Roman Stoicism / being lectures on the history of the Stoic philosophy with special reference to its development within the Roman Empire

by Edward Vernon Arnold

Obedience to God.

314. From the religious standpoint virtue is willing cooperation with the deity, in preference to that unwilling cooperation to which even evil-doers are forced. This conception, first set forth by Cleanthes in a poem that we have quoted above[78], is enforced by Seneca and Epictetus also in varying phrases. ‘I do not obey God,’ says Seneca, ‘I agree with him. I go with him heart and soul, and not because I must[79].’ With a slight change of language this leads us to the paradox that ‘obedience to God is liberty[80].’ ‘I have placed my impulses,’ says Epictetus, ‘in obedience to God. Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is my wish also. Does he not wish it? I do not wish it[81].’ The personal bent of Epictetus leads him to develope this idea in the direction of suffering rather than of acting. ‘If the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would cooperate towards his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him in accordance with the universal arrangement[82].’ The proof that this must be so rests on the unity of the Divine and individual purposes: ‘Good cannot be one thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another thing[83].’

Social duty.

315. It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the individual is that disposition which will make him the best possible member of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis. Yet this is everywhere implied. In the first place the wise man will take part in the life of the community[84], he will marry and bring up children[85]. In the second place the virtue of man differs first from the corresponding quality in the animals in that man is formed by nature for social union; hence his reason only comes into play simultaneously with the recognition that he is a member of a community, and as such bound to prefer the good of the whole to that of a part. ‘Nature,’ says Panaetius, ‘through reason unites man to man, so that they have a common bond in conversation and life; it induces men to approve and take part in public gatherings and festivals, and to collect the materials for a social and cultivated life for themselves, their children, and all whom they hold dear[86].’

Health of soul.

316. Virtue, as a disposition of the soul[87], reflects all the aspects in which the soul itself is regarded. Since the principate is both wisdom and will, so virtue is wisdom, according to the paradox of Socrates and the Cynics[88]. Because virtue is wisdom, it can be taught[89]; in fact, it can only be acquired by teaching; and equally evil-doing can be cured by teaching[90]. But no less virtue is will. Cleanthes emphasized this aspect, and identified virtue both with the Socratic ‘strength of character’ and with the Stoic ‘tone[91].’ In so far as virtue is will, it is to be acquired by constant practice[92]. A true judgment is endangered by hasty assent; a healthy will by slackness of the soul’s sinews. In the Stoic system vigour and strength of mind is everywhere identified with the ‘true tone’ (εὐτονία)[93]; the possibility of overstrain is not considered. But in the development of the ideal we have two varying aspects of virtue presented to us. At one moment we see the man of action, engaged in the thick of the battle, sun-browned, dusty, horny-handed[94]; with this model before him we find Musonius objecting altogether to relaxation of moral tone as being equivalent to its loss[95]. At another moment we see the man of quiet conviction, who goes his way unmoved in the face of the howls of the mob or the threats of the tyrant[96]; he is distinguished by a mental calm[97] which no storms can shake. Any discrepancy between these views is finally reconciled by introducing a comparison between the soul and the body. The philosophers had at all times been greatly influenced by the theories and practice of the physicians; and they were proud to call themselves physicians of the soul.’ Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of the soul to those of the body[98]. Equally there must be a healthy state of the soul corresponding to that of the body, in which all its parts are in harmony[99]. Hence in the Stoic prayer health of soul is asked for, side by side with health of body[100]; and Seneca bases a singularly complete statement of the Stoic conception of happiness upon a permanently healthy condition of the mind[101].

Virtue lies in intention.

317. Virtue is a state of the mind, a disposition of the soul; it is not an act. Hence the bent of the mind (inclinatio), its aim (intentio), its desire (βούλησις, voluntas) is everything; the performance through the organs of the body is nothing[102]. This Stoic dogma is to-day so familiar in divinity, law, and society that it is not easy to realize how paradoxical it seemed when first stated. By its proclamation the Stoics defied the whole system of tabu by which the ancient world prohibited certain acts as in themselves dangerous and detestable; a system still in force in many departments of life and theoretically defended by the ‘intuitive system of morals.’ The defenders of tabu were bitterly affronted, and indignantly asked questions which mostly concerned the sexual relations, with regard to which tabu appears to have been at the time most vigorous. ‘Is there nothing wrong in cannibalism? in foul language? in incest? in the accursed relations with boy favourites (παιδικά)?’ To these questions firm-minded Stoics were bound to give a negative answer, thereby laying themselves open to the charge of being defenders of immorality. This charge however is never to be taken seriously; the high practical morality of the Stoics placed them beyond reproach. But it was also easy to raise a laugh by quotations from these austere moralists which sounded like a defence of licentiousness. The solution of the difficulty in each individual case follows exactly the same lines as in politics; and there is the same divergence of method between the early Stoics, who assert their principles at all costs, and those of the transition period, who are intent upon adapting them to the existing conditions of society. Here we need only discuss the questions of principle, as we deal with questions affecting practical life in another chapter[103].

Tabus.

318. The principal tabus affecting the individual have to do with cannibalism, the sexual relations, nudity, and obscenity. Of the first we have already spoken; the other three appeared to the Stoics partly due to inherited prejudices, partly to the theory that the body is in itself vile and corrupt. Of neither point of view could the Stoics approve. Hence their repeated assertions that no sexual act, whether commonly described as natural or as unnatural, is in itself to be condemned, but only according as it is seemly or unseemly for the individual[104]. It was perhaps unnecessary to explain to Greeks that the naked body is in itself no offensive sight, but doubtless the Stoics had to make this clear to their Oriental pupils; Zeno at any rate laid down the principle when he said that men and women should wear the same clothes (meaning such as nature requires for warmth and not such as fashion prescribes), and hide no part of the body[105]. As to decency of language, it did not occur to the Stoics to discuss this question in connexion with the history of literature. Since truth is always good, and the very purpose of language is to express truth, a wise man will always say straight out what he needs to say[106].