To this proposal the French Government raised objections saying that such an arrangement would doubtless be the best if there were any means of executing it, but that Mehemet Ali would offer resistance and that any measures of violence which the allies might employ to reduce him, would produce effects which might be more dangerous to the peace of Europe and to the independence of the Porte, than the actual state of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could possibly be; that although the French Government thus refused to agree to England's plan, during the long space of time which had subsequently elapsed, it had not proposed any plan of its own. Further, in September 1839, Comte Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London, proposed to draw a line from the east to the west of the sea, nearly from Beyrout to the desert near Damascus and to declare that all the land to the south of this line should be administered by Mehemet Ali and that all to the north should be under the immediate authority of the Sultan. The French Ambassador then gave Her Majesty's Government to understand that if such an arrangement were admitted by the five Powers, France would unite with the four Powers, in case of need, for the use of coercive measures, with the object of forcing Mehemet Ali to submission.
I pointed out to Comte Sébastiani that such an arrangement was open, though in a less degree, to all the objections applicable to the present relative position of the two parties and that consequently Her Majesty's Government could not accede to it. I observed that it seemed inconsistent on the part of France to express her willingness to force Mehemet Ali to agree to an arrangement which would obviously be incomplete and inadequate to secure the proposed object, while objecting to coercive measures when they were proposed for the purpose of forcing consent to the arrangement desired by Her Majesty, the execution of which, as France admitted, would entirely fulfil the desired object.
To these arguments Comte Sébastiani replied that the objections advanced by the French Government to the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, were founded upon considerations of domestic government, and that these objections would be removed if the French Government was enabled to prove to the nation and to the Chambers that it had obtained the best possible conditions for Mehemet All and that he had refused to accept them.
As this insinuation was not admitted by Her Majesty's Government, the French Government communicated officially on September 27, 1839, its own plan, which was that Mehemet Ali should become a hereditary governor of Egypt and of all Syria, and governor for life of Candia, surrendering nothing but the district of Adana and Arabia. The French Government did not say a word as to its knowledge of Mehemet Ali's inclination to adhere to this arrangement, nor did it declare that if he refused to agree, France would take coercive measures to compel him.
Obviously Her Majesty's Government could not consent to this plan, which was open to more objections than the present state of things, the more so as the gift to Mehemet Ali of the legal and hereditary title to a third of the Ottoman Empire, which he now occupies only by force, would have been to begin the positive dismemberment of the Empire.
Her Majesty's Government, therefore, being desirous to show its readiness to come to an agreement with France upon these questions, stated that it would yield its well-founded objection to any extension of Mehemet Ali's power beyond Egypt and would join the French Government in recommending the Sultan to grant to Mehemet Ali, apart from the pashalik of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, to be bounded on the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the southern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias, and by a line from this point to the Gulf of Akaba, provided that France would join the four Powers in coercive measures if Mehemet Ali refused this offer. This proposal, however, was not accepted by the French Government, which now declared its inability to join in coercive measures or to be a party to an arrangement to which Mehemet Ali would not consent.
While these discussions were proceeding with France, separate negotiations were in progress between England and Russia, of which full details and information have been sent to the French Government. Negotiations with France were suspended for a time at the outset of this year, firstly because a change of Ministry was expected, and secondly because a change of Ministry took place.
In the month of May, however, Baron von Neumann and myself resolved, upon the advice of our respective governments, to make a last effort with the object of inducing France to begin a treaty which was to be concluded with the other four Powers, and we submitted to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposal for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. One objection put forward by the French Government to the last proposals of England was that although it was proposed to give Mehemet Ali the strong position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, he would be deprived of the fortress of Acre.
To overcome this objection Baron von Neumann and myself proposed that the northern frontiers of the part of Syria to be administered by the Pasha should extend from Cape Nakhora to the furthest point of the Lake of Tiberias, thus including within the boundary the fortress of Acre; and that the eastern frontier should extend along the western coast of the Lake of Tiberias and thence to the Gulf of Akaba. We declared that the government of this part of Syria could be granted to Mehemet Ali for life only, and that neither England nor Austria would consent to grant Mehemet Ali hereditary rights over any part of Syria. I further declared to M. Guizot that I could go no further in the way of concessions in the hope of securing the co-operation of France, and that this was our last proposal. Baron von Neumann and myself communicated these facts separately to M. Guizot: Baron von Neumann first, and myself the next day. M. Guizot told me he would inform his Government of this proposal and of the facts which I had laid before him, and that he would let me know the answer as soon as he had received it. A short time afterwards the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia informed me that they had every reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon the proposal for themselves, had sent it to Alexandria to learn the decision of Mehemet Ali; that the four Powers who had undertaken the business were thus confronted, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali; that, apart from the inevitable delay, this was an action which their respective courts had never intended to take and one to which they would never consent; and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing position. I agreed with them that their objections were justified with regard to the conduct which they attributed to the French Government, but that M. Guizot had said not a word to me of what would be done. Mehemet Ali had been informed that the French Government at that moment was fully occupied with parliamentary questions and could naturally ask for time before sending an answer to our proposals, and that in any case delay could do no great harm. About June 27, M. Guizot came to me and read me a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, containing the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This answer was a formal refusal. M. Thiers said that the French Government positively knew that Mehemet Ali would not consent to a division of Syria unless he were forced to do so; that France could not co-operate in coercive measures against Mehemet Ali under these conditions, and that therefore she could not become a party to the proposed arrangement.
As France had thus refused to yield to England's ultimatum, the plenipotentiaries were bound to consider what steps should be adopted by their Governments. The position of the five Powers was this: the five had declared their conviction that in the interests of the balance of power and of the peace of Europe it was essential to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; all five had declared that they would use all their influence to maintain this integrity and this independence; but France, on the one hand, insisted that the best means to secure this result was to abandon the Sultan to the mercies of Mehemet Ali and to advise him to submit to the conditions which Mehemet might impose upon him in order to preserve peace sine qua non; while on the other side the four Powers regarded any further military occupation of the Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali as likely to destroy the integrity of the Turkish Empire and to be fatal to its independence; they therefore thought that it was advisable to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.