Man’s wickedness.
236. In the case of men free will comes accompanied by a heavy burden of responsibility; for by its exercise men have defied the gods and brought evil into the world. In vain they accuse the gods and destiny, when their own perverseness has exaggerated their destiny, as Homer bears witness:
‘Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us they say comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness of their own hearts, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained[88].’
‘Through the blindness of their own hearts they perished, fools[89].’
Equally in vain it is that they protest against the penalties prescribed by the lawgiver for acts to which they allege fate has drawn them[90]. Of their wrongdoing the ‘principal cause’ lies in their own natures; if these are from the first wholesome, the blows of fate are deadened; if they are boorish and undisciplined, they rush of themselves into sin and error[91]. Into the further question, whether a man is responsible for his own nature, our authorities do not enter. It is sufficient that in ethics a way will be pointed out, by which all men, if only they consent to undergo the necessary training, may bring their wills into harmony with the will of the universe. As to the animals, they act upon impulse, but cannot be said in a strict sense to possess will, nor are they proper subjects for praise and blame.
No result without cause.
237. Thus free will, which at first sight appears equivalent to the negation of cause, is by the Stoics identified with the highest type of cause. Action without cause (τὸ ἀναίτιον), effect which is self-caused (τὸ αὐτόματον), are totally denied[92]. Even if a man be given the choice between two actions which appear exactly equivalent, as when he must begin walking either with the right or with the left foot, there is always a cause which determines between them, though (as in all cases of ‘chance’) it is not discernible by human reasoning[93]. In this way destiny, cause, will are all brought into harmony; the dualism (which after all cannot be entirely avoided) is thrust out of sight. ‘All things take place according to destiny, but not all things according to necessity[94]’; thus is saved the principle of free choice (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). In other words, the Stoic fixes his attention on the pulsating, living, willing powers of the universe, and refuses to dwell upon any blind non-moral unbending ‘necessity’ of things, even whilst he admits that such necessity is there.
Pons Stoicus.
238. Now that the various steps have been decided upon, by which our philosophy progresses from physics to ethics, it remains to connect them by a pathway in the form of a chain of reasoning. We cannot affirm that the steps have been reached by any logical process, or that the show of reasoning makes them any safer to tread in. But the logical form is a convenient method of impressing dogmatic instruction on the memory, and if it cannot remove difficulties inherent in the subject-matter, it at least so distributes them that they may be overlooked by the zealous and defied by the adventurous. Thus then the argument runs:—