Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. / Particularly of His Services in the Canadas, Including a Reply to the Strictures on His Military Character, Contained in an Article in the Quarterly Review

by E. B. Brenton

It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection or support to our squadron, much less that there existed any "solemn agreement" to that effect. It must also be evident, from the previous statement, that the attack on shore did actually take place at the commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th, and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the Reviewer[87] himself must have known, is usual, by an order to cook, when the time will admit.[88] It has also been shewn, that early on the morning of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the forces on shore to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the Confiance began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the assault. Our batteries, as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the Confiance. Until confidently assured that the fleets would engage (and many circumstances might have intervened to prevent it even after the appearance of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately ordered to take their position for the assault.

Although our naval official accounts of the transaction state the engagement to have lasted for two hours and a half, that is from eight o'clock in the morning until half-past ten, when the Confiance struck, the American naval account, which is corroborated by the testimony of all who witnessed the action from the shore, represents the engagement to have terminated in about an hour and a half. The American account also corresponds with the statements of our officers on shore, that our fleet did not round Cumberland Head until between eight and nine o'clock, before which time all the statements of persons on shore agree in admitting that the action did not begin on the part of our fleet. With regard to the period when the engagement terminated, all the accounts appear to coincide. It has already been shewn, that notwithstanding the unfortunate mistake of the attacking columns taking a wrong route, they had at that very period forced the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the vicinity of the enemy's works, and prepared to make an instant assault, and that the unexpected result of the naval action was the sole cause which induced Sir George Prevost to countermand that assault. It now remains to explain more fully the reasons of the Commander of the forces for giving those orders, which will afford an answer to the last charge brought against him.

It has been often and confidently asserted, that both the enemy's squadron and our own were within reach, of the guns of the works. It is not, therefore, surprising that an unfavourable impression should have been made upon the minds of many persons with regard to the policy of not persevering in an attack, which might, under such circumstances, have led to the recovery of our own fleet, or the destruction of that of the enemy. The fact of the relative situation of the two squadrons and of the enemy's works, has, like most of the other facts connected with this expedition, been grossly misrepresented. Had an opportunity been offered by a public investigation of the transaction, it could and would have been satisfactorily proved, that neither of the fleets was within the range of the enemy's guns from any part of their works, and that their own squadron was anchored more than a mile and a half from the shore.

The grounds of the Reviewer's statement upon this subject it is impossible to ascertain; but, in opposition to what he affirms[89] on the testimony of Captain Pring, and "numerous other eye-witnesses" it can be proved by testimony from on board the Confiance, as well as by officers without number on shore, that she was taken possession of within half an hour after she struck; and it can also be proved, in opposition to the decided opinion of the number of officers, who are stated to have visited Plattsburg after the peace, that the anchorage of the American squadron was not within range of the forts.

The evidence of the greater part of the General Officers accompanying the expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action; of the commanding officer, and others of the Artillery; of naval men on board of our fleet, and of various other persons on shore, could and would have been produced upon the trial of the question, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed his squadron in such a situation, that by possibility they could be annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident intention of Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would in such a case have fallen? That he was aware of the danger to which his squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the circumstance before adverted to, of his having moved further into the Bay from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander thus took, was one in which, according to his judgment, he could not have been annoyed by the fall of the works on shore, an event for which he was prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was entertained by Captain Henley, of the American brig, Eagle, who had himself reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anchored, and which upon his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently out of the range of the guns from the shore. If any thing more were wanting in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject. The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the American Naval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person.

"Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
July 3, 1815.

"Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday; the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not been received, or it assuredly should have been attended to.

In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on the 11th September, 1814.

I am, with much respect,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. Macdonough."
"Cadwr. Colden, Esq."