Virtue in its applications.
319. Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between the ethical principles of the Stoics and the Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid defiance to external circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the universe. To the Stoics virtue is but one expression of that universal reason which is equally at work in the universe and in the human mind. The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into touch with circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this arises their doctrine that virtue is bound up with the study both of universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things indifferent there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must avoid. The critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this doctrine as an afterthought[107], suggested by practical difficulties, and alien from the original teaching of Zeno. This seems to be a misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said: ‘some things are good, some are evil, some indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice, fortitude, everything that is virtue or an aspect of virtue; evil are folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, riches and wealth, disease, health, and so forth[108].’ But there is a difference between a principle and its application; and this very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno was therefore quite consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of this difference.
Worth and Unworth.
320. This secondary difference is termed by the Stoics a difference of worth (ἀξία, aestimatio)[109]. Health, life, riches, have positive worth in greater or less degree; disease, death, poverty, have negative worth (ἀπαξία, inaestimabile)[110]. Between these lie things that are absolutely indifferent, as, for example, whether the number of hairs on one’s head is odd or even[111], or whether we take up one or the other of two coins that have the same general appearance and the same stamp[112]. Even here a slight distinction has to be made; as to whether the hairs on the head are odd or even in number we have not the slightest concern; but in the matter of the coins we must make a choice, and that quickly. Let us then settle the matter anyhow, by chance as common folk say; ‘for a reason that is not clear to us,’ as the Stoics say, not willing to admit an effect without a cause, and yet leaving the matter much where it was[113]. And now as to the things that have ‘worth’; it is clear that in some sense they are ‘according to nature,’ and in the same sense those things that have ‘negative worth’ are opposed to nature[114]; and the former in some way approximate to the character of the good[115]. It is then necessary to describe them by some term other than ‘good.’ Zeno selected the term προηγμένον ‘of high degree,’ which Cicero translates variously by producta, promota, praecipua, praelata, and praeposita. This term, we are told, Zeno borrowed from court life: ‘for no one would think of calling a king “of high degree,” but only those who are of a rank next to his, though far below[116].’ The opposites were described as ἀποπροηγμένα (remota, reiecta) ‘things of low degree[117].’ Seneca, who states the theory with great clearness[118], commonly uses the handier terms commoda (‘advantages’) and incommoda (‘disadvantages’)[119]. In their treatment of the separate matters which fall under these divisions the Stoics were in close agreement with the Peripatetic theory of natural ends (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν)[120]: but their loyalty to their own school came into question, if they actually termed them ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ as Chrysippus thought permissible if sufficient precautions were taken[121], and as Seneca often describes them in his less careful moods[122].
The aim of virtue.
321. The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of ‘advantages’ is essential to their system, because without it virtue has no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as this theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent and distinctive character, that it aims at securing ‘advantages’ and avoiding ‘disadvantages[124].’ Now we are able to enlarge, though we do not alter, our definition of the supreme good; the ‘consistent life,’ the ‘life consistent with nature,’ is the ‘life which is accompanied by a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature’; to which words we now add ‘choosing those things which are in accordance with nature, and avoiding those things which are against nature[125].’ Nevertheless, virtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the hitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing his quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow at the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would seem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those circumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we call ‘the play of fortune’) he gain no ‘advantage’ at all, but suffer dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This is the Stoic doctrine of the ‘sufficiency of virtue,’ expressed in the language of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole ethical system; and its force is really intensified by the doctrine of ‘advantages,’ which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.
Sufficiency of virtue.
322. The doctrine of the sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια, sufficientia) of virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though in ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ‘virtue is sufficient for happiness,’ or in other words ‘virtue needs but herself for a happy life[127].’ Chrysippus maintains that there are only three logical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or both[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is not made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue does not permit addition (accessio)[129]. In the transition period Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a little importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but, as we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full accord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius held to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust the direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious to assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the conclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached importance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that they held health, strength, and estate to be ‘needful’ for happiness, thus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as implying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that ‘the wise man needs nothing, but has use for everything[135].’ But any faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good by the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the paradox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb ‘virtue is its own reward[136]’; in rhetorical exuberance ‘virtue can defy death, ill fortune, and tyranny[137]’; it is ‘independent even of the deity[138]’; and ‘no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].’ Epictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely scholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the practical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single and complete in itself[142].
Virtue and the virtues.