Well, gentlemen, if I am right in feeling that you acquit me of any desire to disparage the officers and men who compose the Territorial Force, and that you will believe me when I repeat, what I have often said before, that I am second to none in my admiration of the patriotism and self-sacrifice displayed by them in their endeavour to make Lord Haldane's scheme a success—you will not, I am sure, misunderstand me if I now express my views quite frankly to you.

At the Manchester meeting I gave it as my opinion that the Territorial Force is a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, a failure in equipment, and a failure in energy. Let me say a few words on each of these supremely important points.

Failure in Discipline.—Gentlemen, only those who have taken part in war, or have carefully studied the history of wars, can, I am persuaded, realize to its full extent the significance of discipline as applied to war. They alone can know that it is by discipline, and discipline alone, that bodies of men can be relied upon to work together in times of great difficulty and danger, and to withstand the disintegrating effect of war; for they have learnt that it is discipline alone which prevents panic seizing upon men when unforeseen circumstances arise. They alone know that amongst untrained or ill-trained troops panic spreads with lightning rapidity, and that when there is no sense of discipline to be appealed to and to keep the men together, defeat is the inevitable result.

It is discipline alone which gives the soldier confidence in himself, reliance on his comrades, and belief in his officers. It is discipline alone which gives him the courage to face vastly superior numbers; to continue marching, though worn out with fatigue and want of food, ready to fight again, and yet again. It is discipline alone that supports him under the strain of lying still for successive hours in the punishing fire zone—one of the most trying of the many exacting conditions of modern warfare. It is discipline alone which makes the soldier obey the word of command, even under such circumstances as I have described. Clear understanding of and prompt obedience to an order become an instinct to the properly trained soldier, whereas the imperfectly trained man, when he finds himself in an unfamiliar and trying position, frequently misunderstands the word of command, and, when matters become acute, he does not heed or even hear it.

Gentlemen, when I tell you that discipline is the backbone of an army, I ask you whether it is possible for that essential quality to be instilled into the ranks of the Territorial Force with the amount of training that is given to them.

Failure in Numbers.—Gentlemen, despite the untiring efforts of the Territorial Associations—a large proportion of whose members are staunch supporters of the National Service League—the Territorial Force is still far short of its established strength of 315,000 men. Possibly this is a blessing in disguise, for if men had come forward in sufficient numbers to bring the Force up to its establishment, politicians would have assured the country, even more fervently than they do now, that our Home Defence Army is in all respects what is needed. The truth is that the number 315,000 has no relation to our real requirements. It was fixed upon because the experience of fifty years had proved that a larger number could never be forthcoming under the voluntary system. As with the Regular Army, so with the Home Defence Army, the strength is governed by what is known to be the limit obtainable by voluntary effort. It has no relation to the requirements of war. It solves no known problem. Again, therefore, gentlemen, I ask you whether it is possible to regard the Territorial Force as fitted, in respect to numbers, for the defence of the United Kingdom.

Failure in Equipment.—In common with the Regular Army the Territorial Force is armed with a rifle inferior to the rifle possessed by foreign nations, and with a less deadly bullet than is used by them. But the Territorial rifle is even inferior to the present Regular Army rifle in range, in trajectory, and in stopping power.

Then the gun in use with the Territorial Artillery is a mere makeshift. It is distinctly inferior in power, range, and rapidity of fire to the gun of any first-rate State, and it is not too much to say that, if our Regular soldiers were armed as the Territorials are armed, they could not keep the field against the troops of any European nation. If this is so, how unfair, how disastrous, it would be to ask Territorial troops to undertake a task which their seasoned and disciplined comrades of the Regular Army could not face.

Then as regards mobilization arrangements, supply and transport services, ammunition columns, trains, horses, vehicles, harness, even boots for the men—in none of these essentials are the Territorials, as a Force, complete. I therefore repeat that failure in equipment is not an unfair statement.

Failure in Energy.—By failure in energy, I do not for a moment mean to imply that individual members of the Territorial Force are wanting in energy. I know how earnestly many of them have striven to learn and to do their duty under adverse circumstances. My criticism applies to the Force itself—to its corporate energy—if I may use such an expression. And even those who are the firmest believers in the Force must, I think, admit that, under existing conditions, it is not practicable for it to attain that combined action, that alertness, that intensity and vitality, all of which are essential to success in war.