THE MUTINY.
In a previous chapter it was related, that at the close of the year 1856 symptoms of mutiny were exhibited in the Bengal army. At the beginning of 1857 these symptoms became demonstrative and terrible. It is difficult to say how far an acute and foreseeing government might have prevented the evil, but the last persons to observe the signs of the times, and provide against the rising calamity, were those in high authority. “There were,” wrote the editor of an Indian paper, “deep tokens of disaffection everywhere, suspicious looks and expressions daily heard in the bazaar, and a belief that all was not sound in the minds of Englishmen unconnected with the services. Every class, except the members of the governing body, was impressed with a foreboding of evil. No one, however, without the pale of authority dreamt of the magnitude of the dangers by which we were about to be assailed; and inside that potent circle not a soul had gained an inkling of the coming horrors. The ship of the state was struck by a white squall, with every sail set, and not a man at his post to warn the crew of their peril. On the 22nd of January, 1857, Captain Wright, of the 70th native infantry, brought to the notice of Major Bontein, commanding the depot of musketry at Dum-Dum, the fact that there was a mutinous spirit among the troops in connection with the greased cartridges.” From that date the conspiracy developed itself rapidly, but at no stage of its incipient progress did the government show sagacity in detecting the causes of the outbreak, or efficient means for its repression.
At Barrackpore and Berhampore indications of mutiny of a decisive nature were made. General Hearsey, who commanded at Barrackpore, gave the government explicit information, and foretold results. The government would not be warned.
A mutiny of the 19th regiment led to the disbanding of that corps. This regiment was by no means among the more disloyal sepoys; it had been seduced into acts of insubordination, and regretted it. There was, however, little discrimination on the part of the Calcutta authorities. Some corps attempted to murder their officers, and were treated with surprising leniency. General Anson, who commanded the forces in India, was at Simlah, where the military records also were, and much loss of time and great confusion resulted from the necessity of the government at Calcutta carrying on a correspondence, with so remote a station, on subjects of such vital moment. When at last the commander-in-chief became convinced of the danger that existed, he hurried down to Umballah, and issued a conciliatory proclamation to the army, which had the effect of increasing the pride and self-importance of the sepoys.
Matters proceeded in this way until May, when the first grand effort of mutiny burst forth at Meerut. The sepoys suddenly arose there, attacked their officers, murdered some, and, having set fire to the cantonments, marched to Delhi. Major-general Hewett, who commanded the garrison, showed extraordinary weakness and vacillation, and took no prompt or vigorous measures to intercept the flight of the fugitives, or to pursue them. The mutiny occurred on Sunday evening, the 10th of May. The rabble of the neighbourhood joined the mutineers. Both the revolted sepoys and the insurgents showed a sanguinary delight in murdering women and children. As soon as the fugitive mutineers arrived at Delhi the whole city rose in insurrection; its garrison revolted, women and children were butchered, the ex-king of Delhi, a pensioner of the British government, was placed at the head of the revolution, and his sons were leaders in every act of barbarity and cowardice. The magazine was defended by a few officers and soldiers. Among them was Lieutenant Willoughby, who, when defence was no longer possible, blew up a large portion of the magazine, causing the death of a considerable number of the assailants, estimated, according to different testimonies, at from one to two thousand.
On the 18th of May the general at Meerut sent a despatch to say that he could not move his troops against Delhi, or for any operations in the field, for want of carriage. Such was the management of military affairs in India.
