Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812

by Edward Foord

The fighting line was seriously weakened by the immense number of sick. It was also reduced by the necessity of making large detachments to bring up the belated supply trains and to forage for bread, and yet further depleted by straggling, partly for purposes of foraging, partly owing to fatigue, and in some measure to indiscipline. This straggling had always been one of the bad features of the Napoleonic army, and the marches always appear, except when in face of the enemy, to have been conducted with great irregularity. A German eyewitness was amazed to see the regiments of Davout’s corps, the best disciplined of the army, making a short march in the most disorderly array.

There is, of course, something to be said for this permission to the men to take their ease when there was no necessity for precise formation and watchfulness; and certainly nothing is ever gained by harassing and overworking soldiers distinguished for cheerful readiness—as Frenchmen have always been. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the irregularity went beneath the surface. With the gaiety and readiness of the French nature is intermixed a decided strain of impatience under restraint which easily degenerates into lawlessness. The straggling which, in earlier days, had perhaps been necessary for the ill-compacted Revolutionary armies, had now become a habit, and soon developed into a monstrous abuse, which ultimately, as much as anything, proved the ruin of the army. The writer is far from wishing to defend a hard and inelastic discipline which crushes personal initiative. But he is strongly of opinion that had the French march discipline been better at the outset, the army would not have broken up as it did during the retreat. Upon this subject more will be said in its proper place.

Finally, it must be observed that the proper means of checking the evils which afflicted the contending armies were very little understood. Not only was there a deficiency of trained personnel, but the medical art was, as compared with what it is to-day, in a very undeveloped condition. It cannot be said that Napoleon did not endeavour to provide his troops with medical and surgical assistance, but it was never adequate, either in quantity or quality. The officers were rarely qualified to make good the deficiencies of the sanitary services. Among the corps commanders there were certainly some who thoroughly understood the details of administration. Davout was undoubtedly the best of them; but Ney was also a careful and conscientious administrator. As early as August he is found issuing orders for the preparation of winter clothing. Among the divisional leaders, also, there were some who thoroughly understood how to look after their men—De Fezensac instances Ledru des Essarts as one of them. Still, the careful administrators were certainly in a minority, and their excellent intentions were often hampered by lack of scientific knowledge.

Turning from the general examination of these evils to consideration of the intrinsic damage which they caused, it is to be noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Army Corps and the 4 corps of Reserve Cavalry totalled on June 24th about 315,000 men. The returns of August 3rd and 4th give an aggregate of less than 213,000. There were, therefore, even on the showing of the official returns, 102,000 men in rear. Detachments account for about 20,000. There remain 82,000; and, since allowance must be made for drafts and absentees rejoined, it will probably be fair to estimate that the losses amounted to 100,000. The loss in battle cannot be estimated higher than 15,000; it follows that 85,000 men had disappeared from the muster-rolls by reason of straggling and sickness—that is, nearly 30 per cent. Of course, they were not all permanently lost to the army, but a very large proportion were, owing to the terrible lack of provision for the temporarily disabled soldiers.

The mortality among the horses had been very large, mainly owing to lack of forage. The number dwindled day by day, and this circumstance was, in a sense, more fatal than loss of men. Every disabled horse meant further lessening of the means of transport. The cavalry regiments were unable to mount even their diminished effectives except by sweeping up horses from the countryside; and these were rarely of much service. The guns of the reserve parks had to be left at Vilna, and even part of the artillery of several army corps.

When Napoleon reached Vitebsk the number of men missing among the 450,000 who had crossed the frontier in June and July, may be conservatively calculated at 120,000, and a very large proportion of them were either already dead or disabled from further service. Straggling and desertion were especially prevalent among the foreign regiments. Their administration was generally less efficient; less care was taken of them by the French officials. They had naturally little affection for the cause in which they had been enlisted by their sovereigns, and their officers must have been exasperated at the disgraceful fashion in which Napoleon invariably endeavoured to saddle their troops with the sole blame for disorders. It is more than probable that disgust at this, no less than the way in which they had been sacrificed, was one of the motives which impelled so many German officers to turn against Napoleon in the following year.

For every reason a halt was imperatively necessary, and Napoleon called it as soon as the escape of the First Russian Army was an accomplished fact. On the 29th he wrote to Davout, ordering him to canton his troops. The various corps took up quarters on a line extending from Surazh to beyond Mohilev, with the cavalry pushed out in front and on the flanks. Latour-Maubourg was about Rogachev-on-Dnieper, some 60 miles south of Mohilev, with a Polish infantry division in support.

There was a little skirmishing between the advanced French cavalry and belated Russian detachments. On July 30th Murat’s horsemen picked up about 100 prisoners and 40 abandoned vehicles, and captured a welcome supply of flour and forage. On the 31st Villata’s Italian cavalry brigade surprised a Russian convoy at Velizh, escorted by 4 depôt battalions. The 2nd Chasseurs under Colonel Banco charged, and captured 60 waggons and 250 prisoners. The total Russian loss was estimated by Eugène at 700, and 600 sacks of flour and a herd of bullocks fell into the hands of the Italian troopers. But for these captures the French cavalry could hardly have advanced another step. The regiments were, with few exceptions, very weak, and the horses exhausted by fatigue and privation. Sebastiani—perhaps with some exaggeration, for he was ill and discouraged—declared that his division had only 2300 mounted men remaining, out of over 4000. Hardly one of the corps was really fit for service except perhaps the 1st. Ney had not yet received his reserve of artillery, which was toiling up from the rear. Not even in the 1st Corps were things altogether satisfactory. Davout was growling at the disorder in the regiments, threatening Desaix, whom he accused of abetting it, with arrest, and re-establishing discipline by stern methods, including the shooting of marauders caught in the act.

During the last days of July Oudinot had fought several very bloody and inconclusive actions with Wittgenstein. The 2nd Corps had been forced back upon the Düna; and on August 4th Napoleon ordered St. Cyr, who was near Bechenkoviczi, to march to its support, though the unhappy Bavarians had scarcely begun to refit and were still smitten with disease. St. Cyr complained bitterly, but he had to obey.

By August 4th the Grand Army had settled down in cantonments. Head-quarters were at Vitebsk, where ovens were being built, and hospitals and magazines established. The 4th Corps was at Surazh, Velizh and Poriechie, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps about Rudnia, the 3rd Corps around Liozna, north-west of Rudnia, with the 24th Light Infantry supporting Sebastiani. The 1st Corps, not yet reunited, was spread from Vitebsk to Orsha, with the 8th Corps at the latter place, and the 5th between Sklov and Mohilev, whither Latour-Maubourg was also moving.