‘If all things are determined by fate, then the ordering of the universe must be smooth and unhindered; if this is so, there must be an ordered universe; and if so, there must be gods. Now if there are gods, the gods are good; and if they are good, goodness exists; and if goodness exists, so also does wisdom. And goodness and wisdom are the same for gods and for men[95]. If this is so, there must be a science of things to be done and to be avoided, that is of right actions and of sins. But right actions are praiseworthy, and sins blameable. Things praiseworthy deserve reward, and things blameable deserve punishment.
Therefore if all things are determined by fate, there must be rewards and punishments[96].’
All this chain of argument is convincing to the man who is already a Stoic; to his opponent it seems to display its weakness at every joint.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The three explanations are very clearly stated by Seneca; ‘dicet aliquis—quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? quid prodest, si deus rector est? quid prodest, si casus imperat?... quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt, philosophandum est; sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disponit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet’ Sen. Ep. 16, 4 and 5.
[2] e.g. Aen. vi 376.
[3] ‘quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans’ R. N. v 108.
[4] ‘vaga volubilisque Fortuna’ Cic. Milo 26, 69; ‘fortuna ... amica varietati constantiam respuit’ N. D. ii 16, 43.
[5] Seneca as in note 1.
[6] Diog. L. vii 149; ‘[Stoici] omnia fato fieri dicunt’ Cic. de Fato 15, 33.