Wellington by this time occupied the lines of Torres Vedras, the formation of which have conferred as much honour on him as any of the great victories which he achieved. A recent writer gives this outline sketch of these lines:—“The peninsula, or promontory, at whose south-eastern extremity Lisbon is situated, is crossed rather obliquely by two serras, or chains of mountains, which extend with various altitudes and various degrees of steepness, but with partial interruptions or openings, from the shore of the Atlantic to the right bank of the Tagus. These two serras run nearly parallel with each other, at a distance of from six to eight miles; the point of the line nearest to Lisbon being close to the Tagus, between Via Longa and Quintilla. Through the passes in these serras and the low ground bordering the Tagus four roads from the interior of the country led to the capital. The hand of nature had marked out these two lines of defence, and British science and engineering had been employed for a whole year in strengthening them, and in blocking up the openings which seemed the most accessible. Here redoubts were erected; here the whole face of a mountain was scarped and hewn into the appearance of the facet of some Titanic fortress; here the threads of mountain-rivulets—which would be something more than rivulets at the end of October and in November—were collected and brought together into one bed; and here rivers, tributaries of the great Tagus, were dammed up, or were provided with dams which could be used, and with flood-gates which could be shut, so as to inundate the country at the foot of the hills, on the approach of the invader. The line of defence was everywhere double, while in some parts there was a treble range of batteries and redoubts. The first line, which was twenty-nine English miles in length, began at Alhendra on the Tagus, crossed the valley of Aruda, and passed along the skirts of Monte Agraca, where there was a large and strong redoubt. It then ran across the valley of Zibreira, skirted the deep ravine of Ruda, to the heights of Torres Vedras, and thence followed the course of the little river Zizandre to its mouth on the Atlantic. The second or inner line, at a distance varying from six to eight, and in some parts to ten miles, extended from Quintilla on the Tagus by Bucellas, Monte Chique, and Mafra, to the mouth of the little river St. Lourenço, on the sea-coast, a distance of about twenty-four miles. This was by far the stronger line of the two, both by nature and by art; and if the first line were forced by an enemy, the retreat of the army upon the second was secure at all times. Both these lines were secured by breast-works, abattis, and stone walls, with banquettes and scarps: not an opening nor interstice through which a mountain goat could pass but was blocked up or guarded. Down the hollows in which the roads ran were pointed the black muzzles of numerous guns, projecting from batteries which could maintain a fire in front, and a crossing fire from the flanks. And, to provide for every occurrence, to make sure of a safe and easy passage to our ships of war in the Tagus, there was in the rear of the second line a shorter, closer line, to protect the embarkation of our troops. This innermost line of all was strong enough to check even a brave enemy, had there been no other lines before it: it rested at one extremity on a tremendous redoubt, and at the other on the broad ditch and lofty walls of the castle of S. Julian. About one hundred redoubts or forts, containing altogether more than six hundred pieces of artillery, were scattered along these lines.”
