Another advantage of the system lies in the stabler policy it will ensure. Our present system results in frequent sharp overturns, according as this party or that may get a temporary majority. But this battledore and shuttlecock of legislation does not represent the far more gradual changes in public opinion. A system whereby the number of representatives of each party is always directly proportioned to the number of votes cast for that party would make it possible to evolve a careful machinery of government, as is not possible with our periodic upheavals and reversals of personnel and policy.[Footnote: See publications of the American Proportional Representation League (Secretary C. G. Hoag, Haverford, Pennsylvania). National Municipal Review, vol. 3, p. 92. American City, vol. 10, p. 319. Thomas Hare, Representation. J. S. Mill, Representative Government, chap. VII. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 29, p. 111. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 112, p. 610.]
(6) THE SEPARATION OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ISSUES. The obtrusion of national party lines into state and municipal affairs has continually confused issues and blocked reforms in the narrower spheres. Masses of voters will support a candidate for governor or mayor simply because he is a Republican or Democrat, although the national party issues in no way enter into the campaign. Bosses skillfully play on this blind party allegiance, and many a scoundrel or incompetent has ridden into office under the party banner. The separation of local from national elections has proved itself a necessity; in the most advanced communities they are now put in different years, that the loyalties evoked by one campaign may not carry over blindly into another. The direct election of United States Senators has this great advantage, among others, of separating issues; in former days the alternative was often forced upon the citizen of voting for a state legislator who stood for measures of which he disapproved, or of voting for a better legislator who would not vote for the United States Senator he wished to see elected.
(7) Space forbids the further discussion of reforms that aim at improving the machinery of election. The value of anti-bribery laws is obvious, as of the laws that require publicity of campaign accounts, forbid campaign contributions by corporations, and limit the legal expenditures of individuals. [Footnote: Cf. Outlook, vol. 81, p. 549.] The publication at public expense and sending to every voter of a pamphlet giving in his own words the arguments on the strength of which each candidate seeks election has recently been tried in the West. But this is sure, that in one way or other the American people will evolve a mechanism which will make it easier for able and honest men to attain office than for the rogues and their incompetent henchmen.
II. A second set of reforms bears rather upon the quality of legislation than upon the selection of men for office. It is not enough that the way be made easy for good men to attain office; they must, when elected, be freed from needless temptations and given every inducement to work for the interests of the community they represent. Every possible pressure is valuable that can counteract the pull of sectional interests, party interests, or the interests of the great corporations, away from the general welfare. For even the best intentioned officials may yield to the insistence of local or partisan wishes, to the arguments of "big business," or to the lure of personal advantage.
(1) REPRESENTATION AT LARGE. The method of legislation by representatives of local districts leads inevitably to laws that are a compromise or bargain between the interests of the several districts, rather than the result of a desire to further the best interests of the entire community. Congressmen are continually beset by their constituents to secure special favors for them, aldermen are expected to push the interests of their respective wards. Each representative stands in danger of political suicide if he refuses to use his influence for these often improper ends; and legislation takes the form of a quid pro quo:-"You vote for this bill which my section desires, and I'll vote for the bill yours demands." This evil is so great that it may be necessary eventually to do away entirely with district representation.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 95, p. 759.]
(2) DELEGATED GOVERNMENT. Another plan, which evades the pressure of local interests while allowing district representation, also avoids the friction and deadlocks which result from government by a group of representatives of sharply opposed parties or principles. By this plan, a representative body is elected, by districts, or at large, by proportional representation; but this body, instead of itself deciding or executing the state or municipal policy, serves merely to select and watch experts, who carry on the various phases of government. These experts remain responsible to the representatives, who in turn are responsible to the people. This method promises to combine concentration of responsibility, efficiency, and business-like government, with democracy, that is, responsiveness to popular control. The national Congress may, for example, appoint a commission of experts on the tariff, agreeing to consider no tariff legislation except such as they recommend; in this way they are freed from all requests to propose this or that alteration in the interests of their State or one of its industries, while the commissioners, not being responsible to any localities, are under no pressure to yield to such requests. Similarly, the right to recommend-or even to enact-legislation on pensions, on river and harbor appropriations, or what not, may be delegated to an appointed body responsible only to the Congress at large; and all the "pork-barrel" legislation, which the better class of legislators hate, but which is forced upon them by the threat of political ruin, may be obviated. [Footnote: Cf. the new (1914) Public Health Council of six members, in New York State, to whom has been delegated all power to make and enforce laws bearing upon the public health throughout the State (except in New York City). See World's Work, vol. 27, p. 495.] The plan of delegating power to appointed experts has very recently been winning approval in municipal government, where it is commonly called the "City Manager " plan. A small body of commissioners are elected and held responsible for the city government; these men may remain in their private vocations, and draw a comparatively small salary from the city. Their duty is to select an expert city manager who will receive a high salary, and conduct personally and through his appointees the whole business of the city. The commissioners may dismiss him if his work is not satisfactory and engage another to take his place. Responsibility is concentrated; mismanagement can be stopped at once, more readily even than by the recall; unity and continuity of policy become possible; in short, the same successful methods that have made American business the admiration of the world can be applied to politics. If this plan becomes widely adopted, as it bids fair to be, politics can become a trained profession, and we can be governed by experts instead of by politicians. [Footnote: See The City Manager Plan of Municipal Government (printed by the National Short Ballot Organization) National Municipal Review, vol. 1, pp. 33, 549; vol. 2, pp. 76, 639; vol. 3, p. 44. Outlook, vol. 104, p. 887.]
(3) THE RECALL. Many of the newer plans for government include a method by which an inefficient or dishonest official can be removed from office by the people, without the cumbersome process of an impeachment. It would not be wise to apply the recall to local representatives, who would then be still more at the mercy of local wishes; but with a short ballot and the concentration of responsibility upon executives or small commissions who represent the community as a whole, it is highly desirable to have a method available for quickly remedying mistakes. The danger of being recalled from office is a salutary influence upon a weak or a self-willed man. And the possibility of it allows the election of officials for longer terms, which are desirable from several points of view: they bring a more stable government, freed from too frequent breaks or reversals of policy; they permit the acquiring of a longer political experience, and stimulate abler men to run for office; they save the public the bother and expense of too frequent elections. [Footnote: See National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 204. Forum, vol. 47, p. 157. North American Review, vol. 198, p. 145.]
(4) THE REFERENDUM. A less drastic instrument of popular control over legislation is the referendum, which refers individual measures back to the people for approval or rejection. An official may be efficient and free from corruption, yet opposed to the general wish on some particular matter. In this, then, he may be overruled by the referendum without being humiliated or required to resign his office. Thus not only the improper influence of the machine or the interests may be guarded against by the public, but the unconscious prejudices of generally efficient officials. Of course there is, in the case of both recall and referendum, the possibility that the official may be right and the people wrong. But that danger is inherent in democratic government. The best that can be done is to make government responsive to the sober judgment of the majority; if that is mistaken, nothing but time and education can correct it. [Footnote: See W. B. Munro, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall; The Government of American Cities, p. 321. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 415; vol. 28, p. 207. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 586. Nation, vol. 95, p. 324.]
The air is full of suggestions, and experiments are being tried in every direction. There is every hope that America may yet learn by her failures and evolve a system of government that shall be her pride rather than her shame. Our National Government has worked far better than our state and local government, but even that can be further freed from the pull of improper motives, made much more efficient and responsive to the general will. We are in a peculiar degree on trial to show what popular government can accomplish. The Old World looks to us with distrust, but with hope. And though the solution of our political problem involves many technical matters, it has deep underlying moral bearings, and affects profoundly the success of every great moral campaign.
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