Madam,
Your faithful Friend,
and Servant.
[1] Of the Immortality of the Soul, l. 2. c. 2.
[XIV.]
MADAM,
If there be any sense and perception in Matter, says your Author,[1] it must needs be Motion or Reaction of one part of matter against another; and that all diversity of sense and perception doth necessarily arise from the diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Posture, Vigour and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such, as are impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that are perceptions of some actions, or modificated Impressions of parts of matter bearing one against another. I have declared, Madam, my opinion concerning Perception in my former Letters, that all Perception is not Impression and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax: For example, the corporeal rational motions in the mind do not print, but move figuratively; but the sensitive motions do carve, print, engrave, and, as it were, pencil out, as also move figuratively in productions, and do often take patterns from the rational figures, as the rational motions make figures according to the sensitive patterns; But the rational can move without patterns, and so the sensitive: For surely, were a man born blind, deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his exterior parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless move both in body and mind according to the nature of his figure; for though no copies were taken from outward objects, yet he would have thoughts, passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could not see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no question but he would see and hear interiously after the manner of dreams, onely they might not be any thing like to what is perceiveable by man in the World; but if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as Words, yet he would hear something equivalent to words; for it is impossible, that his sensitive and rational faculties should be lost for want of an Ear, or an Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object, or marks, or patterns: for although the sensitive Motions do usually pattern out the figures of exterior objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can make interior figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception is not always Reaction, neither is Perception and Reaction really one thing; for though Perception and Action is one and the same, yet not always Reaction; but did Perception proceed from the reaction of outward objects, a blind and deaf man would not so much as dream; for he would have no interior motion in the head, having no other exterior sense but touch, which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease, he would neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and interiously feel nothing but hunger and fulness; and his Mind would be as Irrational as some imagine Vegetables and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave them, and rest,
Madam,
Your Faithful Friend