It should be kept in mind that an imitative act may be performed quite unthinkingly, as when a man in the mob shouts what the others shout or claps when the others clap; may be done from an inference that since A by doing X makes pleasure for himself, I by doing X may get pleasure for myself; may, lastly, be done from what may be called a transferred association. This process is the one of interest in connection with our general topic, and most of my experiments on imitation were directed to the investigation of it. Its nature is simple. One sees the following sequence: ‘A turning a faucet, A getting a drink.’ If one can free this association from its narrow confinement to A, so as to get from it the association, ‘impulse to turn faucet, me getting a drink,’ one will surely, if thirsty, turn the faucet, though he had never done so before. If one can from an act witnessed learn to do the act, he in some way makes use of the sequence seen, transfers the process to himself; in the common human sense of the word, he imitates. This kind of imitation is surely common in human life. It may be apparent in ontogeny before any power of inference is shown. After that power does appear, it still retains a wide scope, and teaches us a majority, perhaps, of the ordinary accomplishments of our practical life.
Now, as the writers of books about animal intelligence have not differentiated this meaning from the other possible ones, it is impossible to say surely that they have uniformly credited it to animals, and it is profitless to catalogue here their vague statements. Many opposers of the ‘reason’ theory have presupposed such a process and used it to replace reason as the cause of some intelligent performances. The upholders of the reason theory have customarily recognized such a process and claimed to have discounted it in their explanations of the various anecdotes. So we found Mr. Romanes, in the passage quoted, discussing the possibility that such an imitative process, without reason, could account for the facts. In his chapter on Imitation in ‘Habit and Instinct,’ Principal C. Lloyd Morgan, the sanest writer on comparative psychology, seems to accept imitation of this sort as a fact, though he could, if attacked, explain most of his illustrations by the simple forms. The fact is, as was said before, that no one has analyzed or systematized the phenomena, and so one cannot find clear, decisive statements to quote.
At any rate, whether previous authorities have agreed that such a process is present or not, it is worth while to tackle the question; and the formation of associations by imitation, if it occurs, is an important division of the formation of associations in general. The experiments and their results may now be described.
Imitation in Chicks
No. 64 learned to get out of a certain pen (16 × 10 inches) by crawling under the wire screening at a certain spot. There was also a chance to get out by walking up an inclined plane and then jumping down. No. 66 was put in with 64. After 9 minutes 20 seconds, 66 went out by the inclined plane, although 64 had in the meantime crawled out under the screen 9 times. (As soon as he got out and ate a little he was put back.) It was impossible to judge how many of these times 66 really saw 64 do this. He was looking in that direction 5 of the times. So also, in three more trials, 66 used the inclined plane, though 64 crawled under each time. 67 was then tried. In 4 minutes 10 seconds, he crawled under, 64 having done so twice. Being then put in alone, he, without the chance to imitate, still crawled under. So probably he went under when with 64 not by imitation but by accident, just as 64 had learned the thing himself.
Fig. 19. Fig. 20.
The accompanying figure ([19]) shows the apparatus used in the next experiment. A represents the top of a box (5 × 4 inches), 13 inches above the level of the floor C. On the floor C were the chicks and food. B is the top of a box 10 inches high. Around the edges of A except the one next B a wire screen was placed, and 65 was repeatedly put upon A until he learned to go quickly back to C via B. Then the screen was bent outward at X so that a chick could barely squeeze through and down (A to C). Eleven chicks were then one at a time placed on A with 65. In every case but one they went A-C. In the case of the chick (75) who went A-B-C, there could have been no imitation, for he went down before 65 did. One other went through the hole before 65 went to B. The remaining nine all had a chance to imitate 65 and to save the uncomfortable struggle to get through the hole, 65 going A-B-C 8 times before 68 went A-C, 2 times when with 66 and 76, once in the case of each of the others.
In still another experiment the apparatus was (as shown in [Fig. 20]) a pen 14 inches square, 10 inches high, with a wire screen in front and a hole 3½ inches square in the back. This hole opened into a passageway (B) leading around to C, where were the other chicks and food. Chicks who had failed, when put in alone, to find the way out, were put in with other chicks who had learned the way, to see if by seeing them go out they would learn the way. Chick 70 was given 4 trials alone, being left in the box 76 minutes all told. He was then given 9 trials (165 minutes) with another chick who went out via B 36 times. 70 failed to follow him on any occasion. The trials were all given in the course of two days. Chick 73 failed in 1 trial (12 minutes) to get out of himself, and was then given 4 trials (94 minutes) with another chick who went out via B 33 times. In this experiment, as in all others reported, sure evidence that the animals wanted to get out, was afforded by their persistent peckings and jumpings at the screen or bars that stood between them and C. Chick 72, after 8 unsuccessful trials alone (41 minutes), was given 8 trials with a chance to imitate. After the other chick had gone out 44 times, 72 did go out. He did not follow the other but went 20 seconds later. It depends upon one’s general opinion whether one shall attribute this one case out of three to accident or imitation.