British experience in Egypt, however, indicated one direction in which it might possibly lead. English control in Egypt had been acquired by the most modern and approved imperial methods. It was no old-fashioned conquest; the procedure was much more subtle than that. First, Egypt was weighted down by a great burden of debt to British capitalists; then British business men and investors acquired numerous privileges and intrenched themselves in their special position by virtue of the Anglo-French control of Egyptian finance; the “advice” of British diplomatists came to possess greater force of law than the edicts of the Khedive; “disorders” always could be counted upon to furnish an excuse for military conquest and annexation, should that crude procedure eventually become necessary.[36] Might not Wilhelmstrasse tear a leaf out of Downing Street’s book of imperial experience?
There is a seeming inconsistency in this description of the British interests involved in the Bagdad Railway question. If British shipping might be seriously injured, if the imperial communications were to be endangered, if undisputed control of the Persian Gulf was essential to the safety of the Empire, if the defence of India was to be jeopardized, if a German protectorate might be established in Asia Minor—if all these were possibilities, how could the Balfour Government afford to temporize with the German concessionaires, holding out the hope of British assistance? Were Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne less fearful for the welfare and safety of the Empire than were the newspaper editors? Rather, of course, were they convinced that the very best way of forestalling any of these developments was to permit and encourage British participation in the financing of the Bagdad Railway Company.[37] Only thus could British trade hope to share in the economic renaissance of the Ottoman Empire; only thus could there be British representatives on the Board of Directors to insist that the Deutsche Bank confine its efforts to the economic development of Turkey, excluding all political arrières pensées. And it would not have required an imperialist of the experience of Mr. Balfour to imagine that dual ownership of the Bagdad Railway might have the same ultimate outcome as the Dual Control in Egypt. But blind antagonism toward Germany prevented the average Englishman from seeing the obvious advantages of not abandoning the Bagdad Railway to the exclusive control of German and French capitalists.
British Resistance is Stiffened by the Entente
One year after the failure of the Bagdad Railway negotiations of 1903, the age-old colonial rivalry of France and Great Britain was brought to a temporary close by the Entente Cordiale. It is not possible, with the information now at our disposal, to estimate with any degree of accuracy the influence which the Bagdad Railway exerted upon British imperialists in the final determination to reach an agreement with France. One may agree with an eminent French authority, however, that “neither in England nor in France is the principle of the understanding to be sought. Rather was it the fear of Germany which determined England—not only her King and Government, but the whole of her people—to draw nearer France.”[38] British fear and dislike of Germany were founded upon the phenomenal growth of German industry and overseas commerce, the rapid expansion of the German mercantile marine, the construction of the German navy, and the insistence of German diplomatists that Germany be not ignored in colonial matters. The Bagdad Railway did nothing to quiet those fears. It served, rather, to render precarious Britain’s position in the East.
In March, 1903, when the definitive Bagdad Railway concession was granted, British imperial affairs were in a far from satisfactory state. The termination of the Boer War had ended the fear that the British Empire might lose its hold on South Africa, but the sharp criticism of British conduct toward the Boers—criticism which came not only from abroad, but from malcontents at home—had dealt a severe blow to British prestige. The relentless advance of Russia in China, Persia, and Afghanistan gave cause for anxiety as to the safety of Britain’s possessions in the Middle and Far East. And although France had withdrawn gracefully from the Fashoda affair, it was by no means certain that Egypt had seen the last of French interference. Added to all of these difficulties was the proposed German-owned railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, flanking the Suez Canal and reaching out to the back door of India.
Under such circumstances it was small wonder that Great Britain took stock of her foreign policies. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 already had ended the British policy of aloofness, and there appeared to be no sound reason against the negotiation of other treaties which similarly would strengthen the British position in the East. The Bagdad Railway negotiations collapsed, but the agreement with France—which seemed far more difficult of achievement—was consummated without further delay. Three years later, in 1907, Great Britain came to an agreement with another of her rivals in the East—Russia. The Tsar, chastened by military defeat abroad and by revolution at home, recognized a British sphere of interest in Persia, relinquished all claims in Afghanistan, and acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet.[39] The understanding with France had assured the safety of the Suez Canal from an attack from the Sudan; the agreement with Russia removed the menace of an attack upon India from the north and northwest. Germany became Great Britain’s only formidable rival in the Near East.
Thus the Germans found themselves facing a powerful diplomatic obstacle to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Here was another instance, in their minds, of the “encirclement” of Germany by a hostile coalition—an “encirclement” not only on the Continent, but in a German sphere of imperial interest as well. A conspicuous German Oriental scholar said that the attitude of the other European powers toward the Bagdad Railway was the best proof of their enmity toward Germany. “Every single kilometre had to be fought for against the unyielding opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and France, who desired to frustrate any increase in the power of Turkey. Great Britain led and organized this opposition because she feared that India and Egypt were threatened by the Bagdad Railway.” If one wishes to understand the diplomatic history of the War, “he needs only to study the struggle for the Bagdad Railway—he will find a laboratory full of rich materials.”[40] Here was the tragedy of the Bagdad Railway—it was one of a number of imperial enterprises which together constituted a principal cause of the greatest war of modern times!
There were some ardent British imperialists who were out of sympathy with the popular opposition to the Bagdad Railway and with the policy of the Entente in obstructing the building of the line. Few Englishmen were more thoroughly acquainted with the Near East than Sir William Willcocks.[41] Basing his opinions upon an intimate, scientific study of conditions in Mesopotamia, he advocated full British coöperation with the Deutsche Bank in the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which he considered was the best means of transportation for Irak. He criticized the British Government for its short-sighted policy in the protection of the Lynch Brothers and their antiquated river service; “rivers,” he said, “are for irrigation, railways for communications.” Furthermore, “You cannot leave the waters of the rivers in their channels and irrigate the country with them. For navigation you may substitute railway transport; for the purpose of irrigation nothing can take the place of water.”[42] He believed that adequate irrigation of the Mesopotamian Valley would result in such a wave of prosperity for the country that it would induce immigration, particularly from Egypt and British India. It was not inconceivable, under such conditions, that Britain would fall heir to ancient Mesopotamia when the Ottoman Empire should disintegrate.[43] Sir William Willcocks was neither pacifist nor visionary; he, himself, was an empire-builder.