309. The Stoic view of slavery can readily be inferred. Without proposing the immediate abolition of this social institution, the Stoics treated it as essentially contrary to nature[44]. The earliest teachers seem to have passed over the subject in silence; Panaetius (as might be expected from his social position), justified slavery by the arguments of Plato and Aristotle in exceptional cases: ‘all those who through the infirmity of their nature are unfit to govern themselves, are rightly made slaves’[45]. According to this theory we may speak of a ‘natural slave’ (φύσει δοῦλος), who as such can no more have rights in the community than the lower animals. The true Stoic theory appears however to be formulated by a definition of Chrysippus, who says that a slave is a ‘labourer hired for life[46].’ This definition makes of slavery a contract, to which there are two parties; and Seneca rightly uses this definition to argue that the relations of master to slave are those of man to man, and that as the master may wrong his slave, so the slave may do a service to his master[47]. All this is really implied in the dogma that ‘women and slaves may become philosophers,’ as is realized by the Church Father Lactantius[48].
Constitutions.
310. The Stoic principles of politics may be realized under any form of government, and the theory of Constitutions, like that of grammar, belongs to a neutral ground on which philosophers of different schools may work in harmony. The Peripatetics appear first to have taken up this study; of the Stoics Diogenes of Babylon[49], who himself acted as a political representative of Athens, is stated to have shown interest in this subject; and after him Panaetius developed a complete theory, of which the substance is preserved for us in Cicero’s de Re publica[50]. According to this theory, which Cicero puts in the mouth of Scipio Africanus, surrounded by Roman Stoics of distinction such as Laelius, Tubero, and Furius Philo, the best constitution is one in which the elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are combined, though a bias remains in favour of monarchy[51]. This mixed constitution, according to the teaching of Panaetius and his pupil Polybius, is best illustrated in the Roman state[52]; whereas tyranny, the perversion of monarchy, is the worst of all governments. By such reasoning the Roman nobles of the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. alike persuaded themselves easily that Stoic teaching supported the position of the republican party. But in fact they were maintaining Peripatetic theories of government, and the real Stoic theory was far more in accord with that practice of the principate, according to which all citizens are treated with respect, and the government of them is placed in the hands of men selected for their personal merit. We shall discuss the whole question of the relation of Stoicism to Roman politics in a later chapter[53]; but we may notice here that those Stoics practically abandoned the theory of providence who looked into the history of their own times with the intention of seeing nowhere the ‘king,’ and everywhere the ‘tyrant.’ On the other hand the practical statesmen who set about to re-create Roman law on the principle of substituting everywhere human rights for class privileges were men thoroughly imbued with the Stoic spirit, whether or not they were avowed disciples of this philosophy.
The citizen.
311. We must therefore maintain that the true Stoic state, whether it be called monarchy or democracy, calls for a revolt against nationalism, antiquity, custom, pride, and prejudice; and a new construction based upon universal reason and individual liberty. For the realization of this state it is first necessary to build up the individual, to fill his mind with the conception of reason and love, to strengthen his will to a true independence: for it is not buying or selling that makes the slave, but the will within[54]. All are in truth slaves except the wise man; for freedom is the power of directing one’s own actions[55]. Here then we pass from the community to the individual, from politics to ethics in the narrower sense.
The supreme good.
312. For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a part of nature, into harmony with the whole. Whether we think of destiny, of providence, of the gods, or of the state, success for the individual is to agree and to cooperate; to struggle and to rebel is to fail. This success is the end (τέλος) for which man exists, the supreme good (summum bonum), the ultimate good (ultimum bonorum), that towards which all other right action works, whilst it works itself for no other end[56]. Its name in the individual is virtue (ἀρετή, virtus), and it is an active and firmly-established disposition of the soul[57]. It follows from the monistic principle that the end for man is one, and that virtue is one; but nevertheless each is capable of being regarded in many aspects. The harmony of the ethical end with other parts of the Stoic philosophy is marked by such phrases as ‘life according to nature[58],’ the rule ‘keep company with God[59],’ and the identification of virtue and reason[60].
Consistency with nature.
313. Because virtue is one thing and not many, it makes a man’s life one consistent whole, and stands in sharp contrast to the changing and undecided ways of the crowd. Virtue is therefore frequently defined as consistency in life[61], an even steady course of action[62], self-consistency[63], a principle in agreement with its applications[64]. The opposite of virtue is the unending restlessness and indecision of the man in the crowd[65]. Accordingly we are told that the earliest Stoics thought it a sufficient definition of wisdom or virtue that it was something simple[66]; and similarly Zeno said that the end of life was ‘to live consistently[67].’ To this short definition the words ‘with nature’ were soon added[68], whereby the distinctiveness of the original definition was diminished: for all the philosophical schools are agreed that the right life must be guided by nature (φύσει), not by convention (θέσει). From the time of Chrysippus the relation of right living to nature was further analyzed. Chrysippus defined the ‘nature’ referred to as ‘universal and human nature[69],’ thereby further approximating to the teaching of rival schools; but on the other hand he gave this new and more characteristic explanation ‘to live virtuously is to live according to scientific knowledge of the phenomena of nature, doing nothing which the Universal Law forbids, which is the Right Reason which pervades all things, and is the same as Zeus, the Lord of the ordering of this world[70].’ Diogenes of Babylon introduced the words ‘to take a reasonable course in choosing or refusing things in accordance with nature[71].’ Antipater’s definition is ‘to live with preference for what is natural, and aversion to what is against nature[72],’ thus throwing the stress on the doctrine of the ‘things of high degree[73].’ Panaetius made a distinct step forward when he admitted the claims of universal nature to be supreme, but (subject to them) held that each man should follow the pointings of his individual nature[74]; this teaching however comes rather near to naming a twofold end. Cicero follows Panaetius in his de Officiis[75], but in the de Finibus adheres more closely to Chrysippus[76], and Seneca agrees with him in laying stress on the need of scientific knowledge of natural events[77]. In the main therefore ‘life according to nature’ means to the Stoics life in accordance with the general movement of the universe, to which the particular strivings of the individual must be subordinated.