Napoleon entered Vitebsk on the 28th. He must have been bitterly disappointed at the negative result of his operations. Once more the Russians had quietly withdrawn out of reach at the very moment of contact. The French losses through fatigue and disease had been relatively enormous, and the manœuvre of Vitebsk had failed as completely as the manœuvre at Vilna. In a sense the failure was even worse, for the Russians had emerged from the situation with a great strategic success to their credit. In spite of blunders and miscalculation, despite contradictory orders and lack of any unity of command, Barclay and Bagration had achieved what had been the primary object of their weary marches and manœuvres to the rear, and had effected their union.
THE OPERATIONS ABOUT SMOLENSK
With the arrival of Napoleon’s main army on the Düna and Dnieper the first stage of the campaign came to an end. To all appearance the invaders had gained immense advantages. Nearly the whole of the ancient Duchy of Lithuania, together with most of Kurland, had passed into Napoleon’s hands almost without a blow having been struck in their defence. A number of considerable towns had been occupied, and a great quantity of Russian stores captured. The Russian armies, which six weeks earlier had been ranged along the line of the Bug and the Niemen, had now retreated behind that formed by the Düna and the Dnieper, and the passage of both these rivers could be effected by the French at their convenience. The Russian troops, apart from the discouragement caused by constant retreating, had suffered considerable material loss.
When the withdrawal from the frontier began the armies of Barclay and Bagration had numbered together some 174,000 men. On the Düna the First Army had been joined by about 9000 reserves, and at Smolensk by 17 depôt battalions and 4 batteries of artillery—probably 6000 more. Bagration had incorporated in his army the garrison of Mohilev and six reserve battalions from Bobruisk—say 3000. These figures, added together, give a total of 192,000.
On August 6th the Russian forces were as follows:—
The First and Second Armies presented a total of 121,000 men; besides a detachment of 1 Dragoon and 3 Cossack regiments detached towards Poriechie. Three regiments of Cossacks had been detached to Riga and elsewhere. Two of Raievski’s infantry regiments, which had been the worst sufferers at Saltanovka, had been sent into the interior to recruit. The deduction under these headings may be fairly estimated at 4500 men. Wittgenstein’s corps and the reserves from Drissa and Dünaburg were on July 12th over 28,500 strong. The total effective of the Russian First and Second Armies early in August was therefore 154,000, showing a deficiency since June of 38,000 men. The fighting round Mohilev and Vitebsk had scarcely cost more than 6000 or 7000 men, and 5000 is a high estimate for losses in the rear-guard actions. The diminution from other causes was therefore 27,000. It is to be accounted for by sickness, by straggling and fatigue due to the long and painful marches, but also in large measure to desertion among the Lithuanian troops. These half-hearted men were probably no great loss, nor can it be said that the diminution was, on the whole, excessive; still it was serious. Over and above the abandoned magazines a portion of the material had been lost. Only eight guns had been captured in action, but some thirty more had been abandoned during the long marches through sands, swamps and forests; it says volumes for the Russian artillery that the number was not greater.
If, however, the Russian losses had been serious, those of the French had been more so. The causes which diminished the strength of the Russians operated also against the invaders, and apparently the latter, for the most part used to a higher standard of living, were less able to endure hardships. Fatigue and heat might have been endured without any very serious results, but owing to the breakdown of the transport, the supplies of bread and biscuit could never keep up with the troops; even flour was rarely to be had. Meat was, as a rule, not lacking, but it was often of bad quality, the cattle being overdriven and frequently themselves ill-fed. A diet of poor meat, unseasoned, and unaccompanied by bread or vegetables, is not suitable for men who have to endure hard labour and fatigue under the rays of a Russian midsummer sun. Such bread and biscuit as were procurable were bad, and the ill-ground rye had serious effects upon the stomachs of men accustomed to well-prepared wheaten flour. Every effort was made to bring up adequate supplies, but the ill-fed and over-worked draft beasts were utterly unable to cope with the transport, and died in great numbers. The men, foraging for themselves, were rarely able to obtain more than small quantities of grain, and as there were no portable mills in the equipment of the troops it had to be consumed boiled. The water available in Lithuania was scanty in quantity and often bad; and in the general disorganisation of the commissariat brandy, which formed part of the usual ration, and might, at any rate, have done something towards rendering the water less unwholesome, was rarely served out. The result was a frightful amount of sickness—diarrhœa, dysentery and typhus—and in a wretchedly poor and sparsely populated region little could be done to reduce it. The sick were left behind in temporary hospital camps; where they died by thousands in the midst of filth, starvation and general destitution. Of those who went into these dens of misery it was calculated that not one in ten ever emerged alive.