Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Bart. / Particularly of His Services in the Canadas, Including a Reply to the Strictures on His Military Character, Contained in an Article in the Quarterly Review

by E. B. Brenton

Upon the expiration of the armistice, Sir George Prevost resolved to continue, for a time at least, and until his resources would better enable him to pursue a contrary line of conduct, the same defensive system which he had previously determined upon; and which he had been originally induced to adopt, in consequence of the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed at the commencement of hostilities, and of the war having been undertaken, on the part of the United States, so much in opposition to the opinions and wishes of a considerable portion of its population. In a private letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, of the 2d August, 1812, upon the subject of the proposed armistice, he particularly refers to the opinion of Mr. Foster, respecting the policy of the defensive system. "Mr. Foster," he says, "submits the propriety of our abstaining from an invasion of the United States' territory, as only in such event could the American government be empowered to order the militia out of the States." As a further ground for this line of conduct, and a confirmation of the propriety of his own opinion in adopting it, he quotes in a subsequent communication to General Brock, of 30th August, 1812, the opinion of his Majesty's Government on the subject. "The King's Government having most unequivocally expressed to me their desire to preserve peace with the United States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole disposeable force of the country, the great interests committed to them in Europe, I have endeavoured to be instrumental in the accomplishment of those views; but I consider it most fortunate to have been enabled to do so without interfering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you men, money, and stores of every kind." It cannot be matter of surprise that Sir George Prevost should persevere in his defensive system, even after the termination of the armistice, and when from the manner in which the Government of the United States had received the communication of the repeal of the Orders in Council, it was evident that they meant to continue the war for other objects; for it ought to be considered, that up to that period, the only reinforcements of troops received by him were the 103d, nearly a boy-regiment, and the first battalion of the Royals from the West Indies, the latter incomplete, from the capture of part of their numbers, on board of one of the transports, by an American frigate. In consequence, however, of this addition to the force in the Lower Province, Sir George Prevost was enabled immediately to strengthen the army in Upper Canada, by detachments from the 49th regiment, Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, and Royal Veterans; but it must be evident that the total accession of strength in both Provinces was not sufficient to warrant a departure from a system, which had been adopted after the fullest deliberation, and upon a just calculation of the means necessary to meet the American warfare. The grounds of Sir George Prevost's opinion on this head had been stated to General Brock, in his letters to him of the 7th and 10th July, before referred to; and as a further confirmation of the necessity of adhering to it, in his communication to General Brock, of the 17th September, Sir George Prevost acquaints him, that in his last despatches from Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th July, 1812, he is told by him, "That his Majesty's Government trusts he will be enabled to suspend, with perfect safety, all extraordinary preparations for defence, which he may have been induced to make, in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States."—As this opinion of the British Government was evidently founded upon their belief, that the revocation of the Orders in Council would either prevent war, if not declared, or lead to an immediate peace, had hostilities commenced, it was plain that no further reinforcements could be expected to be even ordered from England, until accounts should arrive there of the reception which the intelligence of the revocation of the Orders in Council had met with from the Government of the United States. As this could not well be before the end of September, there was not the slightest prospect of any addition being afforded to the force in the Canadas before the ensuing year; and it was therefore certain, that the Commander of the forces would until that period be completely left to his own resources for the defence of those Provinces.

To husband those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of Montreal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent insecurity to the Provinces which he was defending, Sir George Prevost continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his successor, General Sheaffe, the necessity of adhering to a defensive system; nor does it appear from any part of the correspondence between these officers and Sir George Prevost, that they had any particular object in view, which that policy restrained them from pursuing. Previous to the armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his reasons, which were evidently independent of the consideration of any instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive operations against the American frontier; and subsequent to the capture of Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of inadequate objects.

The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that moment; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and aware of the policy of permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not contemplate any immediate attack." Two strong inferences naturally arise from this letter—the one, that General Brock must have considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not positive, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but discretionary; the other, that General Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their homes, would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy, they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,[30] something more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 regular troops which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the prisoners, whose numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were constantly arriving. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at, that Major-General Sheaffe should not have listened to the suggestions of any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful, to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the Reviewer's sagacious opinion, "Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops!"

Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the critic against General Sheaffe and Sir George Prevost as lovers of armistices, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and prudence in General Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the advantages gained by the gallant and able conduct of his lamented predecessor, and strengthened and confirmed at Queenstown by himself. General Sheaffe was, therefore, wisely contented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to invade the Province; and, anxious to secure its future preservation, he willingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all conversant with military subjects, that to those who are carrying on a defensive warfare, which their inferiority of force and means of every description has obliged them to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be infinitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was fully aware of the importance of this measure to the safety of the province, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, since he was in daily expectation of receiving supplies of clothing, and other articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were also on their way to him; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and materially contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expedient in the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the purpose of affording time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over to the enemy's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last tribute of respect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and permitted him to leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil government.

It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious officer, although it was adopted without any reference to, and without the consent or approbation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit to characterize the armistice[31] as one for which no reason, civil or military, was ever assigned; whereas it was notorious to the army employed on the Niagara line that General Sheaffe was influenced in this step by the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately communicated by him to Sir George Prevost. If any thing further were necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has thought fit so groundlessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged, although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his Majesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declaration of war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, "The instructions given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sherbrooke, cautioning them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent."

In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the general principles upon which Sir George Prevost intended to conduct the operations of the war, by making the defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, "I have it in command from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence."

In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds—"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."

Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"[32] of Sir George Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been discretionary instead of positive. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in possession of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's detachment at the Moravian village.

Having thus briefly adverted to the principal occurrences of the first campaign in Upper Canada, it becomes necessary to say a few words with regard to those of the Lower Province, during the same period; and which, being under the immediate direction of Sir George Prevost, the Reviewer has thought proper to characterize as utterly insignificant.[33] Almost immediately after intelligence of the war had arrived at Quebec, Sir George Prevost repaired to Montreal, for the purpose of providing for the defence of that frontier; and having established a cordon of troops in the situations most exposed to attack, between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu rivers, consisting of all the flank companies of the 49th and 100th regiments, together with three battalions of embodied militia, and one of Canadian voltigeurs, which last four corps had been raised and disciplined previous to the war, he returned to Quebec, in order to meet the Provincial Parliament. The legislature had been summoned, principally, for the purpose of obtaining from them an act authorizing the circulation of army bills, a measure to which from his deserved popularity with that body, they did not hesitate to accede, and without which, from the want of specie, it would scarcely have been possible to carry on the public service. To many of the arrangements and measures of Sir George Prevost, for reinforcing and strengthening Upper Canada, as well as for guarding the approaches to the Lower Province, reference has already been made. The whole summer had been unceasingly employed in these important objects, and the greatest exertions had been made to transport and convey to Kingston, by the tedious route of the St. Lawrence, against the current, and along a frontier much exposed to the enemy, the various supplies which the exigencies of the Upper Province demanded; all of which, by the judicious and able arrangements made by him for that purpose, arrived safe and without loss, or with very inconsiderable molestation.

In the month of August Sir George Prevost again repaired to Montreal, in order that he might be ready to take the field, should the movements of General Dearborn, who commanded the enemy's forces on that frontier, indicate any intention of attacking our line of defence, which had been entrusted to the charge of Major-General de Rottenburg. General Dearborn having, on the 16th November, advanced from Plattsburg to Champlain town, close upon our frontier line, thereby threatening the front of Major-General de Rottenburg's position, Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of this intelligence, crossed the St. Lawrence with a considerable proportion of the force then at Montreal, in order to strengthen the point thus threatened, and established his head-quarters at Chambly, where he remained for several weeks. Whether this movement on the part of General Dearborn was made in the expectation of finding that no effectual resistance would be offered by the Canadian population to his further advance into the Province, or with the view of preventing the sending of reinforcements from the Lower to the Upper Province, he was equally disappointed in both these objects. The able measures adopted by Sir George Prevost in the disposition of the regular troops, as well as of the militia, who displayed the most ardent spirit of loyalty, and the most resolute determination to repel every attempt of the enemy to invade the Colony, induced the American Commander in Chief to abandon any further intention of advancing. After pushing forward a few reconnoitring parties which were invariably forced to retreat without effecting their object, he was ultimately compelled, by the advanced season of the year, to close the campaign, and to put the army into winter quarters.