General Anson slowly collected a force at Umballah, and Sir John Lawrence sent Sikh troops from the Punjaub. General Anson died, and the command devolved upon General Barnard, who marched upon Delhi. It must not be supposed that Sir Henry Barnard, in his advance to Delhi, was unopposed. Whatever the sepoys may have been in British pay, in revolt they were energetic and persevering, and, as long as they entertained any hope of success, fought with keenness; as a loyal native in Delhi described them, “they were willing to take life, and willing to give their lives away.” It had been arranged, before General Anson’s death, that a brigade should advance from Umballah, under General Barnard, and that General Hewett, at Meerut, should order another brigade to advance from that station, the two forces to form a junction, and storm or lay siege to Delhi. In pursuance of this plan General Hewett placed a small body of troops under the command of Colonel Archdale Wilson, consisting of five hundred men of the 60th Royal Rifle regiment, two hundred of the carbineers, and one battery of artillery, to which a troop of horse-artillery was subsequently added. They marched on the 27th of May, and encamped on the 30th at Ghazeeoodeen Nuggur, a large Hindoo village on the left bank of the river Hindoun, eighteen miles east of Delhi. At that place there was a suspension bridge, the possession of which commanded the passage of the Hindoun from Meerut. Brigadier Wilson was attacked there by a force from Delhi, who hoped, by defeating the colonel, to prevent the junction of his forces with troops from Kurnoul. A battle ensued, the first of the war, as the previous struggles between mutineers and loyalists did not assume the form of a regular engagement. The rebels not only disputed the passage of the river, but opened a heavy cannonade with five guns from a well-chosen position. Wilson brought all his troops into action. The rifles were very efficient, fighting in a mode similar to that afterwards attributed to the Turcos of the French army in the war in Italy. They rushed forward with great rapidity for short spaces, then falling flat on their faces, timing their intervals of movement by the play of the enemy’s guns, which they watched skilfully. In this way they suffered exceedingly little in their advance, until at last springing upon the guns they captured them instantaneously, piercing the gunners with their sword bayonets. The sepoy infantry made a stand, but the rifles, in a hand to hand combat, were easy victors. The battle was decided in favour of the British; the sepoys fled, pursued by the carbineers, who continued the pursuit until night closed around conquerors and fugitives. The loss on the part of the English was eleven killed, and twenty-one wounded and missing. Of the killed five met their death by the explosion of a powder-waggon, fired by a desperate sepoy. Captain Andrews, of the Rifles, was one of those blown up.
On the 31st Colonel Courtance, of the carbineers, was actively employed watching strong reconnoitering parties of the enemy’s horse, so that the brigade could not advance far on the left side of the river without another action. At one o’clock five thousand mutineers and irregulars took up a position on an elevated sweep of land. A battle of artillery ensued; the mutineers of the 3rd Bengal cavalry charged the English guns repeatedly, but were repulsed. After more than two hours, spent in a contest of this kind, Colonel Wilson ordered his line to advance, and the mutineers were routed. The English were too much exhausted by the heat to pursue: several men in all branches of the service dropped dead from sun-stroke. The rebels bore away their guns. The English lost twenty-four men; about half from sun-stroke. Lieutenant Perkins was among the slain; Captain Johnson, and Ensign Napier, among the wounded. The stubbornness of the mutineers led Colonel Wilson to maintain his position and await orders and reinforcements. On the 3rd of June he was joined by another company of the Royal York Rifle regiment, and by a battalion of Goorkhas. These troops remained faithful, for, although attached to the Brahminical religion, they are more superstitious than fanatical, and hold the sepoys, and even Sikhs, in contempt, while the British are objects of military admiration to them. On the 6th the brigade reached the rendezvous at Rhagput.
The force from Umballah left that place on the 24th of May, and readied Kurnaul on the 25th. Anson died on the 27th. In his last illness he confided the capture of’ Delhi to General Barnard, and telegraphed to Lord Canning that he had done so, who confirmed the general in the command of the forces acting against Delhi. Before the command delegated to Barnard by Anson could be confirmed at Calcutta, General Reid, in virtue of seniority, became chief of the army, but he carried out the wish of General Anson in confiding the attack on Delhi to Sir. H. Barnard.
After various misunderstandings and serious delays on the part of Colonel Wilson, caused by the obstruction offered by the sepoys, and by taking a circuitous and difficult route, the two brigades met on the 6th of June, and on the 7th the whole force was reorganized near Delhi.