Chichagov, assuming that Kutuzov had good reason for sending his despatch, and considering the intelligence sent by his detachment commanders, concluded that Napoleon’s rumoured southern movement was a reality; and, on the 25th, leaving Pahlen at Borisov, and ordering Chaplitz to draw in to him, he marched off with Voïnov and Sabaniev to Chabachevichi, some 15 miles down the Berezina. Langeron says that both he and Sabaniev endeavoured to dissuade him—Sabaniev apparently losing his temper. Chichagov, however, persisted, and considering everything it is difficult to see what else he could have done, misled as he was by bad information from every side. On the 25th Napoleon himself reached Borisov, and was seen by Langeron and his staff, much to their consternation, as the only force at hand to oppose him was Pahlen’s weakened advance-guard. The French Guards were in Borisov; the rest of the Moscow remnant between Borisov and Krupki, two marches to the rear. Oudinot was at Studianka; Victor rather to the north of Davout at Krupki, in order to cover him against Victor. Davout since Orsha had been only harassed by Cossacks. The bulk of Wittgenstein’s slowly advancing force was at Kolopenichi, 27 miles north-east of Borisov: Platov was east of Krupki, and Yermólov at Maliavka, near Bobr.
General Aubry, Oudinot’s chief of artillery, began to fell trees and construct trestles for bridges immediately upon arriving at Studianka, but unfortunately they proved too weak. As soon as it was dark Oudinot started his artillery for the selected point of passage, and as night drew its veil over the dreary banks of the Berezina, Generals Eblé and Chasseloup reached Studianka with their men and their slender equipment, and began in earnest to construct bridges. All night they laboured to prepare the supports, and at 8 a.m. on the 26th the first trestle was fixed in position. It had been hoped to throw three bridges, but there were scarce enough materials for two. Chasseloup soon saw that the hopeless deficiency of equipment of his engineers would prevent him from doing anything independently; he therefore brought his men to help Eblé, the engineers working at the preparation of trestles and floors while the pontonniers fixed them.
The fate of the relics of the Grande Armée now rested, humanly speaking, in the hands of a prematurely aged and physically broken man of fifty-five years of age, who had never, under Napoleon, received employment equal to his merits. The name of Jean Baptiste Eblé is one to be uttered with all honour and reverence as that of a man who, besides being a master of his profession, was in very truth a hero, upright, modest, self-sacrificing, and literally faithful unto death. One seeks not for purity or an exalted standard of duty among the rough and greedy fighters about Napoleon. Exceptions there were, but they were comparatively few; and so one turns with peculiar respect towards the simple, gracious figure of Eblé.
Early on the 26th Eblé verified the width and depth of the river. The latter had increased, owing to a freshet, since Corbineau’s crossing from 3½ feet to 5.
Besides pushing on the preparations for the bridges, the engineers constructed three small rafts, by which some 400 infantry were ferried over to guard the bridge-head, accompanied by some of Corbineau’s troopers, who forded the river with foot soldiers behind them.
The cold was bitter; the water was already freezing; and the pontonniers would have to work in it up to their shoulders. The ordeal meant certain death to almost all; but the men answered the call of their chief with a heroism as high as his own. They were relieved every 15 minutes and were promised special rewards, but five-sixths of them perished. There were 7 companies in all, about 400 men, of whom 100 were Dutch.
The bridges were placed 200 yards apart. Each had 23 sets of trestles (chevalets). That on the right was intended only for troops. It was terribly weak. Suitable wood for the roadway was lacking, but the engineers patched up one of planks nailed one upon another, and laid brushwood and twigs upon it to lessen the strain. The roadway was in places nearly level with the water; there were no rails. The left-hand bridge was intended for artillery and baggage. It was more solid than the other; but still very weak, and as there was no time to square them the roadway was constructed of rough logs, the passage over which of vehicles occasioned continued joltings which impaired the stability of the frail structure.
GENERAL BARON EBLÉ
Commander of the Bridge Trains of the Grand Army in 1812