Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. / Particularly of His Services in the Canadas, Including a Reply to the Strictures on His Military Character, Contained in an Article in the Quarterly Review

by E. B. Brenton

Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed. The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's consideration. The enemy had at that time a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depôt at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co-operate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depôt at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not assailable in any other quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were.

The State of Vermont on the east shore of the Lake might, indeed, have been entered from St. Amand, and our townships on that frontier, without the assistance of our squadron. But independently of there not being any object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it advisable, it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly passing by that route from the United States into Canada; a fact which is not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy which Sir George Prevost pursued during the American warfare. As the destruction of the enemy's naval depôt on Lake Champlain was then the only operation contemplated by His Majesty's Government, which could be undertaken with any prospect of success, Sir George Prevost with a view to that object, had, immediately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd June, above referred to, used every possible exertion to accelerate the building of the new ship at Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed to be employed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir George Prevost's correspondence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly called the particular attention of that officer to the manning of the squadron for Lake Champlain.[82] In addition to this, his correspondence with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that object.

The Confiance was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first brigade of troops quartered at Chambly; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Having here received information that General Izzard had suddenly quitted his position at Champlain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had established a footing on the Niagara frontier, and was pressing upon Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to co-operate,) in the hope by this movement of checking General Izzard's progress, and of thus making a diversion in favour of General Drummond. Our troops accordingly crossed the frontier line, and on the 3d of September took possession of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simpson's Inn, about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superintended the building of the Confiance, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his services peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly and unexpectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval force on the Richelieu, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the 3rd September, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to superintend the equipment of the new ship. On the 5th of September, the day on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter assured the Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate with the army in less than forty-eight hours; that he had correctly ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet; and that in consequence he entertained no apprehensions of the result of an action. Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day, the 6th September, the army advanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified position on the crest of the hills.

No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked;[83] but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to have day-light, as the movement was to be made through so thick and intricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried.

As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough reconnoitring of the enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he communicated the enemy's force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter[84] dated the 7th September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aid-de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major Fulton's statement[85] on this subject, shews most clearly the views which Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours. Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication, although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, "that his ship was not ready, and that until she should be, it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy;" and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be assumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any assistance in his approaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous attack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of which we may be assured that he had not a doubt, Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter, Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance, Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his communication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant-General de Rottenburg, (who was second in command,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unless prevented by accident, might soon be expected, and therefore directed him immediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Generals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold themselves in readiness as on the preceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke before the fleet had made its appearance, and before the scaling of their guns was heard. It seems by the time on shore to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Commander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were accordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confiance had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the commencement of the naval action, orders were despatched for the troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, proceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops, which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on the Lake, and from the enemy, Major-General Brisbane's brigade had formed, and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power should have passed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of the works which were the object of attack. Unfortunately, during this period, and whilst the two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction, by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were counter-marched, but before they could recover the right direction, full three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost—an invaluable portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On approaching the ford, it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the assault. Major Cochrane was therefore despatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the fleet having at that time surrendered, Sir George Prevost most reluctantly gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts, and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he considered his paramount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing through the wood to the enemy's position. Under these circumstances, General Robinson felt himself bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the attack.

Having thus given a full and correct statement of the circumstances which attended the enterprise against Plattsburg, it is necessary to notice the animadversions which have been made upon the military character of Sir George Prevost, in consequence of the unfortunate result of that expedition. In no instance has the conduct of Sir George Prevost been attacked with more virulence and injustice, than by the writer in the Quarterly Review, whose representations are, as the reader must already have perceived, in the highest degree incorrect.

The charges which have been brought forward by the Reviewer and by others are, that Sir George Prevost improperly urged Captain Downie into action before his ship was adequately prepared; that he disregarded the signal for the supposed co-operation between the army and the fleet, as solemnly agreed upon by himself and Captain Downie, and neglected to assault the fort when our fleet was engaged with the enemy; and lastly, that he did not, after the defeat of our squadron, persist in his attack upon the fort, by which it is pretended, that our fleet might still have been saved.

With regard to the accusation, that Captain Downie was prematurely hurried, against his better judgment, into an unequal contest with the enemy, the correspondence between that officer and Sir George Prevost already referred to, fully negatives any such supposition. The co-operation of the fleet being deemed essentially necessary to the success of the land-forces, Sir George Prevost was naturally anxious that Captain Downie should be prepared as early as possible to meet the enemy. It has been seen, that upon the 7th of September, Captain Downie informed the Commander of the forces, that it would take a day or two at least, before the Confiance would be in an efficient state, and that the engagement did not take place till the 11th, four days after the above communication. So far was Sir George Prevost from attempting by "taunt and inuendo"[86] improperly to hurry the fleet into action, that in his letter to Captain Downie, of the 9th of September, he says, "I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from delay, as I am well convinced you have done every thing in your power to accelerate the armament and equipment of your squadron, and I am also satisfied that nothing will prevent its coming off Plattsburg the moment it is ready." On the same day Captain Downie announced his intention of commencing an attack on the enemy's squadron the ensuing morning. Up to this time, therefore, it appears that however anxious Sir George Prevost was to make an immediate attack upon Plattsburg, for which purpose the assistance of the fleet was requisite, he never urged Captain Downie to engage the enemy while unprepared, but on the contrary, expressed his confidence that the moment the fleet was ready, it would appear before Plattsburg.

