions, is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by changing their own parts of matter into several figures by the power of self-motion: For example, I see a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my eye, in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight upon the sight of the Man or Beast make the like figure in the sensitive organ, the Eye, and in the eyes own substance or matter, as being in the eye as well as the other degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate, for they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed, That the rational matter can and doth move in its own substance, as being the purest and subtillest degree of matter; but the sensitive being not so pure and subtil, moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so the perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational corporeal Motions make, are made in their own degree of Matter; but those figures which the sensitive patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of the sentient body proper to such or such a sense or perception: as in an animal Creature, the perception of sight is made by the sensitive corporeal motions in the Eye; the perception of hearing, in the Ear, and so forth. As for what your Author says, That we cannot conceive any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft; I answer, That these are but effects of Matters actions, and so is rare, and dense, and the like; but there are some Creatures which seem neither perfectly rare, nor dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for example, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft, and yet is hard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to our touch, and rare to our sight, yet it is so dense and hard, as not to be readily dissolved from its nature; and if there be such contraries and mixtures in one particular creature made of self-moving Matter, what will there not be in Matter it self, according to the old saying: If the Man such praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave? So if a particular Creature hath such opposite qualities and mixtures of corporeal motions, what will the Creator have which is self-moving Matter? Wherefore it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving Matter is either all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; because by its self-moving power it can be either, or both, and so by the change and variety of motion, there may be soft and rare Points, and hard and sharp Points, hard and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes; also there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and printing without pressures. Concerning that part of Matter which is the Common Sensorium, your Author demands, Whether some point of it receive the whole Image of the object, or whether it be wholly received into every point of it? I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter is not in Points; Next, That not any single part can subsist of it self; and then that one Part doth not receive all parts or any part into it self; but that Parts by the power of self-motion can and do make several figures of all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into a very little figure; for outward objects do not move the body, but the sensitive and rational matter moves according to the figures of outward objects: I do not say always, but most commonly; But, says your Author, How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast or so various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion. First, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Matter is not bound up to a Point, nor to be a single self-subsisting Part. Next, as for confusion, I say, that the sensitive matter makes no more confusion, then an Engraver, when he engraves several figures in a small stone, and a Painter draws several figures in a small compass; for a Carver will cut out several figures in a Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little black Patch; and if gross and rude Art is able to do this, what may not Ingenious and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is ingenious and knowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her Parts in her; for neither whole nor Parts are ignorant, but have a knowledg, each according to the motion of its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion in Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the diversity and variety of knowledg, so that every particular figure and motion hath its particular knowledg, as well as its proper and peculiar parts; and as the parts join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many times causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and remembrance in Particular Creatures: I do not say, they are utterly lost in nature, but onely in respect to particular Creatures, by the dissolving and dividing of their particular figures. For the rational matter, by reason it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and rechange into several figures without division of parts, which makes memory and remembrance: But men not considering or believing there might be such a degree of onely matter, namely rational, it has made them erre in their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference between sensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet they are agreeable most commonly in their actions, though not always. Also the rational can make such figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational has a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety, then the sensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move with the inanimate, but the rational moves onely in its own parts; for though the sensitive and rational oftentimes cause each other to move, yet they are not of one and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same motions. And this rational Matter is the cause of all Notions, Conceptions, Imaginations, Deliberation, Determination, Memory, and any thing else that belongs to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Nature, and so being dividable, the mind of all Creatures, as the sensitive is the life; and it can move, as I said, more subtilly, and more variously then the sensitive, and make such figures as the sensitive cannot, without outward examples and objects. But all diversity comes by change of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agreeing, as antipathetical and disagreeing; And though Nature's artificial motions, which are her Playing motions, are sometimes extravagant, yet in her fundamental actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe by her exact rules in the various generations, the distinct kinds and sorts, the several exact measures, times, proportions and motions of all her Creatures, in all which her wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety her wise pleasure: To which I leave her, and rest,