While Dokhturov’s troops were taking up their positions they came into collision with the French outposts, which were driven back some short distance, Likhachev and Kapsevich making a general move forward at daybreak on the 17th in order to clear their front. This has been usually regarded as a general sortie on the part of Dokhturov to regain the suburbs, but neither in the French documents nor in Raievski’s account is there any indication that they had been evacuated. Meanwhile, Davout’s corps and the bulk of the Guard had arrived; and Napoleon had before Smolensk on the morning of the 17th the 1st, 3rd and 5th Corps, the Guard, and Murat’s eight cavalry divisions—in all over 120,000 men. Junot’s corps, owing to a series of mischances and misdirections, for which Napoleon blamed Junot, and the latter his senior divisional commander Tharreau, was still in rear. Latour-Maubourg was observing the country some distance to the south, while the 4th Corps was extended from Korythnia back to Rasasna.
Napoleon was still uneasy concerning the Russian troops at Katan, so much so that on the 17th, by his orders, Ney sent thither Mourier’s cavalry brigade, supported by 6 battalions of Würtembergers and 6 guns, to guard against a possible flank attack. The force had a sharp action with the Cossacks and supporting infantry, which cost them 11 officers and probably 200 men killed and wounded.
During the morning there was continual skirmishing in the suburbs, but it was not until past midday that Napoleon ordered the advance. His reasons for assaulting the city at all are obscure, but it is possible that he expected to be able to carry the suburbs without excessive difficulty, and that the old walls of the city would easily yield to a steady cannonade. He may have counted upon the disadvantage of Dokhturov’s position on a down slope, and on the fact that he himself could overlook both the city and the opposite bank of the river. Bogdanovich says that he wished to cross the Dnieper and cut off Bagration’s army, and only when no ford could be found did he make a direct assault—but there is no trace of this in the French documents. De Chambray thinks that Napoleon expected the Russians to deliver battle before the city. But from his higher ground he could see every movement of troops from Barclay’s position. He therefore had no grounds for making such an assumption, and there is no reason for supposing that he did so. It is, of course, possible that he hoped by developing an assault, to induce Barclay to support Dokhturov with the bulk of his forces and fight with his back to the river, but there appears to be no evidence in favour of the supposition.
At about 12.30 the French advanced to the attack. Ney moved against the Royal Citadel and the Krasnoï suburb, with Ledru’s division on the right, the remainder of the Württembergers on the left, and Razout in reserve. Davout assailed the Mstislavl suburb, Morand’s division in the centre, Friant’s on the right, and Gudin’s, accompanied by the Marshal in person, on the left. Compans and Desaix were in reserve. Still farther to the right advanced Poniatowski’s corps, with Zayonczek’s division marching on the left against the Malakova Gate, and Kniaziewicz’s on the right against the Nikolska suburb. The whole east front of the city was merely observed by Murat’s cavalry.
On the whole the attack was, up to a certain point, successful—as might have been expected, when some 55,000 infantry were advancing downhill against about 19,000, whose position among a straggling maze of timber buildings was swept by the fire of over 300 guns. Progress was, however, very slow. Ledru and the Württembergers eventually carried the riverine suburbs, but could get no farther; the Royal Citadel, now formidably armed and garrisoned, defied attack. Davout’s three splendid divisions went forward with admirable determination, drove Kapsevich’s troops into the suburbs, and gained ground steadily, though at the price of very severe losses. On the right the Poles, after fierce fighting, captured the suburbs opposite to them, but, coming under the fire from the ramparts, were brought to a stand. The result was that by five o’clock the French and Poles had carried all the suburbs. Kapsevich’s division was being pressed back towards the walls by Davout’s advance. Konovnitzin’s troops had all been used up in supporting the fighting line.
