The brigades under both generals had been considerably augmented on the march. The officials took no steps for preventing disaster, but acted in the same way as in England and elsewhere, that occasioned so much loss of life and reputation before Sebastopol. Sir H. Barnard found himself and all about him, upon whom in the first instance the duty devolved, bewildered, and incapable of combining, arranging, or devising expedients to supply governmental and commissary defects. The army before Delhi, on a small scale, for a time repeated the faults and follies of the army before Sebastopol. Those upon whom the army depended for intelligence, succour, and directions, gave no real aid, but created additional embarrassments. The time consumed in deciding anything was extraordinary, although in the early part of the siege the telegraphic wire lent all its aid between Agra and Calcutta. General Barnard found that he could not take Delhi by storm; a regular siege was therefore resorted to. Throughout the month of June a fierce conflict raged around the once proud capital of Hindostan. During July these conflicts were continued, and rendered fiercer by the arrival of large forces-of mutineers from Rohilcund. Mutiny was discovered in the camp of the besiegers. Sickness also smote the British, so that by the end of July there were 1,200 invalids in the little army. Battle and disease must have utterly wasted it had not Sir John Lawrence sent troops’ and supplies, and with them the skilful and intrepid young General Nicholson. The sickness and ultimate decease of Sir Henry Barnard caused the demand to devolve on the senior general, Reid. His health also giving way, General Wilson, an excellent artillery officer, assumed the command.
Early in August the English made an effort to destroy the bridge of boats, by floating detonating machines, which was unsuccessful, and the mutineers continued to make it available for purposes hostile to the besiegers, and advantageous to themselves. On the 1st of August 5000 men made a sortie, if such, in the peculiar circumstances of the siege, it could be called. The Metcalf picket-house and the flag-staff tower became the objects of incessant attack. The sepoys, however, fought in vain. During August reinforcements for the rebels poured into the city of Delhi, from the various districts, far and near, where revolt had raged.
In the beginning of September the siege-train arrived, and strong reinforcements of troops; the sick and wounded then reached the number of 3000. A terrible bombardment was opened against the city on the 11th, which continued until the 14th, when the assault was ordered, and after desperate fighting it proved successful. It was not, however, destined to triumph on the first day. On all points but one the British were victorious. The attack on the western suburbs failed from the inefficiency of the Cashmere contingent, the bravery and number of the sepoys, and their contempt for the native force under Captain Dwyer’s command. After a fearful conflict for possession of the Redghat, the whole attack on the western side was abandoned. The English held the posts won within the gates: the enemy showed unflinching resolution, and even threatened the English flanks and rear. Night closed over the sanguinary scene, the English having lost 8 officers killed, and 52 wounded; 162 English and 103 native soldiers killed; 512 English, and 310 natives wounded. The first and second columns held all the towers, bastions, and ramparts from the vicinity of the Cashmere-gate to the Cabulgate; the third column and the reserve held the Cashmeregate, the English church, Skinner’s house, the Water bastion, Ahmed Ali Khan’s house, the college gardens, and many buildings and open spots in that part of Delhi; while the fourth column, defeated in the western suburbs, had retreated to the camp or the ridge. It was not until the end of that the long and bloody succession of assaults ended in the total subjugation of the place, after deeds of slaughter seldom paralleled. The king and several members of his family escaped, but were pursued by Major Hodson, and captured under circumstances of extraordinary daring and presence of mind on the part of that officer.
The taking of Delhi was a deadly blow to the hopes of the rebels all over India.
The progress of the mutiny and its suppression in other directions must now be related. It was alleged that the King of Delhi was treated with extraordinary indulgence, reinstated in his palace, and was treated by the company’s civil officers with even marks of homage. These reports were set at rest by a letter written to the brother of his captor, by Mrs. Hodson, the major’s wife. The letter was deeply interesting, and depicted the ex-royal family as in a condition of abject ignorance and moral degradation.
The narrative of the siege of Delhi having been conducted to its close, it is necessary to show the occurrence of events taking place in other directions, which were contemporaneous with those which happened around and in the capital of the Mogul.
While the incidents just related passed in and around Meerut and Delhi, Scinde and the Punjaub were greatly agitated. Conspiracy to revolt and murder, similar to what had taken place elsewhere, were discovered in these two provinces. In both they were promptly and effectually suppressed. Scinde remained tranquil, after a few arrests and executions had been effected. In the Sikh districts Sir John Lawrence acted with extraordinary sagacity, management, vigour, and courage, putting down at once, and with a high hand, all attempts at mutiny or insurrection, so as to direct the great resources of the Punjaub to the assistance of the other provinces, and especially during the siege of Delhi. The services of that great man have never been sufficiently acknowledged by the British government.
In the presidencies of Bombay and Madras the army and people, with few exceptions, remained quiet, and to a considerable extent were loyal. In Central India the disturbance was universal, and the contingents of native princes burst into open hostility. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay were much endangered by this state of things, but “field forces” were organized in the presidencies, by which the rebel districts of Central India were penetrated from the south and west, until the revolt was crushed. The troops of Madras displayed more loyalty than those of Bombay. Some of the Bombay regiments mutinied, bringing upon themselves a swift and terrible punishment.
In the eastern districts of Bengal there were only the perturbations caused by the great earthquake of revolution, which had its centre far north and west. The disposition to insurrection in Assam and Chittagong was kept down by astonishingly weak forces. Along the Assam frontier a few troops sufficed to preserve tolerable quietude. A small detachment of British sailors, acting as infantry of the line, awed a vast region of eastern Bengal.
The native troops of the Bengal army, stationed on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal, showed the same disposition to revolt as upon the eastern land confines of that presidency; but the people of Pegu, Martaban, and the other provinces on the sea-coast, were loyal. The troops there were mostly European, and were moved up the bay to Calcutta, as occasion demanded and opportunity served.