Of the General Staff it may be said that it had scarcely any affinity with the board of specially trained officers which accompanies and assists a modern commander-in-chief. Napoleon’s absorption, in his single person, of all military and administrative functions had reduced it to a position of complete insignificance. For all practical purposes it was nothing but a mass of orderlies, and though it contained many talented and meritorious officers they had small opportunity of distinguishing themselves so long as they remained members of it. Napoleon in one moment of exasperation declared that “the General Staff is organised in such a manner that nothing is foreseen.” The remark was more or less true; but that such a state of affairs could exist is a very severe comment upon his methods. The invading host was, in short, the army of a despot who endeavoured to supervise everything himself and discouraged initiative in others, with the natural result that much that might have been done to minimise the catastrophe was not attempted.
The numbers of the invading army and its composition, according to the states and peoples who contributed contingents, are given in detail in Appendices A and B. Roughly it may be said that during the campaign Napoleon disposed of the following numbers:—
First Line
Head-quarters; Imperial Guard; }
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, Corps; } 449,000
Austrian Corps; Cavalry Reserve}
Second Line
9th Corps; Polish and Lithuanian levies; }
2 French Divisions; } 165,000
German Troops, Drafts, Parks, etc. }
Third Line
Drafts and organised troops in touch with }
Russians at close of campaign, including} 60,000
garrisons of Danzig and on Vistula }
————
674,000