Lord Wellington and the allied army entered within the foremost of these lines on the 8th of October. On arriving each division took up its assigned quarters, and the defences, which were strong enough before, were made still stronger. In the whole the troops which manned them amounted to about 130,000; of which 70,000 were regulars, and half of them British. Massena arrived in the plains below Torres Vedras on the 11th: he appears to have been taken by surprise at the sight of Wellington’s lines; and he employed several days in examining their nature, and in endeavouring to discover a spot through which he might force a passage. Some demonstrations were made in order to compel the British divisions to exhibit their force; and on the 14th there was some fighting between the town of Sobral and the lines, in which the French were defeated by the English bayonet. The war was now reduced to a species of blockade. The heart of Massena was smitten with despair at the sight of the scarped rocks, and the cannon on the eminences; and the object he had in view now was to support his army till re-enforcements should arrive. In the meantime re-enforceinents had arrived in Wellington’s camp from England and Gibraltar, so that he had a force numerically equal to that of the enemy. Massena’s situation soon, however, became desperate. In order to starve his opponents Lord Wellington brought down the Portuguese militia from the north, and persuaded Carlos d’Espaua to pass the Tagus with a considerable corps of Spaniards, to co-operate in cutting off all communication with the French rear and, as it were, enclosing the blockades. Massena was reduced to such straits for provisions that he was obliged to send movable columns to scour the country; and, on these columns the independent corps of Portuguese Spaniards sought revenge for desolated homes and slaughtered kindred: they were attacked and slain with as little mercy as they had shown to others. Losses by the sword, by sickness, and by privation, amounting to about 15,000 men since the battle of Busaco, at length induced Massena, on the 15th of November, to make a retrograde movement. He withdrew his army from the low wet grounds in front of Torres Vedras, and placed it in cantonments for the winter: the second, or Itegnier’s corps, being placed in and near Santarem; the eighth in Perns; the sixth corps further back, in Thomar; while his head-quarters were at Torres Novas. Before Massena could reach these safe positions, his soldiers were molested by the British light division and cavalry, who took some prisoners. Lord Wellington did not deem it prudent to attack them in these several positions, but leaving part of his army in the lines, he moved forward with the remainder; and having placed Hill’s division on the banks of the Tagus, he fixed his head-quarters at Cartaxo. Such were the positions of the belligerent forces during the winter. By his movements Lord Wellington had saved the capital of Portugal, and reduced the enemy to a state of inactivity. The sequel of Massena’s invasion of that country belongs to the history of the next year.
AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.
These events in Portugal had the effect of counteracting some of the designs of the French in Spain. During their transaction Soult had been devising measures for the capture of Cadiz; but towards the end of December, instructions arrived requiring him to co-operate with Massena. He repaired to Seville, taking with him Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, and 5000 infantry; but such was Lord Wellington’s precaution, and such the activity of the partidas, that he could not effect any communication with Massena, as directed. Under these circumstances, Soult represented that as his force was weakened by the blockade of Cadiz, and the protection of Seville, he dared not penetrate into the Alemtejo. This movement, he said, would oblige him to leave Olivenza and Badajoz in his rear, with two Spanish corps under Ballasteros and Mendizabel; and he requested permission to besiege these two places. Napoleon consented to his request, and Soult prepared for a siege of these cities. At this time General Hill was obliged to return home on account of ill health; and the command of the troops, British, Spanish, and Portuguese, on the Tagus, was given to Marshal Beresford. The Marshal’s instructions were to prevent the passage of the river; to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult; and to join the main army by Vellada if in retreat, and by Abrantes if in advance. His head-quarters were fixed at Chamusea, and his troops dispersed along the Tagus, from Almey-rim to the mouth of the Zezere. During the winter several attacks were made by the irregular forces and Portuguese militia on the French detachments; but each commander waited for re-enforcements before they assumed offensive operations.
FOREIGN CONQUESTS, ETC.
In other quarters of the world our operations this year were of considerable importance. In the lists of our conquests was that of Santa Maura, added to the other Ionian Islands rescued from the French dominion; the Dutch settlement of Amboyna, with its dependent islands; the Dutch settlement of Banda, the principal of the Spice Islands; and the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius. In the latter island a large quantity-of stores and valuable merchandise, five large frigates, some smaller ships of war, twenty-eight merchantmen, and two British captured East Indiamen were taken by the conquerors. In the West Indies a combined naval and military force, under Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane and Lieutenant-General Beckwith, made the important conquest of the island of Guadaloupe, the last colonial possession of France. Nearer home the arms of the British were also successful. In the month of July Murat collected a large armament on the coast of Calabria, for the invasion of Sicily; but 900 of his troops were taken prisoners by General Campbell, and the rest were driven for shelter to their vessels. With similar success the island of Anholt, in the Baltic, was defended by Captain Maurice with 380 men, against a Danish force of eight times the number.