After about two months of deliberations, France not only refused to consent to the plan proposed by the four Powers as an ultimatum upon their part, but further declared that she would not become a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali did not voluntarily consent without the use of force. It only remained then for the four Great Powers to adopt as an alternative the principle laid down by France, which consisted in the complete submission of the Sultan to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or to act upon their principles and force Mehemet Ali to accept an arrangement compatible in form with the rights of the Sultan, and compatible in content with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If the former alternative were adopted, the co-operation of France would be secured; in the latter alternative the hope of that co-operation must be abandoned.
The keen desire of the four Powers to secure the co-operation of France has been shown by the fact that they have continued their efforts for several months in the course of negotiations. They are well aware of the value of French support, not only for the particular object which they have in view, but also with reference to the general and permanent interests of Europe. But what they failed to secure, and what they esteemed, was the co-operation of France in the maintenance of peace to secure the eventual safety of Europe and the practical execution of the principles to which the five Powers had declared their agreement. They desired the co-operation of France, not only for themselves and for the advantage and opportunity of the moment, but also for the good which it might have conferred, and for the future consequences which might have resulted from it. They wished to co-operate with France to do good, but they were not prepared to co-operate with her in doing evil.
Thinking, therefore, that the policy advised by France was unjust, and in no way judicious with regard to the Sultan; that it might become the cause of misfortunes in Europe; that it was inconsistent with the public engagement undertaken by the five Powers, and that it was incompatible with the principles which they had wisely emphasised, the four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice demanded of them, and buy the help of France at so high a price—if, indeed, that could be called co-operation which merely consisted in allowing events to follow their natural course. As the four Powers were thus unable to adopt the views of France, they determined to accomplish their mission.
This determination, however, was not unexpected and the probable eventualities had not been hidden from France. On the contrary, upon several occasions during the course of negotiations, and no later than October 1 last, I had pointed out to the French Ambassador that our desire to remain united with France must have a limit, that we were anxious to go forward with France but not disposed to come to a standstill with her, and that if she could not contrive to act in harmony with the four Powers, she must not be astonished if she saw them come to an understanding between themselves and acting apart from France.
Comte Sabastiani told me that he foresaw that we should thus act, and that he could predict the result; that we were bound to try and conclude our arrangements without the help of France, and that we should find that our means were inadequate; that France would be a passive spectator of events; that after a year or eighteen months of useless efforts we should recognise that we had been mistaken, and that we should then apply to France; that this Power would then co-operate to settle these matters upon a friendly basis with as much friendliness after our failure as she would have shown before our attempt, and that she would then probably persuade us to agree to conditions to which we refused our consent at the moment.
Similar indications were given to M. Guizot with regard to the line which would probably be taken by the four Powers if they were unsuccessful in coming to an arrangement with France. The French Government has therefore refused the ultimatum of the four Powers, and by the act of refusal has enounced afresh a principle of action which it knew could not be adopted by the four Powers: a principle which consisted in the idea that no settlement of the difficulties between the Sultan and his subject could take place except under conditions which the subject could accept voluntarily, or, in other terms, could dictate; hence, the French Government must have been prepared to see the four Powers determined to act apart from France; and when the four Powers had come to this determination, they could not be represented as breaking with France, or as excluding France from the arrangement of a war to be carried on by Europe. On the contrary, it was France who broke with the four Powers, for it was France who laid down for herself a principle of action which made co-operation with the other Powers impossible.
At this point, without attempting further controversial observations with reference to the past, I feel obliged to point out that the voluntary retirement on the part of France was not entirely due to the course of negotiations at London, but that, unless Her Majesty's Government has been strangely misled, it was decided even more definitely in the course of negotiations at Constantinople. The five Powers declared to the Sultan by a Collective Note, which was handed to the Porte on July 27, 1839, by their representatives at Constantinople, that their unanimity was complete, and these representatives requested the Porte to refrain from any direct negotiations with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha without the concurrence of the five Powers. However, Her Majesty's Government has good reason to believe that during the last few months the French representative at Constantinople has decisively isolated France from the other four Powers, and has energetically and repeatedly pressed the Porte to negotiate directly with Mehemet Ali, and to conclude an arrangement with the Pasha, not only without the concurrence of the four great Powers, but under the mediation of France alone, and in accordance with the special views of the French Government.
As regards the line of conduct followed by Great Britain, the French Government must recognise that the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government have never varied, from the outset of these negotiations, except in so far as Her Majesty's Government has offered to modify its views with the object of securing the co-operation of France. These views have been from time to time frankly expressed to the French Government, and have been continually supported in the most urgent manner by arguments which seemed conclusive to Her Majesty's Government. From the very outset of the negotiations, the declarations of principle made by the French Government induced Her Majesty's Government to believe that the two Governments had only to agree upon the means of carrying out their common principles. If the intentions of the French Government concerning these means differed from the views of England even at the outset of the negotiations, France has certainly not the right to refer to the difference between France and England as unexpected, seeing that the French Government recognised its existence a long time previously. If the intentions of the French Government with regard to the measures to be taken have undergone a change since the opening of negotiations, France certainly has not the right to impute to Great Britain a change of political intention which proceeds from France, and not from England.
But in any case, when four out of five Powers have agreed upon a definite line of conduct, and when the fifth has resolved to pursue an entirely different policy, it would be unreasonable to require the four to abandon, in deference to the fifth, opinions to which they are daily more resolved to adhere and which refer to a question of vital importance for the chief and future interests of Europe.
But as France continues to maintain the general principles which she laid down at the outset and continues to consider the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire as necessary to preserve the balance of power; as again France has never refused to admit that the arrangement which the four Powers wished to introduce between the Sultan and the Pasha would be the best solution if it could be secured, and as again the objections of France referred not to the object proposed but to the means by which it is to be gained, her opinion being that the end is good, but that the means are inadequate and dangerous; Her Majesty's Government is confident that the isolation of France, which no one regrets more than Her Majesty's Government, will not be of long duration.