Accordingly, still proceeding on the assumption that Bagration would invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while Barclay stood fast to oppose his own advance upon Vilna, the French Emperor decided to operate the passage of the Niemen close to Kovno. Kovno lies at the confluence of the Vilia, the river of Vilna, with the Niemen, and was therefore admirably adapted for the collection of stores by water from Danzig and Königsberg, and forwarding them to Vilna as soon as that place and the surrounding country were in Napoleon’s power. In point of fact the Vilia proved too sinuous and difficult to be of much utility, but this could hardly be known at the time, and in any case did not greatly affect the value of Kovno as a base. The forest of Pilwiski or Wilkowiski, extending over a considerable area on the bank of the river opposite Kovno, furnished an excellent screen for Napoleon’s operations. Finally, by bridging the river and debouching rapidly in the direction of Vilna, Barclay might be separated from his detached right wing under Wittgenstein. All this obviously assumed that the Russians would remain stationary.
On June 22nd Jerome was directed to be at Augustowo on the 25th. On that day his three corps were extended along the Warsaw-Augustowo road, and the head of the 5th Corps, which was leading, was nearly 50 miles away. The 8th was still farther behind, and the 7th as yet in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, awaiting the Austrians, who were slowly advancing from Lublin. Napoleon was probably misinformed as to distances, and certainly had not taken into full consideration the wretched Polish roads. He apparently calculated upon being able to throw his main body suddenly across the Niemen at Kovno, deal a smashing blow at Barclay and then wheel round to crush Bagration.
Fortunately for the Russians they had now decided to do the right thing, and had no intention of awaiting their enemies’ pleasure. The three corps on the Niemen were drawn back to Vilna, leaving only a light cavalry screen along the right bank. Wittgenstein retired from Rossieni to Keidani, 40 miles nearer Vilna. On June 23rd, therefore, Barclay had four corps echeloned on a line of 70 miles, nearly two marches from the Niemen at its nearest point; and, as all were ready to retreat on Sventsiani at the shortest notice, Napoleon’s plans were already half disconcerted. Irresolution, however, clung to the Russian counsels, and Dokhturov was still left in a dangerously isolated position at Lida.
On the 22nd Napoleon, being himself at Wilkowiski, about 40 miles from Kovno, drafted a proclamation to the army which may be regarded as the official declaration of war. It was of the usual Napoleonic type, chiefly compounded of false statements and prophecies which were never fulfilled. Mr. Hereford George is probably correct in pronouncing that “a more unfortunate document was perhaps never penned.”
On the afternoon of the 23rd Napoleon had under his hand opposite Kovno in the Pilwiski Forest some 214,000 men, comprising the Imperial Guard, the reserve parks and engineers, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps d’Armée, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of Reserve Cavalry. At Tilsit, in line with the main body, was the 10th Corps, under Macdonald. Eugène, with the 4th and 6th Corps, was still some 60 miles to the right rear, and could hardly reach the Niemen near Kovno before the 28th. General Bonnal appears to consider that his absence materially contributed to the failure of the Emperor’s strategy, but it is a little difficult entirely to agree with him. Even had the situation been as Napoleon imagined it, with the Russians extended in a long, thin line upon the frontier, Eugène’s absence could not have fatally influenced results. The invaders, with their overwhelming numerical superiority, could not fail of success. Without Eugène Napoleon had 247,000 men in all opposed to Barclay’s 120,000. Bagration could hardly under any circumstances have gained more than a temporary success over the head of the long column of divisions marching from Lublin to Augustowo, and as yet not disquieted by Tormazov on its rear. Given that Reynier and Schwarzenberg were forced to turn back to face Tormazov—as did ultimately happen—Jerome would still have over 60,000 regulars against Bagration’s 36,000; and Eugène’s retardation would place him in a favourable position for supporting him. It is even permissible to argue that Eugène’s absence was rather a favourable circumstance than otherwise, since the knowledge that Napoleon was short of over 70,000 men might have induced Barclay to stand to give battle, which was precisely what Napoleon desired.
As a fact the situation was quite other than Napoleon envisaged it. Had all his corps been in position to time, the manœuvre of Vilna would still have failed. Had Jerome, with his whole force, reached Augustowo on the 25th June, as contemplated, he could not have reached Grodno before the 27th. Volkovisk is nearly 50 miles farther on, and Bagration evacuated it on the 28th to retreat on Minsk. It was absolutely impossible for Jerome to reach him. Of Barclay’s corps, the 1st was nearly two days’ march from the Niemen, and Wittgenstein had permission to retreat as soon as he had information of the French passage of the river. Baggohufwudt, Tuchkov and Shuvalov were still farther back, out of touch with the French, who could not reach them in less than two forced marches, even if they stood fast. Dokhturov alone was somewhat isolated, and ran considerable risk of being cut off from the main body. Still even had Dokhturov been cut from Barclay it is highly probable that the course of events would have been little different. A junction of the two Armies of the West would have eventually been effected, and it is possible that Barclay, short of 20,000 men, would not have made, as he did, at least one very perilous halt on his march to Smolensk.
To conclude, when once the Russian commanders had determined to adopt a policy of steady retreat, and to adhere to it with more or less resolution, the campaign may almost be said to have decided itself. Napoleon was ever striving to obtain contact with his elusive foes and to fight the great battle which should crush the heart out of their resistance. But only thrice all through the advance was he able to establish this contact, and in each case the Russians drew away without having sustained decisive defeat. The first operations on the Niemen were typical of most of those which were to follow.
On June 23rd all the troops under Napoleon’s immediate command were nearly opposite Kovno. Napoleon gave the strictest orders that only light cavalry were to approach the river; infantry, artillery and heavy cavalry were to be kept under cover in the forest, so as to conceal from the enemy until the last moment the exact direction in which the blow was to be dealt. Meanwhile the river was reconnoitred for a point of passage, and a bend between Kovno and the village of Poniemon, a little higher up, was selected by General Haxo, Davout’s chief of engineers.
At daybreak on the 23rd Napoleon in person arrived in his travelling carriage at the bivouacs of the 1st Cavalry Corps. He descended at that of the 6th Polish Lancers, and, still anxious to conceal everything from the Russians until the last moment, removed his famous Guard uniform and cocked hat, and donned the coat of a Polish officer—an example followed by the staff-officers with him. Count Soltyk, an officer of the Lancers, has minutely described the episode. Napoleon’s strong common sense appears in his refusal of the heavy Polish cavalry shako, and acceptance of a cap instead. He then rode forward to a village directly opposite Kovno, and carefully reconnoitred the place from the windows of the house of the village doctor. Returning to the Lancers’ bivouac, he made a hasty meal, chatting meanwhile with the Polish officers, and especially asking if their uniform suited him. He then resumed his own garments and rode off to reconnoitre the course of the river elsewhere. He approved Haxo’s selection of Poniemon, and issued elaborate orders for the passage. They obviously imply that vigorous resistance was anticipated; nothing was yet known of the Russian retirement on Vilna. They also contain much minute regulation of detail, which might well have been left to Haxo or Davout.
During the afternoon and evening the 1st Corps was brought up to Poniemon, whither the pontoon trains, under General Eblé, were also despatched. Three bridges, about 300 yards apart, were to be thrown across. As soon as it was completely dark—that is to say, about 10 p.m.—General Morand, the commander of the 1st Division, crossed in person with three companies of Voltigeurs and one of Sappers, who were ferried over in boats. As they were disembarking they were detected by the nearest Russian picket—a detachment of the Hussars of Yelisabetgrad. They rode up to the mustering Voltigeurs, and their leader challenged in French: “Qui vive?”