BATTLE OF SMOLENSK
August 17 1812
Very early on the 16th the French and Russian outposts before Smolensk were bickering with each other. Between 8 and 9 a.m. the bulk of Ney’s and Murat’s force reached the front. The King and the Marshal brought some batteries into action against Raievski’s artillery, and Ney deployed his corps opposite the Krasnoï suburb and the Royal Citadel, Ledru’s division on the right, Scheler’s Württembergers on the left rear, Razout in reserve. Murat’s divisions extended to the right. The advance posts were skirmishing hotly, and on both sides a number of guns were engaged, but, to the astonishment of Raievski, no attack was made. He spoke afterwards of his success having been due to the feeble measures of the French. Ney and Murat were, of course, awaiting orders. Ney also had less than 19,000 infantry, scarcely enough to attempt to carry the city by main force, especially since he did not know Raievski’s strength. Napoleon was keeping the bulk of his army ready to face towards Katan and endeavouring to clear up the situation by reconnaissances. Towards noon he heard that the bridge had been removed, and started for Smolensk. He arrived about 1 p.m. and, going at once to the front, closely reconnoitred the Russian position.
It was perhaps in consequence of inferences made from what he had seen, that Napoleon directed Murat and Ney to press their advance. The indications as to time are very vague, but in all probability nothing like an attack was made until the afternoon. Apparently about 1.30 p.m. the Russian cavalry were forced to retire under the walls of the town, and the Württembergers began to press home the attack on the Krasnoï suburb. Raievski’s line was so thin that an advance in force at any point would shatter it. In strengthening the defence in the Krasnoï suburb troops had to be moved in that direction. All along the opposing fronts extended a line of fire, and, though the attack was nowhere being energetically pressed, the Russian troops were almost all engaged. There remained in reserve only the two regiments in the town, when Raievski was informed that the French had penetrated his skeleton left and were approaching the bridge. He rushed off to repel them with his feeble reserve, and at this moment a battalion of the French 46th, seeing the Royal Citadel almost denuded of defenders, dashed forward, easily mounted the crumbling earth rampart, and penetrated into the interior. The garrison, however, resisted desperately. Raievski, finding the report of the advance upon the bridge baseless, hurried back to the threatened point, supports were brought up, and the gallant assailants thrown back over the rampart just as a second battalion was mounting to their assistance, carrying it away in their retreat. As they went to the rear they were heavily fired upon, and suffered great loss. Elsewhere the only successes gained had been the driving in of stubbornly resisting outposts, and the French opportunity was fleeting. At 3.20 p.m. General Sokolnicki, a Polish officer attached to the General Staff, reported Russian troops on the road to Rudnia. Gudin’s division did not reach the front until 4 p.m., Poniatowski not until 5 p.m., and time was needed for the men to rest and to take up position. The critical period for the Russians was, in fact, over. Firing continued until dusk, but no attempt was made to press home an attack. The Russian main army was pouring down towards the city, and any success could hardly be more than a temporary one. Raievski’s fine resolution had robbed Napoleon of his chance; and it is no discredit to him that his own immediate peril had been less great than he had imagined.
Bagration, despite his encouraging words, was not able to arrive to Raievski’s assistance until the evening, and as the distance from Katan to Smolensk is not more than 17 miles, it must be supposed that he felt himself obliged to halt in order to become satisfied that Napoleon’s reconnaissances did not prelude a serious attack. He himself hastened on to Smolensk, and having ascertained that Raievski was not as yet pressed and also, apparently, that no attack was intended at Katan, hurried back to the latter place and directed Borozdin on Smolensk. The Second Cuirassier Division had already been sent on. Raievski, feeling that cavalry was useless in the town, kept them on the north side of the Dnieper.[1]
Barclay, having convinced himself of his error as to the direction of Napoleon’s attack, turned the heads of all his corps towards Smolensk, and the march was pressed with desperate energy. All through the hot summer’s day, over roads so bad as not to deserve the name, the Russian soldiers pressed forward. Tuchkov I with the 3rd and 4th Corps and Uvarov’s cavalry came from Kasplia by the Poriechie road; the Grand Duke Constantine, with the 2nd and 3rd, and Korf’s and Pahlen’s cavalry, from Volokovaia by Prikaz Vidra; Dokhturov from Nadva by the Rudnia road; while Borozdin and Vassilchikov marched along the bank of the Dnieper. Tuchkov’s and Dokhturov’s troops had to march over 24 miles in a direct line without allowing for sinuosities in the roads and additions occasioned by moving into position, Constantine’s over 22. Nevertheless, by five in the afternoon the whole army was within easy reach of the threatened town, and an hour later Borozdin’s leading brigade reached the bridge to the support of Raievski.
Smolensk being saved, the problem before the Russian generals was what next to do. Barclay anticipated that, having failed to capture Smolensk, Napoleon’s next move would be on Solovievo. Its seizure would force the Russian armies either to reopen their chief line of communications at the sword’s point, with all the chances against them, or to retreat northward. The abandonment of Smolensk would then become practically inevitable. It would, of course, have been perfectly feasible to leave a garrison in the place which might have held out for a week or two, but it may reasonably be asked what end could be gained by sacrificing it. At any rate, it was obvious that a possible French move upon Solovievo must be guarded against, and it was arranged that the Second Army should move eastward ready to anticipate the enemy at the threatened point, while the First remained about Smolensk to defend the line of the Dnieper.
To this end Dokhturov, with the 6th Corps, Konovnitzin’s division of the 3rd and the Chasseurs of the Guard, was ordered to relieve Raievski, and about midnight his troops arrived to take up the positions in the suburbs vacated by those of the former. Raievski left the 6th Chasseurs at the disposal of Dokhturov; and the Dragoons of Siberia, Irkutsk and Orenburg replaced the cavalry of the Second Army. Paskievich assisted Dokhturov’s divisional leaders in posting their troops; while the 7th Corps and 27th Division crossed the Dnieper and rejoined the 8th Corps. Next day Bagration started eastward, leaving a rear-guard at Sheïn Ostrog, 3 miles east of Smolensk, to guard a ford on the Dnieper.
In Smolensk Likhachev’s division held the Krasnoï suburb and the Royal Citadel, and that of Kapsevich those of Mstislavl and Roslavl. Konovnitzin’s division was held in reserve. For the present the left was only watched by the 6th Chasseurs and the cavalry. The Guard Chasseurs were at the bridge. Dokhturov had at his disposal about 120 guns, some of which were hoisted on to the platforms of the towers.
The rest of the First Army was stationed on the St. Petersburg road, about a mile and a half from the city, on a low plateau overlooking it. The corps of Baggohufwudt and Ostermann-Tolstoï were in front line, the former on the right of the road, the latter on the left. On Baggohufwudt’s right were the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps, while behind him stood Strogonov’s division of the 3rd Corps. The 3rd Cavalry Corps (less the regiments in Smolensk) was stationed to the left and in advance of the 4th Corps. The general reserve was formed by the 5th Corps, stationed 1 verst in rear of Strogonov. Finally, Platov’s and Karpov’s Cossacks watched the course of the river as far as Katan.