With the exception of Moscow, Warsaw and Riga, there were no large towns, in the modern sense of the word, within the theatre of war, and even Riga can scarcely be regarded as one. Moscow had somewhat over 200,000 inhabitants, Warsaw about half as many. Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk had each from 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants; Kovno, Dünaburg, Mitau, Brest-Litovsk, Bielostok, Mohilev and Bobruisk perhaps from 15,000 to 20,000; Polotsk possibly 15,000. Borisov, Orsha, Bobr, Smorgoni and many other places described as towns were merely villages—not often large villages, according to modern ideas. From Moscow to Smolensk, a distance of over 250 English miles, there were only three small towns,—Viasma, Gzhatsk and Dorogobuzh—and the largest of these had but about 5000 inhabitants.
While Napoleon was inspecting his depôts, completing the organisation of his water transport, and setting in train the formation and pushing to the front of his numerous reserve forces, the Grand Army, now practically secure from Russian attack, was moving up to the Niemen. By the 12th of June the advance-guard of the 10th Corps was at Tilsit, and the Imperial Guard and five army corps, besides three corps of the cavalry reserves, were steadily advancing behind towards the line of the Niemen between Tilsit and Kovno. The 5th and 8th Corps were in advance of Warsaw, and the 7th a little way in rear of it. The Emperor still expected that Bagration would invade the Grand Duchy, for on June 10th he wrote to Eugène on that hypothesis. He also appears to have anticipated that Bagration’s advance would be supported by at least a part of Barclay’s army. At all events he speaks of a possible attack upon Eugène, which indicates that he looked for something like a general encounter along his whole front.
He explained to Eugène that his echelon formation, with the left in advance, would enable him to take in flank the attack of the Russians directed against his right or centre. If Jerome were attacked, Eugène with the 4th and 6th Corps would be able to fall on the flank of the hostile columns, while if Eugène himself were assailed he could be supported at need by the whole left wing. All this certainly appears to point to the idea of a general Russian advance. Whether the somewhat complicated manœuvres anticipated by the Emperor took sufficiently into account the inexperience of Eugène and Jerome, and the frightful Polish tracks by which they would be obliged to move, may be doubted. Moreover, it is clear that their successful execution depended upon the Russian generals being so obliging as to play into Napoleon’s hands. The armies, it must be remembered, were not yet in touch, and the Russians had perfect freedom to manœuvre at will.
By June 18th Napoleon had about 320,000 men (Imperial Guard, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 10th Corps d’Armée, and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps) concentrated on a front of about 130 miles from Tilsit south-westward to the Prusso-Polish frontier. Thence to Warsaw stood the 5th, 7th and 8th Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps—80,000 men on a line of 80 miles. Finally, the Austrians, 34,000 strong, constituted the detached right flank-guard, marching from Zamosc by Lublin on Warsaw.
Total 434,000 combatants, 1076 guns.
The Russians were cantoned as follows: The First Army was strategically disposed in a main body, a reserve, and two semi-independent wings. The 1st Corps (Wittgenstein) constituted the right wing, about Rossieni, some 100 miles north-west of Vilna, and nearly opposite to Napoleon’s detached left flank-guard, under Macdonald, at Tilsit. About Lida, 60 miles south of Vilna, on the road to Slonim, stood the 6th Corps (Dokhturov) and the 3rd Cavalry Corps (Pahlen II), forming the left wing, under Dokhturov. The 2nd Corps (Baggohufwudt), the 3rd (Tuchkov I) and the 4th (Shuvalov) were guarding the line of the Niemen above and below Kovno, on a front of about 60 miles. The 1st Cavalry Corps (Uvarov) was at Vilkomirz, 40 miles north-north-west of Vilna, and the 2nd (Korff) at Smorgoni, nearly 50 miles on the road to Minsk. The 5th Corps (H.I.H. the Grand Duke Constantine) formed the general reserve at Sventsiani, about 45 miles north-east of Vilna. The “Flying Corps” of Cossacks under the Ataman Platov was pushed forward to the frontier about Grodno, 60 miles west of Lida. The First Army, including Platov, numbered some 126,000 men, including 19,000 regular cavalry and 584 guns.
Of the two army corps which composed the Second Army the 8th (Borozdin I) was at Volkovisk, 60 miles south-south-west of Lida, and the 7th (Raievski) at Novi Dvor, 20 miles farther south. The 4th Cavalry Corps (Sievers), and about 4000 Cossacks, under General Ilovaïski, connected the two. The newly formed 27th Division (Neverovski) which was marching from Moscow to join Bagration, had not yet passed Minsk. Including it the Second Army comprised about 47,000 men, including 7000 regular cavalry, and 168 guns.
The Third Army was widely dispersed and could not take the field for some weeks. It numbered in all perhaps 45,000 men.
Thus, owing to various causes—divided counsels, imperfect organisation, bad roads and especially the lack of any real command-in-chief—the Russian forces were, almost up to the very moment of hostile contact, in a state of dangerous dispersion. The secret history of the months during which Alexander had been at Vilna will probably never be accurately known. Dissension and intrigue were rampant in the Tzar’s personal entourage. Much valuable time was wasted in drafting and discussing plans of action, all impracticable, because based upon hypotheses which proved untenable. They all considerably underestimated Napoleon’s fighting strength, and appear to have assumed a concentration of the Russian forces about Vilna. There was great disorder in the higher commands. Barclay was nominally commander-in-chief, but Alexander frequently issued orders, through his adjutant, Prince Volkonski, over the head of the harassed War-Minister, while to make confusion worse confounded Phull, as Clausewitz expresses it, “sometimes put in his oar.” Contrary to the usually accepted belief, it appears that Barclay would have preferred to stand to fight, granted a favourable opportunity. The deciding factor in the situation seems to have been that almost at the last moment the Russian staff obtained better information as to the strength which Napoleon had with him in Prussia.
At all events the party of prudence finally obtained the upper hand in the Tzar’s councils. The policy of retreating before the invader had been so often discussed that there was nothing unexpected in the resolution which was adopted. It was determined to draw back the whole First Army at least as far as Sventsiani. All the corps commanders were warned to be ready to retreat thither immediately upon receiving orders, except Wittgenstein, who was given permission to anticipate them if pressed by a rapid advance of Napoleon’s extreme left wing over the Niemen. Platov, it was vaguely supposed, would be able to threaten Napoleon’s communications, and would be supported by Bagration from Volkovisk. Tormazov, with the Third Army, was to retreat on Kiev if hard pressed; but, if not, was to leave General Sacken with his incomplete division to observe the Austrian frontier, and with the rest of his army to fall upon the right of the forces which were opposed to Bagration. General Okunev, in his commentaries upon the war, suggests that Bagration and Tormazov should have effected a junction and advanced in force against Napoleon’s communications while he was engaged in front with Barclay. As, however, Napoleon could detach 80,000 men, under Eugène, to support the 114,000 whom he already had in the Grand Duchy, Bagration, Tormazov and Platov would eventually be outnumbered by at least two to one; while Napoleon would still have possessed a double superiority of numbers over Barclay. In fact the Russians were so enormously outmatched at every point that retreat was the only sensible strategy. Napoleon, it is true, assumed that the Russians would stand to fight. This was partly, no doubt, due to mistaken but not unreasonable calculations as to their state of preparation, but also largely, it is to be feared, to the obstinate optimism which during his latter years became something like an acute mental disease with him. He had developed a fatal habit of believing that his enemies would always play into his hands.