As the object is not to do mischief to Russia, but to save the Turkish
Empire, I should say that measure was to be effected at the Bosphorus, for
Constantinople, once taken, and the Ottoman Power annihilated, it would be
of no use to distress Russia.
Fitzgerald seemed to be of my opinion that, however desperate the chance, we should do all we could to save Constantinople, and at any risk.
It was determined that our fleet in the Mediterranean should be reinforced by three or four line-of-battle ships, on the principle that wherever any Power had a large force, we should have one—not a very wise principle, it seems to me, if we are never to use force. I interceded for a few powerful steamers, with 68 pound carronades, and I think Lord Melville seemed inclined to acquiesce.
Questions are to be put to Polignac to ascertain what he would do in certain events. I said he never would open himself to Lord Stuart. It was then suggested by the Duke that Aberdeen could write a private letter. This will, I believe, be done. I said to Fitzgerald, who was next to me, 'Neither letter nor Stuart will get anything out of Polignac. One of ourselves should go to Paris as an individual, see Polignac, and return before the Conference.'
I suggested Rosslyn, as he had nothing to do. Fitzgerald said he could go and return in a week, and seemed to wish to do so. However, nothing was said openly; and with all the means of success in our hands, for, I think, Polignac might be brought into our views, we shall lose all by not using proper instruments; just as we have lost the Greek question by persisting in keeping Stratford Canning.
We had a good deal of conversation as to the limits of Greece. The Duke was for adhering to the Morea. It was really the best line. It was what we had guaranteed. We had told the Turks we did not mean to go beyond it.
Aberdeen has always had a little private hankering after Athens, though he ridicules it. He had no scruple about annexing Athens, although not yet taken. I said I thought Polignac would be disposed to hold our language to Russia, if we would make some concession on the subject of Greece, and enable him to settle that question with éclat. He would then be supported by France in any strong language he might hold, and would establish himself by the experiment of his first fortnight of office.
However, the Cabinet seems disposed to look at accessories, not at principles, at the minor objects rather than at the one great object, which is inducing France to act with us to prevent the occupation of Constantinople or to force its evacuation. Instead of yielding upon points of minor importance, in order to carry the question, we are to insist now on the minor points-the evacuation of the Morea by the French, and then, I fear we shall weaken Polignac's Government, and lose our object.
Our foreign policy has certainly been, most unsuccessful. We have succeeded in nothing.
The communication to be made to Polignac is to be made to him confidentially, and he is to know it is not to be made to Austria. It is considered that in any case Austria would support France and England if they acted together, and any indication Austria might give of moving alone would bring down Prussia upon her. This line, I think, well considered and prudent.