Wrote two letters to the Duke—one on the subject of Sir J. P. Grant, who has closed the Courts at Bombay because the Government would not execute an unlawful process, and the other respecting Persian affairs, giving the substance of the despatches which I enclosed.
We have a Cabinet to-morrow at 12 on Turkish affairs. I would not allow the Russians to advance any further. I would send one from our own body, incognito, to Paris to talk to Polignac and endeavour to get him to join us in an act of vigorous intervention which would give character to his Government and save Constantinople. I would pass the English and French fleets through the Dardanelles, and give Russia a leaf out of the Greek Treaty. But I do not expect that this will be Aberdeen's course.
Drummond, whom I saw, said the Duke was delighted with the account of the
Jaghirdars of the Kistna. Granville is gone to Ireland.
The Duke was gone to Windsor. It is the King's birthday.
August 13.
When the Cabinet was assembled the Duke said we were not to consider the state of things at Constantinople, and what we should do. He thought the Russians would get to Constantinople, and into it. If they did he thought there was an end of the Ottoman Empire. He was doubtful whether, after the innovations introduced, the Turks would cordially support Mahmoud, [Footnote: Sultan Mahmoud, as is well known, remodelled the whole internal organisation of the Turkish Empire. He was denounced as the Giaour Sultan by old-fashioned Turks.] and already there were insurrections of the Greeks. It was just what he predicted in his letter to La Ferronays, and what Lord Dudley afterwards said in a letter to Lièven; the success of the Russians was the dissolution of an Empire which could not be reconstituted. It was too late to interfere by force, even if we had been disposed to do so alone.
He thought France, if we did nothing, would be quiet—if we did anything, she would take the other line. Polignac was a more able man than people supposed, and he would adhere to the course he adopted. We might endeavour, at any rate, to ascertain his feelings and intentions.
As to the Greek question we must have a conference, and consider the suggestions of the Ambassadors, namely, that whatever we chose to make Greece, should be declared independent, and guaranteed. Both the Duke and Aberdeen thought France and Russia would both take the proposition into consideration. The former as to limits, the latter for delay. France had already told us that, provided we could agree upon the limits, she was inclined to adopt the suggestion of the Ambassadors.
We asked whether the permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia was to be submitted to? The answer was, No, to be opposed by war. It seemed to me and to Fitzgerald we had better endeavour to prevent, at a small expense, even if alone, a measure we could only retrieve if it took place at an enormous expense, if at all, and which would in all probability effect the ruin of the Turkish Empire. I did not think affairs quite so desperate. I thought the Russians might get to Adrianople, but not to Constantinople, and that they could not maintain themselves at Adrianople without the command of the sea. We had six ships at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and these with the Turkish Fleet would open the Black Sea.
I was for passing our ships up to Constantinople and placing them at the disposal of the Ambassador, for from hence we cannot give orders adapted to circumstances. It was replied that would be war. If war were to be declared we should do as much mischief as possible, and go to Cronstadt, not to the Black Sea. We should have our ships beyond the Bosphorus when Russia occupied the Dardanelles, and shut us in. This would make us ridiculous.