On the French right the Russian dragoons were charged and driven back into the city by the Polish cavalry. A battery of heavy artillery opened from the north bank of the Dnieper and checked the pursuers, but as it was isolated the Poles, with great gallantry, forded the river and rode forward to charge. They were attacked and repulsed by the escort of Barclay, who had just come thither to reconnoitre. A Lancer regiment was then detailed to escort the battery. Murat and Poniatowski now established a mass of artillery on the bank which fired over the city upon the permanent bridge and the temporary ones which had been thrown near it. Barclay thereupon placed several batteries in position on the north bank opposite the French and Polish guns, and after a hot cannonade succeeded in silencing them or forcing them to withdraw. Sir Robert Wilson says that he chose the position for the Russian artillery.
As he saw himself driven from the suburbs Dokhturov sent to Barclay for reinforcements. The latter sent an encouraging message; and ordered forward the division of the young Prince Eugen of Württemberg, who had never yet commanded in action, and was burning to distinguish himself. Eugen reached the front at the most critical moment of the action. Dokhturov’s reserves were all engaged; Ney was furiously assailing the Royal Citadel; Davout and Poniatowski had driven Kapsevich and Konovnitzin upon and into the city, and were massing for an assault on the Malakova Gate. Kapsevich’s division was broken and crowding back in complete disorder; Generals Skalon and Balla had fallen; and Dokhturov, having no fresh troops to put in, was greatly depressed. The appearance of Eugen’s division relieved him. Pushnitzki’s brigade was sent off to the right to help Likhachev against Ney, Rossi’s to the left to strengthen the defence against Poniatowski; and the Chasseur brigade, led by Eugen himself, marched straight forward to the Malakova Gate and, charging furiously out through the midst of the fugitives, reoccupied the covered way and checked the farther advance of Davout.
The driving of the Russians out of the suburbs marked the end of the French success. Rossi’s brigade reached the Royal Citadel just in time to help Likhachev to resist Ney’s final attack, which was repelled with heavy loss, though Ledru and Scheler were now supported by the 4th Regiment from Razout’s division. Dokhturov rallied Kapsevich’s division, and posted his force along the walls, Prince Eugen taking command on the left. The French halted within musket-shot, sheltering as best they could behind the houses and the old earthworks among them, but losing heavily by the fire from the battlements, and especially from the light guns on the towers. It was clearly hopeless to attempt an assault until a breach had been effected, and Napoleon sent forward 24 12-pounder guns of the Imperial Guard, which joined Davout’s reserve and opened a furious fire. The Russians retorted vigorously, and as the infantry attacks slackened, the battle became a tremendous cannonade. The Russian artillery strove its hardest to silence the 12-pounder batteries, but in vain; they pounded steadily at the ancient walls, the gunners encouraged by the example set by Davout and Comte Sorbier, who personally directed their fire; but they could make little impression. Accounts are conflicting as to the fate of the covered way, the Russians insisting that they occupied it; while the French equally declared that they carried it. Captain François of the 30e de Ligne says that the enfilading fire of the French artillery finally obliged the Russians to abandon it; and that Davout’s sappers began to undermine the wall. Probably fortune varied at different points. It is only certain that the French and Poles were definitely checked at the wall, and the battle died out when darkness came on.
By this time the city and suburbs were everywhere on fire. The French later declared that the city had been deliberately destroyed; but this is entirely improbable. Being very largely constructed of wood, it was certain to take fire, and both time and means were lacking to extinguish a conflagration which spread with the fall of every shell.
The losses on both sides had been heavy. The Russians had engaged only 55 battalions, and Dokhturov’s entire force, including cavalry, Cossacks and artillery, probably hardly exceeded 30,000 men. Barclay probably understates his loss at 4000, but no Russian authority admits more than 6000. Prince Eugen gives his own loss at 1300. Though his division came into action late it must be remembered that one brigade had to execute a desperate sortie in the face of enormous odds and a concentrated fire of cannon and musketry. Konovnitzin’s division can hardly have suffered more; that of Likhachev and the detachments on the left probably lost less in proportion. On the other hand, Kapsevich’s troops must have lost heavily. Probably the Russian figure of 6000 casualties is near the mark. In other words, Dokhturov had lost one-fifth of his effective strength. Raievski estimated his losses on the 16th at about 1000, giving a Russian total for the two days of 7000.