Another British imperialist who believed that Great Britain was pursuing entirely the wrong course in obstructing German economic penetration in Turkey was Sir Harry Johnston, novelist, explorer, lecturer, former member of the consular service. He believed in “The White Man’s Burden,” in the inevitable overrunning of the habitable globe by the Caucasian race. But he believed that the task of spreading white civilization to the four corners of the earth was such an herculean task, that “what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all the world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict.” His program for the settlement of the Near Eastern question was: “the promotion of peace and goodwill among white nations, to start with; and when the ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence have been nicely adjusted, then to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical, and sympathetic fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity.” Sir Harry believed that Great Britain was the last country in the world which ought to oppose the legitimate colonial aspirations of any other nation. There was every reason for the recognition of the economic and moral bases of German expansion, and any dog-in-the-manger attitude on the part of British statesmen, he was sure, would defeat the highest interests of the Empire.[44]
Applying his principles to the problem of Teutonic aggrandizement in the Ottoman Empire, Sir Harry Johnston advocated that the western European nations should acknowledge the Austrian Drang nach Osten as a legitimate and essential part of the German plans for a Central European Federation and for the economic development of Turkey. “The Turkish Sultanate would possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German councils. Germany in fact would become the power with the principal ‘say’ as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted as a separate state under French protection, and Judea might be offered to the Jews under an international guarantee. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, which already lies within the British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent Arab States. For the rest, Turkey-in-Asia—less Armenia, which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, prosperous, busy, and happy, for at least a century ahead.” Sir Harry believed that obstructionist tactics on the part of Great Britain would promote Prussianism within Germany, whereas, on the other hand, a frank recognition of Germany’s claims in the Near East would provide Central Europe with a safety valve which would “relieve pressure on France, Belgium, and Russia, paving the way for an understanding on Continental questions. Let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome German expansion with Kruger’s metaphor of the tortoise putting out his head. Germany and Austria are dangerous to the peace of the world only so long as they are penned up in their present limits.”[45]
One obvious disadvantage of the solution suggested by Sir Harry Johnston was its total indifference to the wishes of the Ottoman Turks. Apparently it was out of place to consider the welfare of Turkey in a discussion of the Bagdad Railway question! Certainly there were very few European statesmen who cared the least about the opinions of Turks in the disposition of Turkish property. Among the few was Viscount Morley, one of the old Gladstonian Liberals. Answering Lord Curzon, in the House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Lord Morley, a member of the Asquith cabinet, asserted the right of the Turks to determine their own destinies: “A great deal of nonsense,” he said, “is talked about the possible danger to British interests which may be involved some day or other when this railway is completed, and there have been whimsical apprehensions expressed. One is that it will constitute a standing menace to Egypt ... because it would establish [by junction with the Syrian and Hedjaz railways] uninterrupted communication between the Bosporus and Western Arabia. That would hardly be an argument for Turkey to abandon railway construction on her own soil, whereas it overlooks the fact that the Sinai Peninsula intervenes. You cannot get over this plain cardinal fact, that this railway is made on Turkish territory by virtue of an instrument granted by the Turkish Government.... I see articles in newspapers every day in which it is assumed that we have the right there to do what we please. That is not so. It is not our soil, it is Turkish soil, and the Germans alone are there because the Turkish Government has given them the right to be there.”[46]
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] Sir William Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route (London, 1857), passim; also The Euphrates Valley Route to India (London, 1882); F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition (London, 1868); The Proposed Imperial Ottoman Railway, a prospectus issued by the promoters (London, 1857); F. von Koeppen, Moltke in Kleinasien (Hanover, 1883).
[2] Cf. article “Suez Canal” in Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 26, p. 23. How similar were these objections to those subsequently advanced in opposition to the Bagdad Railway! Cf., e. g., a statement by Lord Curzon, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583 et seq.
[3] Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route, p. 225.
[4] Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1345; “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations,” in The Quarterly Review, Volume 228 (1917), pp. 489–490; Baron Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, The Strategical Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway (English translation by Sir C. W. Wilson, London, 1873); V. L. Cameron, Our Future Highway to India, 2 volumes (London, 1880); A. Bérard, La route de l’Inde par la vallée du Tigre et de l’Euphrate (Lyons, 1887); F. Jones, The Direct Highway to the East considered as the Perfection of Great Britain’s duties toward British India (London, 1873).
[5] Supra, pp. 66–67.
[6] Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Volume 120 (1903), pp. 1247–1248, 1358, 1361, 1364–1367, 1371–1374.