In 1689, being now an Admiral, he commanded a fleet which, in connection with one under D’Estrées, was to support the cause of James II. This combined fleet succeeded in landing some few men and some munitions of war in Ireland, but, on the whole, the operation was a failure. While in command of the French fleet, in the year following, he had a battle with the Anglo-Dutch fleet, off the Isle of Wight, which was a most inglorious affair for the English, their Admiral, the Earl of Torrington, behaving with great want of spirit. The result was that Tourville captured and burned many of the English ships, not losing one himself. The sturdy Dutchmen made a good fight, and came off much better than their English allies.

In 1692, as above stated, Tourville was ordered to the fleet fitted for a descent on England; and now we shall take up the account of the battle once more.

The bulk of Tourville’s fleet was in Brest, and as the spring opened he received orders to sail from that port, enter the Channel, and attack the English fleet, no matter in what force they might be found, before they could be reinforced by the Dutch fleet, which was preparing to join them.

The French King and his ministers had convinced themselves that, in the event of a collision, a very large part of the English fleet would go over to the side of the Allies of James II.

All these projects and all these hopes were brought to naught, however, by head winds and bad weather, which detained Tourville in Brest harbor for more than a month, while the two squadrons from Rochefort and Toulon, which should have reinforced him, were prevented by the same bad weather from joining him in time.

Tourville, supposing that the same winds which had prevented his leaving Brest had facilitated the junction of the Allies, requested the permission of the Minister of Marine to remain in Brest until his expected reinforcements had joined him.

Pontchartrain, at that time minister, and exercising an enormous influence over the King, ordered him to fight the English fleet, whether he was strong or weak—“fort ou faible.” The minister added, “It does not become you to discuss the King’s orders. Your duty is to execute them, and to sail for the Channel at once. Send me word whether you intend to do so; and, if not, the King will place in command of the fleet some one who is more obedient and less cautious.”

This was certainly a most insolent and improper manner for the minister—who was, by the way, profoundly ignorant of naval matters—to address the greatest seaman which France, up to that time, had produced.

But Pontchartrain was noted for his arrogant and overbearing official manners. Tourville having at this time complained of the bad quality of the powder supplied him, and reporting that it could not be depended upon, a subordinate of the Ministry of Marine was deputed to reply to him that “if he found the powder did not carry far enough, he had only to approach his enemy a little nearer.” There seems to be absolutely something grotesque and ridiculous in such words, addressed in such a way, to such a man, had it not been for the sad termination of the action into which he was driven, against his own professional convictions.

Tourville put to sea with about fifty-six ships, in place of seventy-eight which had been promised him. He had hardly got to sea before Louis XIV received information that the Jacobite plot had completely failed, and that it was reported that Marlborough and several other persons of distinction had been arrested; and that the Dutch and English fleets had effected a junction.