[20] Compiled from the Report of the Bagdad Railway Company, 1903–1914. Figures for the years 1904 and 1905 are incomplete and have therefore been omitted. It should be kept in mind in reading this table that the years 1912–1914 were abnormal, especially as regards passenger traffic, because of the two Balkan Wars and the Great War.
[21] The Levant Herald (Constantinople), October 25, 1893.
[22] Caillard, loc. cit., p. 439.
[23] Commerce Reports, No. 18d (1915), pp. 1–2.
[24] Cf. Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 26 (1908), pp. 475–477.
CHAPTER X
BARGAINS ARE STRUCK
The Kaiser and the Tsar Agree at Potsdam
During the early days of November, 1910, William II entertained at the Potsdam palace his fellow sovereign Nicholas II, Tsar of all the Russias. He extended his royal hospitality, also, to the recently chosen foreign ministers of Germany and Russia respectively—Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, next to the ambassador at Constantinople the Kaiser’s most competent expert on the tortuous affairs of the Near East; and M. Sazonov, subsequently to guide Russian foreign policy during the critical days of July, 1914. It was apparent even to the untutored that there was some political significance to the conference between the German Emperor and his distinguished guests, and the press was rife with speculation as to what the outcome would be. The answer was forthcoming on November 4, when it was announced that the Kaiser and the Tsar, with the advice and assistance of their foreign ministers, had reached an agreement on the Bagdad Railway question.
A short time later the terms of this Potsdam Agreement were made public. As outlined by the German Chancellor, with some subsequent modifications, they were as follows: 1. Germany recognized the Russian sphere of interest in northern Persia, as defined by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, and undertook not to seek or support concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, or other means of communication in the region; in other words, there was to be no change in the status quo. 2. Russia recognized the rights of the Deutsche Bank in the Bagdad Railway and agreed to withdraw all diplomatic opposition to the construction of the line and to the participation of foreign capital therein. 3. Russia agreed to obtain from Persia, as soon as possible, a concession for the construction of a railway from Teheran, the capital city, to Khanikin, an important commercial city on the Turco-Persian frontier. This new railway was to be linked with a branch of the Bagdad system to be constructed in accordance with the terms of the concession of 1903 from Sadijeh, on the Tigris, to Khanikin. Both lines were to be planned for through international traffic. If, for any reason, the Russian Government should fail to build the proposed railway from Teheran to Khanikin, it was understood that German promoters might then apply for the concession. 4. The policy of the economic open door was to be observed by both nations. Russia agreed not to discriminate against German trade in Persia, and the two nations pledged reciprocal equality of treatment on the new railway lines from Sadijeh to Teheran.[1]