An expression in Sir George Prevost's letter, of the 10th, has indeed been construed by the Quarterly Reviewer into a "taunt," which is supposed to have driven Captain Downie to an engagement against his cooler judgment. In that letter the Commander of the forces, after informing Captain Downie that in consequence of his communication of the 9th, the troops had been held in readiness since six in the morning to storm the enemy's works: thus continues, "I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." It must be obvious that many other causes, independent of the wind, might have prevented Captain Downie from sailing as he had intended to do on the 9th, although the state of the wind was in fact the real cause of the delay. In consequence of the despatch used in equipping his ship, articles might have been overlooked or omitted, which at the last moment only might have been discovered to be indispensably necessary; accidents might have happened to different parts of the squadron in their progress, and even the reinforcements of soldiers from the 39th, although they had been immediately ordered upon his requisition, might not, from various circumstances, have been supplied in time. All, or any of these causes might, as they naturally did, suggest themselves to the mind of the Commander of the forces, and his anxiety to be correctly informed upon the subject, as naturally induced him to express himself to Captain Downie in the terms above stated. It is in the highest degree improbable, that Captain Downie could for a moment construe those expressions in an unfavourable sense. But whatever might have been his impression, it is evident, that a letter written on the 10th, could not have influenced the determination which he took on the 9th, of engaging the enemy the following morning.

Nor will the assertion, that Sir George Prevost disregarded the supposed signal of co-operation, and neglected to attack the fort according to his promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruction of the enemy's fleet being the primary object of the expedition, and until that was effected, the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George Prevost resolved not to assault the fort until he was satisfied that our squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the forces, nor any one in our army allowed themselves to entertain a single doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to assault the enemy's works simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action, and that Captain Downie was aware of that determination, appears from the correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on the part of the Commander of the forces to support, assist, or co-operate with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George Prevost had satisfied himself by personal observation, and by the most accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anchored out of range of the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that officer any hope or promise of assistance was consequently out of the question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same time, or before the fort was assaulted, but of no consequence whatever to Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the naval Commander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his intention of making nearly a simultaneous attack, as part of his own plan of operations, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had been in readiness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the time when the fleets should engage, but there is not the slightest ground for believing that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as importing an agreement to assist him by a simultaneous attack on shore, he would certainly have answered that communication, and have availed himself of the services of Captain Watson, who was left with him for that purpose, to express to the Commander of the forces his reliance on the promised aid, and his assurance that it was the state of the wind alone, which had prevented him from appearing with the fleet on the morning of the 10th, as he had intended. At the time when this letter was written by the Commander of the forces, he was ignorant of the causes which had delayed the fleet, and he was ignorant, likewise, of Captain Downie's further intentions, with regard to the time when he would be prepared to attack the enemy's squadron. Had Captain Downie, therefore, relied, in the slightest degree, on the co-operation of the land forces, he would have informed Sir George Prevost of the exact time when he contemplated an engagement, that the troops on shore might be prepared to second his efforts. No reply, however, was despatched by him to the Commander of the forces, who thus remained in uncertainty with regard to the actual state and condition of the squadron, and the intentions of its commander. Captain Watson, whose directions were to proceed immediately to head-quarters, with intelligence of the sailing of the squadron, should not Captain Downie have previously despatched him, did not arrive until after the fleet had made its appearance. It has, indeed, been asserted, by the Quarterly Reviewer, that the scaling of the guns of our squadron was to be the signal for the advance of the columns of attack. This misstatement appears to have arisen out of the evidence which was given before the Court-Martial on Captain Pring; for in no other place is any allusion to such a fact to be discovered. The error of that statement, which, without doubt, was unintentional, is manifest. The signal in question is said to have been concerted with Major Coore on the 10th, when, in fact, no interview or communication whatever took place between him and Captain Downie on that day; and that no such signal was mentioned to the former on the 8th, the day on which he did see Captain Downie, is a fact to which the Major (now Colonel Coore) is ready to bear witness. In all probability Captain Watson, who was with Captain Downie on the 10th, was the person who was mistaken for Major Coore, and to him Captain Downie might have communicated his intention of scaling his guns, previous to rounding Cumberland Head, in order to announce to the Commander of the forces the approach of the squadron. Whatever may have been the nature of Captain Downie's communication by Captain Watson, it is certain that it never reached Sir George Prevost.