Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. / Particularly of His Services in the Canadas, Including a Reply to the Strictures on His Military Character, Contained in an Article in the Quarterly Review

by E. B. Brenton

It is said by the Quarterly Reviewer, that at this period Colonel Procter was positively restrained by Sir George Prevost from any offensive operations. The nature of the instructions given by the Commander of the forces to that officer has been already shewn; and will further appear by a reference to the letters[55] of Sir George Prevost to Colonel, now become Brigadier-General Procter, in answer to the despatches received from him, announcing the different operations which had taken place in the Michigan territory. These operations, though not always attended with success on the part of General Procter, and though they occasioned a considerable diminution of his small force from his repeated losses, were yet favourably viewed by Sir George Prevost, who, as it appears from the correspondence already referred to, was always disposed to give him full credit for his exertions, and to put the most favourable construction upon his failures. That Sir George Prevost was fully aware of the importance of General Procter's position, and of the necessity of strengthening it by every means in his power, will now be shewn by the testimony of General Procter himself.

The letters of that officer fully prove, in contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer, who has attributed to the Commander of the forces, the neglect (if any took place) in forwarding to him the reinforcements which he had so strongly solicited, that no such neglect is imputable to Sir George Prevost.

As early as the month of March, 1813, a confidential letter was addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Procter, upon the subject of the reinforcements he had solicited, and Captain M'Douall, one of the Commander of the forces' Aids-de-camp, was sent for the purpose of ascertaining General Procter's wants, and the best mode of relieving them. In the correspondence between the Commander of the forces and General Vincent, the situation of General Procter was constantly alluded to, and the former officer was desired to pay his particular attention to the subject. On the 20th June, Sir George Prevost acquainted General Procter that General de Rottenburg, who had been appointed to the command of the forces serving in Upper Canada, had received his directions to push on the remainder of the 41st regiment, from the head of Lake Ontario to Amherstburgh. And in his subsequent letters to General Procter, of the 11th and 12th July, after stating that his wants of money, clothing, &c. had been supplied as far as lay in the power of the Commander of the forces, and that those articles were then on their passage to him, he informed him that the whole of the 41st regiment were either on their way, or would be with him before that letter could arrive. This assurance was given by Sir George Prevost, in the full confidence that the orders which he had sent to the officer commanding in Upper Canada, for the immediate forwarding of the remainder of that regiment to Amherstburgh, had been complied with. That they were not complied with as early as Sir George Prevost intended they should be, was owing to circumstances over which the Commander of the forces had no control. The force under Major-General de Rottenburg, from which the 41st regiment was to be detached, was then before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and resources, and he was very unwilling to weaken it by sending off the remainder of that regiment, until other reinforcements which were on their way to him should arrive. It appears, however, by his letter to Sir George Prevost, of 9th July, 1813, that he had, on the 6th of that month, sent forward 120 men of that regiment to Long Point, in order that thence they might be transported by means of the fleet to Amherstburgh, and that it was his intention to send the remainder of the regiment to General Procter, as soon as the Royals, then daily expected, should arrive. In a subsequent letter from Sir George Prevost to Major-General de Rottenburg, dated 23d July, 1813, in which his high opinion of General Procter's merits and conduct is pointedly expressed, he says, "I trust the reinforcements and supplies, which, in consequence of my orders to you, must be near him," &c.

From these letters it is evident that it was Sir George Prevost's intention that General Procter should be reinforced to the extent he had required, and that the commanding officers in Upper Canada, who from the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed at the time, thought themselves justified, as they really were, in so doing, were the persons who delayed the forwarding of such reinforcements.

That to this cause the delay was attributed by General Procter himself, is unequivocally proved by his correspondence respecting it with the Commander of the forces. The letter to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1813, to which the Reviewer has referred,[56] commences in a way little to be expected, from the extract which that writer has given from it. He says, "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th ult. and am fully sensible that this district has received a due share of your Excellency's attention. I beg to add, that if I had received from the Line the reinforcements which you had directed should be sent, I should by this time," &c.

It must not be forgotten that this letter was before the Reviewer, and that he must therefore have designedly suppressed that portion of it, which completely exonerates Sir George Prevost from any charge of neglect.

In General Procter's next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 11th July, he says, "I beg leave to add, that we are fully confident of every aid from your Excellency, and of the fortunate result of the contest, if we are allowed the benefit of your consideration of us; but I am unfortunately so situated, that your best intentions towards me are of no avail. If the means were afforded me, and which were no more than what your Excellency has repeatedly directed, &c."—In his next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 13th July, he says, "The reinforcements which have been reluctantly afforded me, notwithstanding your Excellency's intentions, have been so sparingly and tardily sent me, as in a considerable degree to defeat the purpose of their being sent. I have no hopes of any aid from the centre division, where our situation is little understood, or has ever been a secondary consideration."—These extracts clearly shew that General Procter ascribed the delay in forwarding to him the remainder of the 41st regiment, not to the Commander of the forces, but to General de Rottenburg, who then commanded the centre division in Upper Canada.

Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was quoting, he has had the hardihood to say, "that although Sir George Prevost fully acknowledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the reinforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered above five weeks to elapse before he despatched the small amount of regular troops, &c."[57]

Now it appears from General de Rottenburg's letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 41st, had been despatched to Amherstburgh on the 6th July; and by a return made to the Military Secretary's Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter's army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th August, 1813, it further appears, that up to the 10th August, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, with nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, had arrived at that post, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provincial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly requested, by General Procter, in his correspondence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him.

It may here be observed, that General Procter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical situation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Amherstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rottenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to General Procter, without injury to the more important service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier.