Unwilling, however, to injure this fine city, I sent in proposals for capitulation, giving permission to the revolutionary leaders to depart unpunished, together with their property, provided they quitted the Brazilian territory—demanding in return the surrender of the forts, ships of war, gunboats, &c. as well as of all public property. In order to prevent waste of time in correspondence, I proposed to Carvalho to meet me on board any neutral ship of war, pledging my honour as to his being permitted to return in safety; he nevertheless declined the interview, proposing in return to meet me on shore on an island near the town but—as after his insulting proposal, I could have no confidence in his honour, this was of course declined.
Still anxious to avoid extremities—from which, after the threats made, I could not consistently refrain—I again wrote to Carvalho, that, had he possessed the means of distinguishing between the intentions of the Emperor, and the proceedings of a foreign faction, he would not have been in arms against His Imperial Majesty, by adherence to whom Brazil could alone be saved from that anarchy and confusion into which Mexico and other South American States had fallen through individual rivalry and the ignorance of their popular assemblies. I further pointed out to him, that if, by procrastination I was compelled to bombard the city, the popular clamour against the insurgent authorities might be followed by melancholy proof to himself how quickly political adventurers may be abandoned or betrayed in the hour of danger, and that he had better yield to reason, what he could not prevent my effecting by force.
By writers who could not have known anything of the circumstances—which exist only in my own documents—I have been blamed for this tone of moderation towards the revolutionary President. There were two valid reasons for this course; first, that the conduct of the Pernambucans admitted of great palliation, seeing that the distractions resulting from the Portuguese faction in the administration at Rio de Janeiro had been ignorantly construed into acts of His Imperial Majesty—so that the injured people argued that it would have been better for them to have remained a colony of Portugal, than a colony of the Government at Rio de Janeiro—this mode of reasoning not being very far wrong. Secondly—and this fully accounts for the moderation complained of—I knew, from the most authentic sources that, in case of attack on the city, Carvalho had determined to retire into the interior, there to carry on civil war by enlisting the negro population under his standard; to avert which, I considered that moderation was the best course to induce him and his partisans to quit the empire, which would thus have been well rid of them.
It was folly, therefore, to consider the rebellion local, as had been represented to the Imperial Government, or that its actors and instigators were few and insignificant, for, in truth, as has been said, it had already extended far and wide into the adjacent provinces, I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine, that "although it might not be difficult to put down the revolution in the city, which, even the land forces could have already accomplished, had they not been landed at a distance—yet that without great circumspection, the prevention of further revolution in the interior would be a work of time, trouble, and expense; and that even all these would be thrown away, unless the causes which had led to the rebellion, were removed or explained."
The time given having expired without acceptance of the terms, it became necessary to make at least a shew of enforcing them, though the water was too shallow to admit vessels of large burden to approach with safety, and the small vessels were ill adapted to the purpose; still I determined to make a demonstration, and as a preparatory step ordered Captain Welsh, of the Paraguassu, to shift into the flagship all the English petty officers and seamen; but a heavy swell set in, and as the anchorage was bad, I considered the risk imprudent.
The schooner Leopoldina was therefore ordered to try the effect of a few experimental shells; but the mortar so shook the vessel, that she had to be withdrawn, it being evident that nothing further could be done till the weather would permit the approach of ships, or that rafts could be constructed—for which purpose timber had been ordered from Bahia. Little damage was effected by this experiment, for the wealthiest inhabitants had fled into the interior, taking with them all their valuable property.
Heavy weather having now set in compelled the flagship to run to Bahia for safety, the outer road of Pernambuco being at this season exceedingly dangerous from the coralline nature of the bottom, as was practically proved by the fact that the Pedro Primiero lost every anchor but one, so that to remain was certain destruction, and there was no alternative but to make for Bahia to procure anchors.
Nothing had been heard of General Lima's force since its debarkation, I was therefore anxious to know what had become of it, and how far it was in a condition to cooperate, the speedy possession of the place being nautically an important point—for, whilst blockading we had intercepted a Portuguese vessel, only forty-three days from the Tagus, and learned from her letters that a large force was preparing at Lisbon, consisting of sixteen ships of war and numerous transports, their destination being Pernambuco; this forming sufficient proof that the Portuguese Government counted on the recovery of those disorganised provinces which had alike revolted against the mother country and the Emperor of Brazil.
On the 4th of September, the flagship left for Bahia, first visiting the island of Alexo, where the Cacique and Maranhaõ were at anchor. From them we learned that General Lima's head-quarters were at Leimham, his advance guard having joined the troops at Mogado, on the banks of a river near Cape St. Augustine, the revolutionary forces occupying the other bank.
On reaching Bahia, we received information that the rebel Government at Pernambuco was in immediate expectation of several fast sailing vessels, ordered by the revolutionary President from North America, and also of two steamers from England. I therefore wrote to the Minister of Marine to send me some superior sailing vessels, as, if the anticipated expedition from Lisbon, or those expected from England and America, made their appearance, four at least of our force would, from their bad sailing, run the risk of being captured on the first appearance of the enemy.