On the south side four chief roads ran into Smolensk, that from Warsaw entering the city from the south-west by Krasnoï. The road from Mohilev by Mstislavl led nearly directly southward; that to Roslavl and Orel branched off from it near the Malakova Gate; the Ielnia-Kaluga road led south-eastward for some distance, finally turning eastward.
From the north gate, over a long wooden bridge, led three roads, that to Vitebsk on the left, that to Velizh and St. Petersburg in the middle, and that to Moscow on the right. The latter ran for some 5 miles along the bank of the Dnieper, and then crossed the chord of a great bend of the river to Solovievo, about 27 miles east of Smolensk, where it passed again to the south side. A cross-road passed by the village of Gorbunovo in a shallow curve to the high-road at Lubino, 14 miles distant. From the south side of Smolensk another track crossed the Dnieper by a ford at Prudichevo, about 6 miles out, and also joined the high-road about 2 miles west of Lubino. These tracks must be noted, since a few days later they became of immense importance.
Raievski had with him only 8 regiments and 6 batteries of his own corps, and Neverovski’s weakened force. According to himself his strength (probably infantry and artillery only) was scarcely 13,000 men. He had 72 guns. Realising that his duty was to contest the city inch by inch, he ranged his force in advance of the suburbs. Paskievich’s division occupied the Krasnoï suburb and the ditch before the citadel, with the Vilna Regiment from the 27th Division and a makeshift battalion of convalescents stationed in reserve behind the wall. Kolubakin’s division defended the Mstislavl suburb, and Stavidzki’s brigade of the 27th that of Roslavl. These 23 battalions could only guard about half of the south front of the suburbs. Four more were in reserve in the town, and only two could be spared to watch the line of nearly 2 miles from the Roslavl suburb to the river. To make the best possible show Raievski stationed his cavalry there. Eighteen guns were placed on the Royal Citadel; the rest along the earth ramparts behind the walls. Thus placed, the Russians awaited attack. Raievski says that though he had had little rest the night before he could not sleep.
In the night the Lancers of Lithuania and the New Russian Dragoons reached Smolensk, thus giving Raievski 12 more squadrons, with which he strengthened his screen on the left.
By 10 p.m. on the 15th the bulk of Murat’s cavalry was about 3 miles from Smolensk, with its outposts in touch with Raievski. Ney’s corps was immediately behind. Davout had reached Korythnia. The Guard was in rear of Davout; the head of the 4th Corps at Liadi. The 8th Corps had lost its way, but the 5th was nearly in line with Davout, and could come up in the afternoon. Without reckoning Eugène and the Guard, 120,000 men could be in front of Smolensk before evening.
What, meanwhile, were Barclay and Bagration doing? Barclay was still anxious about an attack from the direction of Poriechie and sent pressing orders to his cavalry commanders to endeavour to clear up the situation. He doubted whether the advance on Smolensk was being made by more than a part of the French army. Bagration was directed to cross the Dnieper at Katan, and join Raievski and Neverovski in defending the Smolensk road. Dokhturov’s corps would take his place at Nadva. Bagration moved to Katan and threw a bridge, but he soon became aware that to cross would simply mean his annihilation. He sent word to Barclay that an army which he estimated at 115,000 men, without Eugène and the Guard, was marching on Smolensk, and that he himself must now go thither by the right bank. The reports of Bagration and Raievski removed Barclay’s doubts, and he issued orders for all his corps to march upon Smolensk next day. To Raievski Bagration sent a characteristic message:
“Dear Friend,
“I shall not march to rejoin you—I shall run. I only wish I had wings. Courage! God will help you!”
At midnight on the 15th-16th Napoleon wrote to Eugène saying that Smolensk was evacuated. A little later Ney was ordered to occupy it. It does not appear that the Emperor had any definite information upon which to base his over-confident opinion. He seems indeed to have been impressed by Bagration’s bridge-building at Katan, which had been observed on the 15th by a reconnaissance from head-quarters. A flank attack upon his army as it lay stretched along the Rasasna-Smolensk road might have serious consequences. He consequently halted the whole of the 1st Corps about Korythnia, except Gudin’s division, which continued its advance on Smolensk.
